mirror of
https://github.com/speed47/spectre-meltdown-checker
synced 2024-11-14 01:53:38 +01:00
implement offline mode and help
This commit is contained in:
Stéphane Lesimple
parent
75332e6e0f
commit
d73a24cb5b
83
README.md
83
README.md
@ -1,51 +1,96 @@
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Spectre & Meltdown Checker
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==========================
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A simple shell script to tell if your Linux installation is vulnerable
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against the 3 "speculative execution" CVEs:
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A simple shell script to tell if your Linux installation is vulnerable against the 3 "speculative execution" CVEs.
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CVE-2017-5753 bounds check bypass (Spectre Variant 1)
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Without options, it'll inspect you currently running kernel.
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You can also specify a kernel image on the command line, if you'd like to inspect a kernel you're not running.
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The script will do its best to detect mitigations, including backported non-vanilla patches, regardless of the advertised kernel version number.
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## Quick summary of the CVEs
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**CVE-2017-5753** bounds check bypass (Spectre Variant 1)
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- Impact: Kernel & all software
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- Mitigation: recompile software *and* kernel with a modified compiler that introduces the LFENCE opcode at the proper positions in the resulting code
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- Performance impact of the mitigation: negligible
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CVE-2017-5715: branch target injection (Spectre Variant 2)
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**CVE-2017-5715** branch target injection (Spectre Variant 2)
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- Impact: Kernel
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- Mitigation 1: new opcode via microcode update that should be used by up to date compilers to protect the BTB (by flushing indirect branch predictors)
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- Mitigation 2: introducing "retpoline" into compilers, and recompile software/OS with it
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- Performance impact of the mitigation: high for mitigation 1, medium for mitigation 2, depending on your CPU
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CVE-2017-5754: rogue data cache load (Meltdown)
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**CVE-2017-5754** rogue data cache load (Meltdown)
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- Impact: Kernel
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- Mitigation: updated kernel (with PTI/KPTI patches), updating the kernel is enough
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- Performance impact of the mitigation: low to medium
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Example of the output of the script:
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## Example of script output
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### Ubuntu LTS (before official patches)
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```
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$ sudo ./spectre-meltdown-checker.sh
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Spectre and Meltdown mitigation detection tool v0.07
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$ sudo ./spectre-and-meltdown.sh
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Spectre and Meltdown mitigation detection tool v0.16
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Checking for vulnerabilities against live running kernel Linux 4.4.0-104-generic #127-Ubuntu SMP Mon Dec 11 12:16:42 UTC 2017 x86_64
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Will use vmlinux image /boot/vmlinuz-4.4.0-104-generic
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Will use kconfig /boot/config-4.4.0-104-generic
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Will use System.map file /boot/System.map-4.4.0-104-generic
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CVE-2017-5753 [bounds check bypass] aka 'Spectre Variant 1'
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* Kernel compiled with LFENCE opcode inserted at the proper places: NO (only 38 opcodes found, should be >= 60)
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> STATUS: VULNERABLE
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* Kernel compiled with LFENCE opcode inserted at the proper places: NO (only 38 opcodes found, should be >= 70)
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> STATUS: VULNERABLE
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CVE-2017-5715 [branch target injection] aka 'Spectre Variant 2'
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* Mitigation 1
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* Hardware (CPU microcode) support for mitigation: NO
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* Kernel support for IBRS: NO
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* IBRS enabled for Kernel space: NO
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* IBRS enabled for User space: NO
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* Hardware (CPU microcode) support for mitigation: NO
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* Kernel support for IBRS: NO
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* IBRS enabled for Kernel space: NO
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* IBRS enabled for User space: NO
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* Mitigation 2
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* Kernel compiled with retpolines: NO
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> STATUS: VULNERABLE (IBRS hardware + kernel support OR kernel with retpolines are needed to mitigate the vulnerability)
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* Kernel compiled with retpoline option: NO
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* Kernel compiled with a retpoline-aware compiler: NO
