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spectre-meltdown-checker/spectre-meltdown-checker.sh
Stéphane Lesimple 6682d72ada chore: wording: model not vulnerable -> model not affected
2022-03-20 13:16:27 +01:00

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#! /bin/sh
# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-only
# vim: set ts=4 sw=4 sts=4 noet:
#
# Spectre & Meltdown checker
#
# Check for the latest version at:
# https://github.com/speed47/spectre-meltdown-checker
# git clone https://github.com/speed47/spectre-meltdown-checker.git
# or wget https://meltdown.ovh -O spectre-meltdown-checker.sh
# or curl -L https://meltdown.ovh -o spectre-meltdown-checker.sh
#
# Stephane Lesimple
#
VERSION='0.44+'
trap 'exit_cleanup' EXIT
trap '_warn "interrupted, cleaning up..."; exit_cleanup; exit 1' INT
exit_cleanup()
{
# cleanup the temp decompressed config & kernel image
[ -n "${dumped_config:-}" ] && [ -f "$dumped_config" ] && rm -f "$dumped_config"
[ -n "${kerneltmp:-}" ] && [ -f "$kerneltmp" ] && rm -f "$kerneltmp"
[ -n "${kerneltmp2:-}" ] && [ -f "$kerneltmp2" ] && rm -f "$kerneltmp2"
[ -n "${mcedb_tmp:-}" ] && [ -f "$mcedb_tmp" ] && rm -f "$mcedb_tmp"
[ -n "${intel_tmp:-}" ] && [ -d "$intel_tmp" ] && rm -rf "$intel_tmp"
[ "${mounted_debugfs:-}" = 1 ] && umount /sys/kernel/debug 2>/dev/null
[ "${mounted_procfs:-}" = 1 ] && umount "$procfs" 2>/dev/null
[ "${insmod_cpuid:-}" = 1 ] && rmmod cpuid 2>/dev/null
[ "${insmod_msr:-}" = 1 ] && rmmod msr 2>/dev/null
[ "${kldload_cpuctl:-}" = 1 ] && kldunload cpuctl 2>/dev/null
[ "${kldload_vmm:-}" = 1 ] && kldunload vmm 2>/dev/null
}
# if we were git clone'd, adjust VERSION
if [ -d "$(dirname "$0")/.git" ] && command -v git >/dev/null 2>&1; then
describe=$(git -C "$(dirname "$0")" describe --tags --dirty 2>/dev/null)
[ -n "$describe" ] && VERSION=$(echo "$describe" | sed -e s/^v//)
fi
show_usage()
{
# shellcheck disable=SC2086
cat <<EOF
Usage:
Live mode (auto): $(basename $0) [options]
Live mode (manual): $(basename $0) [options] <[--kernel <kimage>] [--config <kconfig>] [--map <mapfile>]> --live
Offline mode: $(basename $0) [options] <[--kernel <kimage>] [--config <kconfig>] [--map <mapfile>]>
Modes:
Two modes are available.
First mode is the "live" mode (default), it does its best to find information about the currently running kernel.
To run under this mode, just start the script without any option (you can also use --live explicitly)
Second mode is the "offline" mode, where you can inspect a non-running kernel.
This mode is automatically enabled when you specify the location of the kernel file, config and System.map files:
--kernel kernel_file specify a (possibly compressed) Linux or BSD kernel file
--config kernel_config specify a kernel config file (Linux only)
--map kernel_map_file specify a kernel System.map file (Linux only)
If you want to use live mode while specifying the location of the kernel, config or map file yourself,
you can add --live to the above options, to tell the script to run in live mode instead of the offline mode,
which is enabled by default when at least one file is specified on the command line.
Options:
--no-color don't use color codes
--verbose, -v increase verbosity level, possibly several times
--explain produce an additional human-readable explanation of actions to take to mitigate a vulnerability
--paranoid require IBPB to deem Variant 2 as mitigated
also require SMT disabled + unconditional L1D flush to deem Foreshadow-NG VMM as mitigated
also require SMT disabled to deem MDS vulnerabilities mitigated
--no-sysfs don't use the /sys interface even if present [Linux]
--sysfs-only only use the /sys interface, don't run our own checks [Linux]
--coreos special mode for CoreOS (use an ephemeral toolbox to inspect kernel) [Linux]
--arch-prefix PREFIX specify a prefix for cross-inspecting a kernel of a different arch, for example "aarch64-linux-gnu-",
so that invoked tools will be prefixed with this (i.e. aarch64-linux-gnu-objdump)
--batch text produce machine readable output, this is the default if --batch is specified alone
--batch short produce only one line with the vulnerabilities separated by spaces
--batch json produce JSON output formatted for Puppet, Ansible, Chef...
