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https://github.com/speed47/spectre-meltdown-checker
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feat(variant1): detect vanilla mitigation
Implement detection of mitigation for Variant 1 that is being pushed on vanilla kernel. Current name of the patch: "spectre variant1 mitigations for tip/x86/pti" (v6) Also detect some distros that already backported this patch without modifying the vulnerabilities sysfs hierarchy. This detection is more reliable than the LFENCE one, trust it and skip the LFENCE heuristic if a match is found.
This commit is contained in:
Stéphane Lesimple
parent
6e544d6055
commit
e05ec5c85f
@ -1140,51 +1140,101 @@ check_variant1()
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msg=''
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if sys_interface_check "/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v1"; then
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# this kernel has the /sys interface, trust it over everything
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# v0.33+: don't. some kernels have backported the array_index_mask_nospec() workaround without
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# modifying the vulnerabilities/spectre_v1 file. that's bad. we can't trust it when it says Vulnerable :(
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# see "silent backport" detection at the bottom of this func
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sys_interface_available=1
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elif [ "$opt_sysfs_only" != 1 ]; then
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fi
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if [ "$opt_sysfs_only" != 1 ]; then
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# no /sys interface (or offline mode), fallback to our own ways
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_info_nol "* Checking count of LFENCE opcodes in kernel: "
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_info_nol "* Kernel has array_index_mask_nospec: "
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# vanilla: look for the Linus' mask aka array_index_mask_nospec()
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# that is inlined at least in raw_copy_from_user (__get_user_X symbols)
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#mov PER_CPU_VAR(current_task), %_ASM_DX
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#cmp TASK_addr_limit(%_ASM_DX),%_ASM_AX
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#jae bad_get_user
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# /* array_index_mask_nospec() are the 2 opcodes that follow */
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#+sbb %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_DX
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#+and %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_AX
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#ASM_STAC
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# x86 64bits: jae(0x0f 0x83 0x?? 0x?? 0x?? 0x??) sbb(0x48 0x19 0xd2) and(0x48 0x21 0xd0)
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# x86 32bits: cmp(0x3b 0x82 0x?? 0x?? 0x00 0x00) jae(0x73 0x??) sbb(0x19 0xd2) and(0x21 0xd0)
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if [ -n "$vmlinux_err" ]; then
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msg="couldn't check ($vmlinux_err)"
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status=UNK
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pstatus yellow UNKNOWN
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pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't check ($vmlinux_err)"
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elif ! which perl >/dev/null 2>&1; then
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pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "missing 'perl' binary, please install it"
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else
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if ! which objdump >/dev/null 2>&1; then
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msg="missing 'objdump' tool, please install it, usually it's in the binutils package"
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status=UNK
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pstatus yellow UNKNOWN
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perl -ne '/\x0f\x83....\x48\x19\xd2\x48\x21\xd0/ and $found++; END { exit($found) }' "$vmlinux"; ret=$?
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if [ $ret -gt 0 ]; then
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pstatus green YES "$ret occurence(s) found of 64 bits array_index_mask_nospec()"
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v1_mask_nospec=1
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else
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# here we disassemble the kernel and count the number of occurrences of the LFENCE opcode
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# in non-patched kernels, this has been empirically determined as being around 40-50
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# in patched kernels, this is more around 70-80, sometimes way higher (100+)
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# v0.13: 68 found in a 3.10.23-xxxx-std-ipv6-64 (with lots of modules compiled-in directly), which doesn't have the LFENCE patches,
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# so let's push the threshold to 70.
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nb_lfence=$(objdump -d "$vmlinux" | grep -wc lfence)
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if [ "$nb_lfence" -lt 70 ]; then
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msg="only $nb_lfence opcodes found, should be >= 70, heuristic to be improved when official patches become available"
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status=VULN
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pstatus red NO
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perl -ne '/\x3b\x82..\x00\x00\x73.\x19\xd2\x21\xd0/ and $found++; END { exit($found) }' "$vmlinux"; ret=$?
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if [ $ret -gt 0 ]; then
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pstatus green YES "$ret occurence(s) found of 32 bits array_index_mask_nospec()"
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v1_mask_nospec=1
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else
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msg="$nb_lfence opcodes found, which is >= 70, heuristic to be improved when official patches become available"
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status=OK
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pstatus green YES
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pstatus red NO
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fi
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fi
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fi
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if [ "$opt_verbose" -ge 2 ] || [ "$v1_mask_nospec" != 1 ]; then
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# this is a slow heuristic and we don't need it if we already know the kernel is patched
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# but still show it in verbose mode
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_info_nol "* Checking count of LFENCE opcodes in kernel: "
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if [ -n "$vmlinux_err" ]; then
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pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't check ($vmlinux_err)"
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else
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if ! which objdump >/dev/null 2>&1; then
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pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "missing 'objdump' tool, please install it, usually it's in the binutils package"
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else
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# here we disassemble the kernel and count the number of occurrences of the LFENCE opcode
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# in non-patched kernels, this has been empirically determined as being around 40-50
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# in patched kernels, this is more around 70-80, sometimes way higher (100+)
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# v0.13: 68 found in a 3.10.23-xxxx-std-ipv6-64 (with lots of modules compiled-in directly), which doesn't have the LFENCE patches,
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# so let's push the threshold to 70.
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nb_lfence=$(objdump -d "$vmlinux" | grep -wc 'lfence')
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if [ "$nb_lfence" -lt 70 ]; then
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pstatus red NO "only $nb_lfence opcodes found, should be >= 70, heuristic to be improved when official patches become available"
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else
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v1_lfence=1
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pstatus green YES "$nb_lfence opcodes found, which is >= 70, heuristic to be improved when official patches become available"
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fi
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fi
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fi
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fi
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else
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# we have no sysfs but were asked to use it only!
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msg="/sys vulnerability interface use forced, but it's not available!"
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status=UNK
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fi
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# report status
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cve='CVE-2017-5753'
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if ! is_cpu_vulnerable 1; then
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# override status & msg in case CPU is not vulnerable after all
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msg="your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not vulnerable"
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status=OK
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pvulnstatus $cve OK "your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not vulnerable"
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elif [ -z "$msg" ]; then
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# if msg is empty, sysfs check didn't fill it, rely on our own test
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if [ "$v1_mask_nospec" = 1 ]; then
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pvulnstatus $cve OK "Kernel source has been patched to mitigate the vulnerability (array_index_mask_nospec)"
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elif [ "$v1_lfence" = 1 ]; then
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pvulnstatus $cve OK "Kernel source has PROBABLY been patched to mitigate the vulnerability (LFENCE opcodes heuristic)"
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elif [ "$vmlinux_err" ]; then
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pvulnstatus $cve UNK "Couldn't find kernel image or tools missing to execute the checks"
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else
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pvulnstatus $cve VULN "Kernel source needs to be patched to mitigate the vulnerability"
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fi
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else
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if [ "$msg" = "Vulnerable" ] && [ "$v1_mask_nospec" = 1 ]; then
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pvulnstatus $cve OK "Kernel source has been patched to mitigate the vulnerability (silent backport of array_index_mask_nospec)"
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else
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[ "$msg" = "Vulnerable" ] && msg="Kernel source needs to be patched to mitigate the vulnerability"
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pvulnstatus $cve "$status" "$msg"
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fi
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fi
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# report status
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pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5753 "$status" "$msg"
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}
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###################
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