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> STATUS: VULNERABLE (IBRS hardware + kernel support OR kernel with retpoline are needed to mitigate the vulnerability)
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CVE-2017-5754 [rogue data cache load] aka 'Meltdown' aka 'Variant 3'
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* Kernel supports Page Table Isolation (PTI): YES
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* PTI enabled and active: YES
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> STATUS: NOT VULNERABLE (PTI mitigates the vulnerability)
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* Kernel supports Page Table Isolation (PTI): NO
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* PTI enabled and active: NO
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> STATUS: VULNERABLE (PTI is needed to mitigate the vulnerability)
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```
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## #First patched kernel of RHEL6
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```
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$ sudo ./spectre-meltdown-checker.sh --kernel /tmp/vmlinuz-2.6.32-696.18.7.el6.x86_64 --config /tmp/config-2.6.32-696.18.7.el6.x86_64 --map /tmp/System.map-2.6.32-696.18.7.el6.x86_64
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Spectre and Meltdown mitigation detection tool v0.16
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Checking for vulnerabilities against specified kernel
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Will use vmlinux image /tmp/vmlinuz-2.6.32-696.18.7.el6.x86_64
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Will use kconfig /tmp/config-2.6.32-696.18.7.el6.x86_64
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Will use System.map file /tmp/System.map-2.6.32-696.18.7.el6.x86_64
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CVE-2017-5753 [bounds check bypass] aka 'Spectre Variant 1'm
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* Kernel compiled with LFENCE opcode inserted at the proper places: YES (84 opcodes found, which is >= 70)
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> STATUS: NOT VULNERABLE
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CVE-2017-5715 [branch target injection] aka 'Spectre Variant 2'
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* Mitigation 1
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* Hardware (CPU microcode) support for mitigation: NO
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* Kernel support for IBRS: YES
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* IBRS enabled for Kernel space: N/A (not testable in offline mode)
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* IBRS enabled for User space: N/A (not testable in offline mode)
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* Mitigation 2
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* Kernel compiled with retpoline option: NO
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* Kernel compiled with a retpoline-aware compiler: NO
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> STATUS: NOT VULNERABLE (offline mode: IBRS will mitigate the vulnerability if enabled at runtime)
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CVE-2017-5754 [rogue data cache load] aka 'Meltdown' aka 'Variant 3'
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* Kernel supports Page Table Isolation (PTI): YES
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* PTI enabled and active: N/A (can't verify if PTI is enabled in offline mode)
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> STATUS: NOT VULNERABLE (offline mode: PTI will mitigate the vulnerability if enabled at runtime)
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```
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@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ pstatus()
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red) col="\033[101m\033[30m";;
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green) col="\033[102m\033[30m";;
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yellow) col="\033[103m\033[30m";;
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blue) col="\033[104m\033[30m";;
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*) col="";;
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esac
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/bin/echo -ne "$col $2 \033[0m"
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@ -65,11 +66,12 @@ extract_vmlinux()
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[ -n "$1" ] || return 1
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# Prepare temp files:
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vmlinuxtmp="$(mktemp /tmp/vmlinux-XXX)"
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trap "rm -f $vmlinuxtmp" EXIT
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# Initial attempt for uncompressed images or objects:
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if check_vmlinux "$1"; then
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cat "$1" > "$vmlinuxtmp"
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echo "$vmlinuxtmp"
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vmlinux=$vmlinuxtmp
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return 0
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fi
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@ -84,19 +86,149 @@ extract_vmlinux()
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# end of extract-vmlinux functions
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show_usage()
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{
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cat <<EOF
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Usage:
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Live mode: $0
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Offline mode: $0 [--kernel <vmlinux_file>] [--config <kernel_config>] [--map <kernel_map_file>]
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Options:
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Two modes are available.
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First mode is the "live" mode (default), it does its best to find information about the currently running kernel.
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To run under this mode, just start the script without any option.
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Second mode is the "offline" mode, where you can inspect a non-running kernel.