--batch nrpe produce machine readable output formatted for NRPE
--batch prometheus produce output for consumption by prometheus-node-exporter
--variant VARIANT specify which variant you'd like to check, by default all variants are checked
VARIANT can be one of 1, 2, 3, 3a, 4, l1tf, msbds, mfbds, mlpds, mdsum, taa, mcepsc, srbds
can be specified multiple times (e.g. --variant 2 --variant 3)
--cve [cve1,cve2,...] specify which CVE you'd like to check, by default all supported CVEs are checked
--hw-only only check for CPU information, don't check for any variant
--no-hw skip CPU information and checks, if you're inspecting a kernel not to be run on this host
--vmm [auto,yes,no] override the detection of the presence of a hypervisor, default: auto
--cpu [#,all] interact with CPUID and MSR of CPU core number #, or all (default: CPU core 0)
--update-fwdb update our local copy of the CPU microcodes versions database (using the awesome
MCExtractor project and the Intel firmwares GitHub repository)
--update-builtin-fwdb same as --update-fwdb but update builtin DB inside the script itself
--dump-mock-data used to mimick a CPU on an other system, mainly used to help debugging this script
Return codes:
0 (not vulnerable), 2 (vulnerable), 3 (unknown), 255 (error)
IMPORTANT:
A false sense of security is worse than no security at all.
Please use the --disclaimer option to understand exactly what this script does.
EOF
}
show_disclaimer()
{
cat <<EOF
Disclaimer:
This tool does its best to determine whether your system is immune (or has proper mitigations in place) for the
collectively named "speculative execution" vulnerabilities. It doesn't attempt to run any kind of exploit, and can't guarantee
that your system is secure, but rather helps you verifying whether your system has the known correct mitigations in place.
However, some mitigations could also exist in your kernel that this script doesn't know (yet) how to detect, or it might
falsely detect mitigations that in the end don't work as expected (for example, on backported or modified kernels).
Your system exposure also depends on your CPU. As of now, AMD and ARM processors are marked as immune to some or all of these
vulnerabilities (except some specific ARM models). All Intel processors manufactured since circa 1995 are thought to be vulnerable,
except some specific/old models, such as some early Atoms. Whatever processor one uses, one might seek more information
from the manufacturer of that processor and/or of the device in which it runs.
The nature of the discovered vulnerabilities being quite new, the landscape of vulnerable processors can be expected
to change over time, which is why this script makes the assumption that all CPUs are vulnerable, except if the manufacturer
explicitly stated otherwise in a verifiable public announcement.
Please also note that for Spectre vulnerabilities, all software can possibly be exploited, this tool only verifies that the
kernel (which is the core of the system) you're using has the proper protections in place. Verifying all the other software
is out of the scope of this tool. As a general measure, ensure you always have the most up to date stable versions of all
the software you use, especially for those who are exposed to the world, such as network daemons and browsers.
This tool has been released in the hope that it'll be useful, but don't use it to jump to conclusions about your security.
EOF
}
os=$(uname -s)
# parse options
opt_kernel=''
opt_config=''
opt_map=''
opt_live=-1
opt_no_color=0
opt_batch=0
opt_batch_format='text'
opt_verbose=1
opt_cve_list=''
opt_cve_all=1
opt_no_sysfs=0
opt_sysfs_only=0
opt_coreos=0
opt_arch_prefix=''
opt_hw_only=0
opt_no_hw=0
opt_vmm=-1
opt_cpu=0
opt_explain=0
opt_paranoid=0
opt_mock=0
global_critical=0
global_unknown=0
nrpe_vuln=''
supported_cve_list='CVE-2017-5753 CVE-2017-5715 CVE-2017-5754 CVE-2018-3640 CVE-2018-3639 CVE-2018-3615 CVE-2018-3620 CVE-2018-3646 CVE-2018-12126 CVE-2018-12130 CVE-2018-12127 CVE-2019-11091 CVE-2019-11135 CVE-2018-12207 CVE-2020-0543'
# find a sane command to print colored messages, we prefer `printf` over `echo`
# because `printf` behavior is more standard across Linux/BSD
# we'll try to avoid using shell builtins that might not take options
echo_cmd_type='echo'
