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mirror of https://github.com/speed47/spectre-meltdown-checker synced 2024-12-22 20:33:56 +01:00
Commit Graph

430 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Stéphane Lesimple
dcf540888d enh: mock: implement reading from /proc/cmdline 2019-11-17 13:36:52 -08:00
Stéphane Lesimple
9911c243b2 feat: use --live with --kernel/--config/--map to override file detection in live mode 2019-11-17 13:36:52 -08:00
Stéphane Lesimple
cb279a49ec enh(taa): more complete version 2019-11-13 01:07:10 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple
c100ce4c0d mcedb: update from v112 to v130 2019-11-12 21:19:03 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple
4741b06160 fix: batch mode for TAA 2019-11-12 21:16:21 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple
e0a1c2ec77 fix shellcheck warnings 2019-11-12 20:06:12 +01:00
Agata Gruza
c18b88d745 Fixing typo 2019-11-12 19:40:47 +01:00
Agata Gruza
d623524342 Added support for TAA related vulnerabilities 2019-11-12 19:40:47 +01:00
Stéphane Lesimple
f5ec320fe5 enh: rework the vuln logic of MDS with --paranoid (fixes #307) 2019-09-22 04:02:33 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple
cc224c0522 fix: mocking value for read_msr
we were returning the mocking value before actually setting it.
also remove spaces around the returned value (no behavior change)
2019-09-22 01:38:18 +02:00
Corey Wright
0518604fe6 Use kernel_err to avoid misreporting missing Linux kernel image
When checking for CVE-2017-5715 (i.e. `check_CVE_2017_5715_linux()`),
if we can't inspect (with `readelf`) or decompress the Linux kernel
image, then we report there is no kernel image (i.e. `we need the
kernel image` or `kernel image missing`, respectively), which confuses
users when the associated file exists.

Instead use `kernel_err` to provide a correct and detailed description
of the problem (e.g. `missing '...' tool, please install it, usually
it's in the '...' package`), so the user can take the prescribed
action.
2019-09-22 01:09:58 +02:00
Erik Zettel
d57fecec91 spectre-meltdown-checker.sh: fix typos 2019-09-20 23:50:52 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple
f835f4d07d Explain that Enhanced IBRS is better for performance than classic IBRS 2019-08-16 12:53:39 +02:00
Agata Gruza
482d6c200a Enhanced IBRS capabilities
There are two flavors of IBRS: plain and enhanced. This patch tells which flavor of IBRS is in use.
2019-08-16 12:53:39 +02:00
David Guglielmi
91d0699029 update MCEdb from v111 to v112 2019-06-03 22:49:03 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple
fcc4ff4de2 update MCEdb from v110 to v111, bump to v0.42 2019-05-24 22:49:45 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple
0bd38ddda0 enh: -v -v now implies --dump-mock-data 2019-05-24 11:36:39 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple
e83dc818cd feat(mds): implement FreeBSD mitigation detection 2019-05-24 11:17:04 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple
d69ea67101 feat(mock): add --dump-mock-data 2019-05-24 10:49:40 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple
dfe0d10f2a fix(mds): remove useless display of MD_CLEAR info in non-hw section 2019-05-24 10:20:48 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple
58a5acfdbb fix(bsd): read_msr returned data in an incorrect format 2019-05-24 09:33:56 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple
ccb4dbef7c enh(mock): avoid reading the sysfs interface outside sys_interface_check() for higher mocking coverage 2019-05-24 09:28:18 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple
afbb26277f feat(mock): add mocking functionality to help reproducing issues under specific CPUs 2019-05-24 09:28:18 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple
77b34d48c6 fix(mds): check MDS_NO bit in is_cpu_mds_free() 2019-05-24 09:28:18 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple
497efe6a82 fix(l1tf): RDCL_NO bit didn't take precedence for vulnerability check on some Intel CPUs 2019-05-24 09:28:18 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple
62b46df4e7 fix(l1tf): remove libvirtd from hypervisor detection (#278) 2019-05-18 14:22:42 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple
7d1f269bed fix(mds): AMD confirms they're not vulnerable 2019-05-16 11:31:28 +02:00
Erich Ritz
4f9ca803c8 Fix help text (#285)
* fix --help message

Commit 7b72c20f89 added help text for the
--cve switch, and the "can be specified multiple times" note got
associated with the --cve switch instead of staying with the --variant
switch.  Restore the line to belong to the --variant switch help
message.