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You'll need to specify the location of the vmlinux file, and if possible, the corresponding config and System.map files:
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--kernel vmlinux_file Specify a (possibly compressed) vmlinux file
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--config kernel_config Specify a kernel config file
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--map kernel_map_file Specify a kernel System.map file
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EOF
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}
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/bin/echo -e "\033[1;34mSpectre and Meltdown mitigation detection tool v$VERSION\033[0m"
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/bin/echo
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# root check
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# parse options
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opt_kernel=''
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opt_config=''
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opt_map=''
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opt_live=1
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if [ "$(id -u)" -ne 0 ]; then
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/bin/echo -e "\033[31mNote that you should launch this script with root privileges to get accurate information.\033[0m"
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/bin/echo -e "\033[31mWe'll proceed but you might see permission denied errors.\033[0m"
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/bin/echo -e "\033[31mTo run it as root, you can try the following command: sudo $0\033[0m"
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/bin/echo
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parse_opt_file()
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{
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# parse_opt_file option_name option_value
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option_name="$1"
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option_value="$2"
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if [ -z "$option_value" ]; then
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show_usage
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echo "$0: error: --$option_name expects one parameter (a file)" >&2
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exit 1
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elif [ ! -e "$option_value" ]; then
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echo "$0: error: couldn't find file $option_value" >&2
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exit 1
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elif [ ! -f "$option_value" ]; then
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echo "$0: error: $option_value is not a file" >&2
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exit 1
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elif [ ! -e "$option_value" ]; then
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echo "$0: error: couldn't read $option_value (are you root?)" >&2
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exit 1
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fi
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echo "$option_value"
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exit 0
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}
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while [ -n "$1" ]; do
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if [ "$1" = "--kernel" ]; then
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opt_kernel=$(parse_opt_file kernel "$2")
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[ $? -ne 0 ] && exit $?
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shift 2
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opt_live=0
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elif [ "$1" = "--config" ]; then
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opt_config=$(parse_opt_file config "$2")
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[ $? -ne 0 ] && exit $?
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shift 2
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opt_live=0
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elif [ "$1" = "--map" ]; then
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opt_map=$(parse_opt_file map "$2")
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[ $? -ne 0 ] && exit $?
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shift 2
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opt_live=0
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elif [ "$1" = "-h" -o "$1" = "--help" ]; then
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show_usage
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exit 0
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else
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show_usage
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echo "$0: error: unknown option '$1'"
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exit 1
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fi
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done
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# root check (only for live mode, for offline mode, we already checked if we could read the files)
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if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
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if [ "$(id -u)" -ne 0 ]; then
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/bin/echo -e "\033[31mNote that you should launch this script with root privileges to get accurate information.\033[0m"
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/bin/echo -e "\033[31mWe'll proceed but you might see permission denied errors.\033[0m"
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/bin/echo -e "\033[31mTo run it as root, you can try the following command: sudo $0\033[0m"
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/bin/echo
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fi
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/bin/echo -e "Checking for vulnerabilities against live running kernel \033[35m"$(uname -s) $(uname -r) $(uname -v) $(uname -m)"\033[0m"
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# try to find the image of the current running kernel
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[ -e /boot/vmlinuz-linux ] && opt_kernel=/boot/vmlinuz-linux
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[ -e /boot/vmlinuz-linux-libre ] && opt_kernel=/boot/vmlinuz-linux-libre
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[ -e /boot/vmlinuz-$(uname -r) ] && opt_kernel=/boot/vmlinuz-$(uname -r)
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[ -e /boot/kernel-$( uname -r) ] && opt_kernel=/boot/kernel-$( uname -r)
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[ -e /boot/bzImage-$(uname -r) ] && opt_kernel=/boot/bzImage-$(uname -r)
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[ -e /boot/kernel-genkernel-$(uname -m)-$(uname -r) ] && opt_kernel=/boot/kernel-genkernel-$(uname -m)-$(uname -r)
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# system.map
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[ -e /boot/System.map-$(uname -r) ] && opt_map=/boot/System.map-$(uname -r)
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# config
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if [ -e /proc/config.gz ] ; then
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dumped_config="$(mktemp /tmp/config-XXX)"
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gunzip -c /proc/config.gz > $dumped_config
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# dumped_config will be deleted at the end of the script
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opt_config=$dumped_config
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elif [ -e /boot/config-$(uname -r) ]; then