# ignore SC2230 here because `which` ignores builtins while `command -v` doesn't, and
# we don't want builtins here. Even if `which` is not installed, we'll fallback to the
# `echo` builtin anyway, so this is safe.
# shellcheck disable=SC2230
if command -v printf >/dev/null 2>&1; then
echo_cmd=$(command -v printf)
echo_cmd_type='printf'
elif which echo >/dev/null 2>&1; then
echo_cmd=$(which echo)
else
# maybe the `which` command is broken?
[ -x /bin/echo ] && echo_cmd=/bin/echo
# for Android
[ -x /system/bin/echo ] && echo_cmd=/system/bin/echo
fi
# still empty? fallback to builtin
[ -z "$echo_cmd" ] && echo_cmd='echo'
__echo()
{
opt="$1"
shift
_msg="$*"
if [ "$opt_no_color" = 1 ] ; then
# strip ANSI color codes
# some sed versions (i.e. toybox) can't seem to handle
# \033 aka \x1B correctly, so do it for them.
if [ "$echo_cmd_type" = printf ]; then
_interpret_chars=''
else
_interpret_chars='-e'
fi
_ctrlchar=$($echo_cmd $_interpret_chars "\033")
_msg=$($echo_cmd $_interpret_chars "$_msg" | sed -r "s/$_ctrlchar\[([0-9][0-9]?(;[0-9][0-9]?)?)?m//g")
fi
if [ "$echo_cmd_type" = printf ]; then
if [ "$opt" = "-n" ]; then
$echo_cmd "$_msg"
else
$echo_cmd "$_msg\n"
fi
else
# shellcheck disable=SC2086
$echo_cmd $opt -e "$_msg"
fi
}
_echo()
{
if [ "$opt_verbose" -ge "$1" ]; then
shift
__echo '' "$*"
fi
}
_echo_nol()
{
if [ "$opt_verbose" -ge "$1" ]; then
shift
__echo -n "$*"
fi
}
_warn()
{
_echo 0 "\033[31m$*\033[0m" >&2
}
_info()
{
_echo 1 "$*"
}
_info_nol()
{
_echo_nol 1 "$*"
}
_verbose()
{
_echo 2 "$*"
}
_verbose_nol()
{
_echo_nol 2 "$*"
}
_debug()
{
_echo 3 "\033[34m(debug) $*\033[0m"
}
explain()
{
if [ "$opt_explain" = 1 ] ; then
_info ''
_info "> \033[41m\033[30mHow to fix:\033[0m $*"
fi
}
cve2name()
{
case "$1" in
CVE-2017-5753) echo "Spectre Variant 1, bounds check bypass";;
CVE-2017-5715) echo "Spectre Variant 2, branch target injection";;
CVE-2017-5754) echo "Variant 3, Meltdown, rogue data cache load";;
CVE-2018-3640) echo "Variant 3a, rogue system register read";;
CVE-2018-3639) echo "Variant 4, speculative store bypass";;
CVE-2018-3615) echo "Foreshadow (SGX), L1 terminal fault";;
CVE-2018-3620) echo "Foreshadow-NG (OS), L1 terminal fault";;
CVE-2018-3646) echo "Foreshadow-NG (VMM), L1 terminal fault";;
CVE-2018-12126) echo "Fallout, microarchitectural store buffer data sampling (MSBDS)";;
CVE-2018-12130) echo "ZombieLoad, microarchitectural fill buffer data sampling (MFBDS)";;
CVE-2018-12127) echo "RIDL, microarchitectural load port data sampling (MLPDS)";;
CVE-2019-11091) echo "RIDL, microarchitectural data sampling uncacheable memory (MDSUM)";;
CVE-2019-11135) echo "ZombieLoad V2, TSX Asynchronous Abort (TAA)";;
CVE-2018-12207) echo "No eXcuses, iTLB Multihit, machine check exception on page size changes (MCEPSC)";;
CVE-2020-0543) echo "Special Register Buffer Data Sampling (SRBDS)";;
*) echo "$0: error: invalid CVE '$1' passed to cve2name()" >&2; exit 255;;
esac
}
is_cpu_vulnerable_cached=0
_is_cpu_vulnerable_cached()
{
# shellcheck disable=SC2086
case "$1" in
CVE-2017-5753) return $variant1;;
CVE-2017-5715) return $variant2;;
CVE-2017-5754) return $variant3;;
CVE-2018-3640) return $variant3a;;
CVE-2018-3639) return $variant4;;
CVE-2018-3615) return $variantl1tf_sgx;;
CVE-2018-3620) return $variantl1tf;;
CVE-2018-3646) return $variantl1tf;;
CVE-2018-12126) return $variant_msbds;;
CVE-2018-12130) return $variant_mfbds;;
CVE-2018-12127) return $variant_mlpds;;
CVE-2019-11091) return $variant_mdsum;;
CVE-2019-11135) return $variant_taa;;
CVE-2018-12207) return $variant_itlbmh;;
CVE-2020-0543) return $variant_srbds;;
*) echo "$0: error: invalid variant '$1' passed to is_cpu_vulnerable()" >&2; exit 255;;
esac
}
is_cpu_vulnerable()