* Add new variants to error message

Commit 8e870db4f5 added new variants but
did not add them to the error message that listed the allowable
variants.  Add them now.
2019-05-15 19:34:51 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple
5788cec18b fix(mds): ARM and CAVIUM are not thought to be vulnerable 2019-05-15 10:56:49 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple
ae56ec0bc5 bump to v0.41 2019-05-15 09:57:28 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple
871443c9db fix typos in README 2019-05-15 00:28:55 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple
8fd4e3ab01 fix(xen): remove xenbus and xenwatch as they also exist in domU 2019-05-15 00:23:05 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple
de793a7204 feat(mds): more verbose info about kernel support and microcode support for mitigation 2019-05-15 00:21:08 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple
11790027d3 feat(mds): add alias ZombieLoad for CVE-2018-12130 2019-05-14 21:42:36 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple
5939c38c5c update mcedb from v109 to v110 to better detect MDS microcodes 2019-05-14 20:31:27 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple
db7d3206fd feat(mds): add detection of availability of MD_CLEAR instruction 2019-05-14 20:30:47 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple
1d13a423b8 adjust README 2019-05-14 20:16:01 +02:00
Agata Gruza
8e870db4f5 Added support for MDS related vulnerabilities (#282) 2019-05-14 19:21:20 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple
d547ce4ab4 fix(ssb): fix error when no process uses prctl to set ssb mitigation
fixes #281
2019-05-13 15:35:58 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple
d187827841 enh(vmm): add Xen daemons detection 2019-05-08 20:44:54 +02:00
Hans-Joachim Kliemeck
2e304ec617 enh(xen): improvements for xen systems (#270)
* add mitigation detection for l1tf for xen based systems
* add information for hardware mitigation
* add xen support for meltdown
2019-05-07 20:35:52 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple
fcc04437e8 update builtin MCEdb from v96 to v109 2019-05-07 20:29:59 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple
d31a9810e6 enhance previous commit logic 2019-05-05 20:09:53 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple
4edb867def fix(vmm): revert to checking the running processes to detect a hypervisor
More information available on #278
2019-05-05 20:04:25 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple
1264b1c7a3 chore: more shellcheck 0.6 fixes 2019-05-05 18:34:09 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple
7beca1ac50 fix: invalid names in json batch mode (fixes #279) 2019-05-05 18:15:41 +02:00
David
8ad10e15d3 chore: Comply with Shellcheck SC2209 (#280) 2019-05-05 17:31:18 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple
bfa4de96e6 enh(l1tf): in paranoid mode, assume we're running a hypervisor unless stated otherwise
This change ensures we check for SMT and advise the user to disable it for maximum security.
Doing this, we'll help users mitigate a whole range of vulnerabilities taking advantage of SMT to attack purely from userland other userland processes, as seen in CVE-2018-5407 (also see #261)
2019-04-21 14:05:43 +02:00
Stéphane Lesimple
b022b27a51 feat(ssbd): in live mode, report whether the mitigation is active (fix #210) 2019-04-20 20:27:45 +02:00
Dario Faggioli
c4bae6ee6a IBRS kernel reported active even if sysfs has "IBRS_FW" only (#275) (#276)
On a (pre-SkyLake) system, where /sys/.../vulnerabilities/spectre_v2 is
"Mitigation: Full generic retpoline, IBPB: conditional, IBRS_FW, RSB filling"

the tool, incorrectly, reports, a couple of lines above:
* IBRS enabled and active:  YES  (for kernel and firmware code)

Use '\<IBRS\>', as suggested by @jirislaby, in upstream issue #275
(https://github.com/speed47/spectre-meltdown-checker/issues/275) when
checking whether IBRS is enabled/active for the kernel.

With that, the output becomes:
* IBRS enabled and active:  YES  (for firmware code only)

which is actually the case.

I double checked that, if the same kernel is used on a post-SkyLake
hardware, which on openSUSE uses IBRS as, even with this change, the
tool (this time correctly) reports:
* IBRS enabled and active:  YES  (for kernel and firmware code)
2019-04-20 14:04:29 +02:00