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opt_config=/boot/config-$(uname -r)
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fi
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else
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/bin/echo "Checking for vulnerabilities against specified kernel"
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fi
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if [ -n "$opt_kernel" ]; then
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/bin/echo -e "Will use vmlinux image \033[35m$opt_kernel\033[0m"
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else
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/bin/echo "Will use no vmlinux image (accuracy might be reduced"
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fi
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if [ -n "$opt_config" ]; then
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/bin/echo -e "Will use kconfig \033[35m$opt_config\033[0m"
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else
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/bin/echo "Will use no kconfig (accuracy might be reduced)"
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fi
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if [ -n "$opt_map" ]; then
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/bin/echo -e "Will use System.map file \033[35m$opt_map\033[0m"
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else
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/bin/echo "Will use no System.map file (accuracy might be reduced)"
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fi
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if [ -e "$opt_kernel" ]; then
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if ! which readelf >/dev/null 2>&1; then
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vmlinux_err="missing 'readelf' tool, please install it, usually it's in the 'binutils' package"
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else
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extract_vmlinux "$opt_kernel"
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fi
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else
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vmlinux_err="couldn't find your kernel image in /boot, if you used neboot, this is normal"
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fi
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if [ -z "$vmlinux" -o ! -r "$vmlinux" ]; then
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[ -z "$vmlinux_err" ] && vmlinux_err="couldn't extract your kernel from $opt_kernel"
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fi
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/bin/echo -e "Checking vulnerabilities against \033[35m"$(uname -s) $(uname -r) $(uname -v) $(uname -m)"\033[0m"
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/bin/echo
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###########
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@ -105,42 +237,25 @@ fi
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/bin/echo -n "* Kernel compiled with LFENCE opcode inserted at the proper places: "
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status=0
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img=''
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# try to find the image of the current running kernel
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[ -e /boot/vmlinuz-linux ] && img=/boot/vmlinuz-linux
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[ -e /boot/vmlinuz-linux-libre ] && img=/boot/vmlinuz-linux-libre
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[ -e /boot/vmlinuz-$(uname -r) ] && img=/boot/vmlinuz-$(uname -r)
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[ -e /boot/kernel-$( uname -r) ] && img=/boot/kernel-$( uname -r)
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[ -e /boot/bzImage-$(uname -r) ] && img=/boot/bzImage-$(uname -r)
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[ -e /boot/kernel-genkernel-$(uname -m)-$(uname -r) ] && img=/boot/kernel-genkernel-$(uname -m)-$(uname -r)
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if [ -z "$img" ]; then
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pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't find your kernel image in /boot, if you used netboot, this is normal"
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if [ -n "$vmlinux_err" ]; then
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pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "$vmlinux_err"
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else
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if ! which readelf >/dev/null 2>&1; then
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pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "missing 'readelf' tool, please install it, usually it's in the 'binutils' package"
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if ! which objdump >/dev/null 2>&1; then
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pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "missing 'objdump' tool, please install it, usually it's in the binutils package"
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else
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extract_vmlinux $img
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if [ "$vmlinux_err" != "" ]; then
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pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't extract your kernel from $img: $vmlinux_err"
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elif [ -z "$vmlinux" -o ! -r "$vmlinux" ]; then
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pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't extract your kernel from $img"
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elif ! which objdump >/dev/null 2>&1; then
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pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "missing 'objdump' tool, please install it, usually it's in the binutils package"
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# here we disassemble the kernel and count the number of occurences of the LFENCE opcode
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# in non-patched kernels, this has been empirically determined as being around 40-50
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# in patched kernels, this is more around 70-80, sometimes way higher (100+)
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# v0.13: 68 found in a 3.10.23-xxxx-std-ipv6-64 (with lots of modules compiled-in directly), which doesn't have the LFENCE patches,
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# so let's push the threshold to 70.
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# TODO LKML patch is starting to dump LFENCE in favor of the PAUSE opcode, we might need to check that (patch not stabilized yet)
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nb_lfence=$(objdump -D "$vmlinux" | grep -wc lfence)
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if [ "$nb_lfence" -lt 70 ]; then
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pstatus red NO "only $nb_lfence opcodes found, should be >= 70"
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status=1
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else
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# here we disassemble the kernel and count the number of occurences of the LFENCE opcode
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# in non-patched kernels, this has been empirically determined as being around 40-50
|
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# in patched kernels, this is more around 70-80, sometimes way higher (100+)
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# v0.13: 68 found in a 3.10.23-xxxx-std-ipv6-64 (with lots of modules compiled-in directly), which doesn't have the LFENCE patches,
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# so let's push the threshold to 70.