{
# param: one of the $supported_cve_list items
# returns 0 if vulnerable, 1 if not vulnerable
# (note that in shell, a return of 0 is success)
# by default, everything is vulnerable, we work in a "whitelist" logic here.
# usage: is_cpu_vulnerable CVE-xxxx-yyyy && do something if vulnerable
if [ "$is_cpu_vulnerable_cached" = 1 ]; then
_is_cpu_vulnerable_cached "$1"
return $?
fi
variant1=''
variant2=''
variant3=''
variant3a=''
variant4=''
variantl1tf=''
variant_msbds=''
variant_mfbds=''
variant_mlpds=''
variant_mdsum=''
variant_taa=''
variant_itlbmh=''
variant_srbds=''
if is_cpu_mds_free; then
[ -z "$variant_msbds" ] && variant_msbds=immune
[ -z "$variant_mfbds" ] && variant_mfbds=immune
[ -z "$variant_mlpds" ] && variant_mlpds=immune
[ -z "$variant_mdsum" ] && variant_mdsum=immune
_debug "is_cpu_vulnerable: cpu not affected by Microarchitectural Data Sampling"
fi
if is_cpu_taa_free; then
[ -z "$variant_taa" ] && variant_taa=immune
_debug "is_cpu_vulnerable: cpu not affected by TSX Asynhronous Abort"
fi
if is_cpu_srbds_free; then
[ -z "$variant_srbds" ] && variant_srbds=immune
_debug "is_cpu_vulnerable: cpu not affected by Special Register Buffer Data Sampling"
fi
if is_cpu_specex_free; then
variant1=immune
variant2=immune
variant3=immune
variant3a=immune
variant4=immune
variantl1tf=immune
variant_msbds=immune
variant_mfbds=immune
variant_mlpds=immune
variant_mdsum=immune
variant_taa=immune
variant_srbds=immune
elif is_intel; then
# Intel
# https://github.com/crozone/SpectrePoC/issues/1 ^F E5200 => spectre 2 not vulnerable
# https://github.com/paboldin/meltdown-exploit/issues/19 ^F E5200 => meltdown vulnerable
# model name : Pentium(R) Dual-Core CPU E5200 @ 2.50GHz
if echo "$cpu_friendly_name" | grep -qE 'Pentium\(R\) Dual-Core[[:space:]]+CPU[[:space:]]+E[0-9]{4}K?'; then
variant1=vuln
[ -z "$variant2" ] && variant2=immune
variant3=vuln
fi
if [ "$capabilities_rdcl_no" = 1 ]; then
# capability bit for future Intel processor that will explicitly state
# that they're not vulnerable to Meltdown
# this var is set in check_cpu()
[ -z "$variant3" ] && variant3=immune
[ -z "$variantl1tf" ] && variantl1tf=immune
_debug "is_cpu_vulnerable: RDCL_NO is set so not vuln to meltdown nor l1tf"
fi
if [ "$capabilities_ssb_no" = 1 ]; then
# capability bit for future Intel processor that will explicitly state
# that they're not vulnerable to Variant 4
# this var is set in check_cpu()
[ -z "$variant4" ] && variant4=immune
_debug "is_cpu_vulnerable: SSB_NO is set so not vuln to variant4"
fi
if is_cpu_ssb_free; then
[ -z "$variant4" ] && variant4=immune
_debug "is_cpu_vulnerable: cpu not affected by speculative store bypass so not vuln to variant4"
fi
# variant 3a
if [ "$cpu_family" = 6 ]; then
if [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_XEON_PHI_KNL" ] || [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_XEON_PHI_KNM" ]; then
_debug "is_cpu_vulnerable: xeon phi immune to variant 3a"
[ -z "$variant3a" ] && variant3a=immune
elif [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SILVERMONT" ] || \
[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SILVERMONT_MID" ] || \
[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SILVERMONT_D" ]; then
# https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/security-center/advisory/intel-sa-00115.html
# https://github.com/speed47/spectre-meltdown-checker/issues/310
# => silvermont CPUs (aka cherry lake for tablets and brawsell for mobile/desktop) don't seem to be vulnerable
# => goldmont ARE vulnerable
_debug "is_cpu_vulnerable: silvermont immune to variant 3a"
[ -z "$variant3a" ] && variant3a=immune
fi
fi
# L1TF (RDCL_NO already checked above)
if [ "$cpu_family" = 6 ]; then