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# TODO LKML patch is starting to dump LFENCE in favor of the PAUSE opcode, we might need to check that (patch not stabilized yet)
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nb_lfence=$(objdump -D "$vmlinux" | grep -wc lfence)
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if [ "$nb_lfence" -lt 70 ]; then
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pstatus red NO "only $nb_lfence opcodes found, should be >= 70"
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status=1
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else
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pstatus green YES "$nb_lfence opcodes found, which is >= 70"
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status=2
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fi
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pstatus green YES "$nb_lfence opcodes found, which is >= 70"
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status=2
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fi
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fi
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fi
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@ -180,57 +295,65 @@ if [ "$insmod_msr" = 1 ]; then
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fi
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/bin/echo -n "* Kernel support for IBRS: "
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if [ ! -e /sys/kernel/debug/sched_features ]; then
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# try to mount the debugfs hierarchy ourselves and remember it to umount afterwards
|
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mount -t debugfs debugfs /sys/kernel/debug 2>/dev/null && mounted_debugfs=1
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if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
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if [ ! -e /sys/kernel/debug/sched_features ]; then
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# try to mount the debugfs hierarchy ourselves and remember it to umount afterwards
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mount -t debugfs debugfs /sys/kernel/debug 2>/dev/null && mounted_debugfs=1
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fi
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if [ -e /sys/kernel/debug/ibrs_enabled ]; then
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# if the file is there, we have IBRS compiled-in
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pstatus green YES
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ibrs_supported=1
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ibrs_enabled=$(cat /sys/kernel/debug/ibrs_enabled 2>/dev/null)
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elif [ -e /sys/kernel/debug/x86/ibrs_enabled ]; then
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# RedHat uses a different path (see https://access.redhat.com/articles/3311301)
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pstatus green YES
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ibrs_supported=1
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ibrs_enabled=$(cat /sys/kernel/debug/x86/ibrs_enabled 2>/dev/null)
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fi
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fi
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if [ -e /sys/kernel/debug/ibrs_enabled ]; then
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# if the file is there, we have IBRS compiled-in
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pstatus green YES
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ibrs_supported=1