if [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SALTWELL" ] || \
[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SALTWELL_TABLET" ] || \
[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SALTWELL_MID" ] || \
[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_BONNELL" ] || \
[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_BONNELL_MID" ] || \
[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SILVERMONT" ] || \
[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SILVERMONT_MID" ] || \
[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SILVERMONT_D" ] || \
[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_AIRMONT" ] || \
[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_AIRMONT_MID" ] || \
[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_AIRMONT_NP" ] || \
[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_GOLDMONT" ] || \
[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_GOLDMONT_D" ] || \
[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_GOLDMONT_PLUS" ] || \
[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_TREMONT_D" ] || \
[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_XEON_PHI_KNL" ] || \
[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_XEON_PHI_KNM" ]; then
_debug "is_cpu_vulnerable: intel family 6 but model known to be immune to l1tf"
[ -z "$variantl1tf" ] && variantl1tf=immune
else
_debug "is_cpu_vulnerable: intel family 6 is vuln to l1tf"
variantl1tf=vuln
fi
elif [ "$cpu_family" -lt 6 ]; then
_debug "is_cpu_vulnerable: intel family < 6 is immune to l1tf"
[ -z "$variantl1tf" ] && variantl1tf=immune
fi
elif is_amd || is_hygon; then
# AMD revised their statement about variant2 => vulnerable
# https://www.amd.com/en/corporate/speculative-execution
variant1=vuln
variant2=vuln
[ -z "$variant3" ] && variant3=immune
# https://www.amd.com/en/corporate/security-updates
# "We have not identified any AMD x86 products susceptible to the Variant 3a vulnerability in our analysis to-date."
[ -z "$variant3a" ] && variant3a=immune
if is_cpu_ssb_free; then
[ -z "$variant4" ] && variant4=immune
_debug "is_cpu_vulnerable: cpu not affected by speculative store bypass so not vuln to variant4"
fi
variantl1tf=immune
elif [ "$cpu_vendor" = CAVIUM ]; then
variant3=immune
variant3a=immune
variantl1tf=immune
elif [ "$cpu_vendor" = PHYTIUM ]; then
variant3=immune
variant3a=immune
variantl1tf=immune
elif [ "$cpu_vendor" = ARM ]; then
# ARM
# reference: https://developer.arm.com/support/security-update
# some devices (phones or other) have several ARMs and as such different part numbers,
# an example is "bigLITTLE". we shouldn't rely on the first CPU only, so we check the whole list
i=0
for cpupart in $cpu_part_list
do
i=$(( i + 1 ))
# do NOT quote $cpu_arch_list below
# shellcheck disable=SC2086
cpuarch=$(echo $cpu_arch_list | awk '{ print $'$i' }')
_debug "checking cpu$i: <$cpupart> <$cpuarch>"
# some kernels report AArch64 instead of 8
[ "$cpuarch" = "AArch64" ] && cpuarch=8
if [ -n "$cpupart" ] && [ -n "$cpuarch" ]; then
# Cortex-R7 and Cortex-R8 are real-time and only used in medical devices or such
# I can't find their CPU part number, but it's probably not that useful anyway
# model R7 R8 A8 A9 A12 A15 A17 A57 A72 A73 A75 A76 Neoverse-N1 A77
# part ? ? c08 c09 c0d c0f c0e d07 d08 d09 d0a d0b d0c d0d
# arch 7? 7? 7 7 7 7 7 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
#
# Whitelist identified non-vulnerable processors, use vulnerability information from
# https://developer.arm.com/support/arm-security-updates/speculative-processor-vulnerability
# Partnumbers can be found here:
# https://github.com/gcc-mirror/gcc/blob/master/gcc/config/arm/arm-cpus.in
#
# Maintain cumulative check of vulnerabilities -
# if at least one of the cpu is vulnerable, then the system is vulnerable
if [ "$cpuarch" = 7 ] && echo "$cpupart" | grep -q -w -e 0xc08 -e 0xc09 -e 0xc0d -e 0xc0e; then