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ibrs_enabled=$(cat /sys/kernel/debug/ibrs_enabled 2>/dev/null)
|
||||
elif [ -e /sys/kernel/debug/x86/ibrs_enabled ]; then
|
||||
# RedHat uses a different path (see https://access.redhat.com/articles/3311301)
|
||||
pstatus green YES
|
||||
ibrs_supported=1
|
||||
ibrs_enabled=$(cat /sys/kernel/debug/x86/ibrs_enabled 2>/dev/null)
|
||||
else
|
||||
if [ "$ibrs_supported " != 1 -a -n "$opt_map" ]; then
|
||||
if grep -q spec_ctrl "$opt_map"; then
|
||||
pstatus green YES
|
||||
ibrs_supported=1
|
||||
fi
|
||||
fi
|
||||
if [ "$ibrs_supported" != 1 ]; then
|
||||
pstatus red NO
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
/bin/echo -n "* IBRS enabled for Kernel space: "
|
||||
# 0 means disabled
|
||||
# 1 is enabled only for kernel space
|
||||
# 2 is enabled for kernel and user space
|
||||
case "$ibrs_enabled" in
|
||||
"") [ "$ibrs_supported" = 1 ] && pstatus yellow UNKNOWN || pstatus red NO;;
|
||||
0) pstatus red NO;;
|
||||
1 | 2) pstatus green YES;;
|
||||
*) pstatus yellow UNKNOWN;;
|
||||
esac
|
||||
if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
|
||||
# 0 means disabled
|
||||
# 1 is enabled only for kernel space
|
||||
# 2 is enabled for kernel and user space
|
||||
case "$ibrs_enabled" in
|
||||
"") [ "$ibrs_supported" = 1 ] && pstatus yellow UNKNOWN || pstatus red NO;;
|
||||
0) pstatus red NO;;
|
||||
1 | 2) pstatus green YES;;
|
||||
*) pstatus yellow UNKNOWN;;
|
||||
esac
|
||||
else
|
||||
pstatus blue N/A "not testable in offline mode"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
/bin/echo -n "* IBRS enabled for User space: "
|
||||
case "$ibrs_enabled" in
|
||||
"") [ "$ibrs_supported" = 1 ] && pstatus yellow UNKNOWN || pstatus red NO;;
|
||||
0 | 1) pstatus red NO;;
|
||||
2) pstatus green YES;;
|
||||
*) pstatus yellow UNKNOWN;;
|
||||
esac
|
||||
if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
|
||||
case "$ibrs_enabled" in
|
||||
"") [ "$ibrs_supported" = 1 ] && pstatus yellow UNKNOWN || pstatus red NO;;
|
||||
0 | 1) pstatus red NO;;
|
||||
2) pstatus green YES;;
|
||||
*) pstatus yellow UNKNOWN;;
|
||||
esac
|
||||
else
|
||||
pstatus blue N/A "not testable in offline mode"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
/bin/echo "* Mitigation 2"
|
||||
/bin/echo -n "* Kernel compiled with retpoline option: "
|
||||
# We check the RETPOLINE kernel options
|
||||
if [ -e /proc/config.gz ]; then
|
||||
# either the running kernel exports his own config
|
||||
if zgrep -q '^CONFIG_RETPOLINE=y' /proc/config.gz; then
|
||||
pstatus green YES
|
||||
retpoline=1
|
||||
else
|
||||
pstatus red NO
|
||||
fi
|
||||
elif [ -e /boot/config-$(uname -r) ]; then
|
||||
# or we can find a config file in /root with the kernel release name
|
||||
if grep -q '^CONFIG_RETPOLINE=y' /boot/config-$(uname -r); then
|
||||
if [ -r "$opt_config" ]; then
|
||||
if grep -q '^CONFIG_RETPOLINE=y' "$opt_config"; then
|
||||
pstatus green YES
|
||||
retpoline=1
|
||||
else
|
||||
@ -246,42 +369,53 @@ fi
|
||||
# See gcc commit https://github.com/hjl-tools/gcc/commit/23b517d4a67c02d3ef80b6109218f2aadad7bd79
|
||||
# In latest retpoline LKML patches, the noretpoline_setup symbol exists only if CONFIG_RETPOLINE is set
|
||||
# *AND* if the compiler is retpoline-compliant, so look for that symbol
|
||||
if [ -n "$vmlinux" ]; then
|
||||
if [ -n "$opt_map" ]; then
|
||||
# look for the symbol
|
||||
if [ -e /boot/System.map-$(uname -r) ]; then
|
||||
if grep -qw noretpoline_setup /boot/System.map-$(uname -r); then
|
||||
retpoline_compiler=1
|
||||
pstatus green YES "noretpoline_setup symbol found in System.map"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
elif which nm >/dev/null 2>&1; then
|
||||
if grep -qw noretpoline_setup "$opt_map"; then
|
||||
retpoline_compiler=1
|
||||
pstatus green YES "noretpoline_setup symbol found in System.map"
|
||||
else
|
||||
pstatus red NO
|
||||
fi
|
||||
elif [ -n "$vmlinux" ]; then
|
||||
# look for the symbol
|
||||
if which nm >/dev/null 2>&1; then
|
||||
# the proper way: use nm and look for the symbol
|
||||
if nm "$vmlinux" 2>/dev/null | grep -qw 'noretpoline_setup'; then
|
||||
retpoline_compiler=1
|
||||
pstatus green YES "noretpoline_setup symbol found in vmlinux"
|
||||
pstatus green YES "noretpoline_setup found in vmlinux symbols"
|
||||
else
|
||||
pstatus red NO
|
||||
fi
|
||||
elif grep -q noretpoline_setup "$vmlinux"; then
|
||||
# if we don't have nm, nevermind, the symbol name is long enough to not have
|
||||
# any false positive using good old grep directly on the binary
|
||||
retpoline_compiler=1
|
||||
pstatus green YES "noretpoline_setup symbol found in vmlinux"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
if [ "$retpoline_compiler" != 1 ]; then
|
||||
pstatus green YES "noretpoline_setup found in vmlinux"
|
||||
else
|
||||
pstatus red NO
|
||||
fi
|
||||
else
|
||||
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't find your kernel image"
|
||||
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't find your kernel image or System.map"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
/bin/echo -ne "> \033[46m\033[30mSTATUS:\033[0m "
|
||||
if grep -q AMD /proc/cpuinfo; then
|
||||
pstatus green "NOT VULNERABLE" "your CPU is not vulnerable as per the vendor"
|
||||
elif [ "$ibrs_enabled" = 1 -o "$ibrs_enabled" = 2 ]; then
|
||||
pstatus green "NOT VULNERABLE" "IBRS mitigates the vulnerability"
|
||||
elif [ "$retpoline" = 1 -a "$retpoline_compiler" = 1 ]; then
|
||||
pstatus green "NOT VULNERABLE" "retpoline mitigate the vulnerability"
|
||||
elif [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
|
||||
if [ "$ibrs_enabled" = 1 -o "$ibrs_enabled" = 2 ]; then
|
||||
pstatus green "NOT VULNERABLE" "IBRS mitigates the vulnerability"
|
||||
else
|
||||
pstatus red VULNERABLE "IBRS hardware + kernel support OR kernel with retpoline are needed to mitigate the vulnerability"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
else
|
||||
pstatus red VULNERABLE "IBRS hardware + kernel support OR kernel with retpoline are needed to mitigate the vulnerability"
|
||||
if [ "$ibrs_supported" = 1 ]; then
|
||||
pstatus green "NOT VULNERABLE" "offline mode: IBRS will mitigate the vulnerability if enabled at runtime"
|
||||
else
|
||||
pstatus red VULNERABLE "IBRS hardware + kernel support OR kernel with retpoline are needed to mitigate the vulnerability"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
##########
|
||||
@ -291,24 +425,17 @@ fi
|
||||
/bin/echo -n "* Kernel supports Page Table Isolation (PTI): "
|
||||
kpti_support=0
|
||||
kpti_can_tell=0
|
||||
if [ -e /proc/config.gz ]; then
|
||||
# either the running kernel exports his own config
|
||||
if [ -n "$opt_config" ]; then
|
||||
kpti_can_tell=1
|
||||
if zgrep -q '^\(CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION=y\|CONFIG_KAISER=y\)' /proc/config.gz; then
|
||||
kpti_support=1
|
||||
fi
|
||||
elif [ -e /boot/config-$(uname -r) ]; then
|
||||
# or we can find a config file in /root with the kernel release name
|
||||
kpti_can_tell=1
|
||||
if grep -q '^\(CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION=y\|CONFIG_KAISER=y\)' /boot/config-$(uname -r); then
|
||||
if grep -Eq '^\(CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION\|CONFIG_KAISER\)=y' "$opt_config"; then
|
||||
kpti_support=1
|
||||
fi
|
||||
fi
|
||||
if [ "$kpti_support" = 0 -a -e /boot/System.map-$(uname -r) ]; then
|
||||
if [ "$kpti_support" = 0 -a -n "$opt_map" ]; then
|
||||
# it's not an elif: some backports don't have the PTI config but still include the patch
|
||||
# so we try to find an exported symbol that is part of the PTI patch in System.map
|
||||
kpti_can_tell=1
|
||||
if grep -qw kpti_force_enabled /boot/System.map-$(uname -r); then
|
||||
if grep -qw kpti_force_enabled "$opt_map"; then
|
||||
kpti_support=1
|
||||
fi
|
||||
fi
|
||||
@ -330,29 +457,33 @@ if [ "$kpti_support" = 1 ]; then
|
||||
elif [ "$kpti_can_tell" = 1 ]; then
|
||||
pstatus red NO
|
||||
else
|
||||
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't read your kernel configuration"
|
||||
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't read your kernel configuration nor System.map file"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
/bin/echo -n "* PTI enabled and active: "
|
||||
if grep ^flags /proc/cpuinfo | grep -qw pti; then
|
||||
# vanilla PTI patch sets the 'pti' flag in cpuinfo
|
||||
kpti_enabled=1
|
||||
elif grep ^flags /proc/cpuinfo | grep -qw kaiser; then
|
||||
# kernel line 4.9 sets the 'kaiser' flag in cpuinfo
|
||||
kpti_enabled=1
|
||||
elif [ -e /sys/kernel/debug/x86/pti_enabled ]; then
|
||||
# RedHat Backport creates a dedicated file, see https://access.redhat.com/articles/3311301
|
||||
kpti_enabled=$(cat /sys/kernel/debug/x86/pti_enabled 2>/dev/null)
|
||||
elif dmesg | grep -Eq 'Kernel/User page tables isolation: enabled|Kernel page table isolation enabled'; then
|
||||
# if we can't find the flag, grep in dmesg
|
||||
kpti_enabled=1
|
||||
if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
|
||||
if grep ^flags /proc/cpuinfo | grep -qw pti; then
|
||||
# vanilla PTI patch sets the 'pti' flag in cpuinfo
|
||||
kpti_enabled=1
|
||||
elif grep ^flags /proc/cpuinfo | grep -qw kaiser; then
|
||||
# kernel line 4.9 sets the 'kaiser' flag in cpuinfo
|
||||
kpti_enabled=1
|
||||
elif [ -e /sys/kernel/debug/x86/pti_enabled ]; then
|
||||
# RedHat Backport creates a dedicated file, see https://access.redhat.com/articles/3311301
|
||||
kpti_enabled=$(cat /sys/kernel/debug/x86/pti_enabled 2>/dev/null)
|
||||
elif dmesg | grep -Eq 'Kernel/User page tables isolation: enabled|Kernel page table isolation enabled'; then
|
||||
# if we can't find the flag, grep in dmesg
|
||||
kpti_enabled=1
|
||||
else
|
||||
kpti_enabled=0
|
||||
fi
|
||||
if [ "$kpti_enabled" = 1 ]; then
|
||||
pstatus green YES
|
||||
else
|
||||
pstatus red NO
|
||||
fi
|
||||
else
|
||||
kpti_enabled=0
|
||||
fi
|
||||
if [ "$kpti_enabled" = 1 ]; then
|
||||
pstatus green YES
|
||||
else
|
||||
pstatus red NO
|
||||
pstatus blue N/A "can't verify if PTI is enabled in offline mode"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
if [ "$mounted_debugfs" = 1 ]; then
|
||||
@ -363,12 +494,20 @@ fi
|
||||
/bin/echo -ne "> \033[46m\033[30mSTATUS:\033[0m "
|
||||
if grep -q AMD /proc/cpuinfo; then
|
||||
pstatus green "NOT VULNERABLE" "your CPU is not vulnerable as per the vendor"
|
||||
elif [ "$kpti_enabled" = 1 ]; then
|
||||
pstatus green "NOT VULNERABLE" "PTI mitigates the vulnerability"
|
||||
elif [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
|
||||
if [ "$kpti_enabled" = 1 ]; then
|
||||
pstatus green "NOT VULNERABLE" "PTI mitigates the vulnerability"
|
||||
else
|
||||
pstatus red "VULNERABLE" "PTI is needed to mitigate the vulnerability"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
else
|
||||
pstatus red "VULNERABLE" "PTI is needed to mitigate the vulnerability"
|
||||
if [ "$kpti_support" = 1 ]; then
|
||||
pstatus green "NOT VULNERABLE" "offline mode: PTI will mitigate the vulnerability if enabled at runtime"
|
||||
else
|
||||
pstatus red "VULNERABLE" "PTI is needed to mitigate the vulnerability"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
/bin/echo
|
||||
|
||||
[ -n "$vmlinux" -a -f "$vmlinux" ] && rm -f "$vmlinux"
|
||||
[ -n "$dumped_config" ] && rm -f "$dumped_config"
|
||||
|
||||
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user