variant1=vuln
variant2=vuln
[ -z "$variant3" ] && variant3=immune
[ -z "$variant3a" ] && variant3a=immune
[ -z "$variant4" ] && variant4=immune
_debug "checking cpu$i: armv7 A8/A9/A12/A17 non vulnerable to variants 3, 3a & 4"
elif [ "$cpuarch" = 7 ] && echo "$cpupart" | grep -q -w -e 0xc0f; then
variant1=vuln
variant2=vuln
[ -z "$variant3" ] && variant3=immune
variant3a=vuln
[ -z "$variant4" ] && variant4=immune
_debug "checking cpu$i: armv7 A15 non vulnerable to variants 3 & 4"
elif [ "$cpuarch" = 8 ] && echo "$cpupart" | grep -q -w -e 0xd07 -e 0xd08; then
variant1=vuln
variant2=vuln
[ -z "$variant3" ] && variant3=immune
variant3a=vuln
variant4=vuln
_debug "checking cpu$i: armv8 A57/A72 non vulnerable to variants 3"
elif [ "$cpuarch" = 8 ] && echo "$cpupart" | grep -q -w -e 0xd09; then
variant1=vuln
variant2=vuln
[ -z "$variant3" ] && variant3=immune
[ -z "$variant3a" ] && variant3a=immune
variant4=vuln
_debug "checking cpu$i: armv8 A73 non vulnerable to variants 3 & 3a"
elif [ "$cpuarch" = 8 ] && echo "$cpupart" | grep -q -w -e 0xd0a; then
variant1=vuln
variant2=vuln
variant3=vuln
[ -z "$variant3a" ] && variant3a=immune
variant4=vuln
_debug "checking cpu$i: armv8 A75 non vulnerable to variant 3a"
elif [ "$cpuarch" = 8 ] && echo "$cpupart" | grep -q -w -e 0xd0b -e 0xd0c -e 0xd0d; then
variant1=vuln
[ -z "$variant2" ] && variant2=immune
[ -z "$variant3" ] && variant3=immune
[ -z "$variant3a" ] && variant3a=immune
variant4=vuln
_debug "checking cpu$i: armv8 A76/A77/NeoverseN1 non vulnerable to variant 2, 3 & 3a"
elif [ "$cpuarch" -le 7 ] || { [ "$cpuarch" = 8 ] && [ $(( cpupart )) -lt $(( 0xd07 )) ]; } ; then
[ -z "$variant1" ] && variant1=immune
[ -z "$variant2" ] && variant2=immune
[ -z "$variant3" ] && variant3=immune
[ -z "$variant3a" ] && variant3a=immune
[ -z "$variant4" ] && variant4=immune
_debug "checking cpu$i: arm arch$cpuarch, all immune (v7 or v8 and model < 0xd07)"
else
variant1=vuln
variant2=vuln
variant3=vuln
variant3a=vuln
variant4=vuln
_debug "checking cpu$i: arm unknown arch$cpuarch part$cpupart, considering vuln"
fi
fi
_debug "is_cpu_vulnerable: for cpu$i and so far, we have <$variant1> <$variant2> <$variant3> <$variant3a> <$variant4>"
done
variantl1tf=immune
fi
# we handle iTLB Multihit here (not linked to is_specex_free)
if is_intel; then
# commit f9aa6b73a407b714c9aac44734eb4045c893c6f7
if [ "$cpu_family" = 6 ]; then
if [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SALTWELL" ] || \
[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SALTWELL_TABLET" ] || \
[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SALTWELL_MID" ] || \
[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_BONNELL" ] || \
[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_BONNELL_MID" ] || \
[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SILVERMONT" ] || \
[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SILVERMONT_D" ] || \
[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SILVERMONT_MID" ] || \
[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_AIRMONT" ] || \
[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_XEON_PHI_KNL" ] || \
[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_XEON_PHI_KNM" ] || \
[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_AIRMONT_MID" ] || \
[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_GOLDMONT" ] || \
[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_GOLDMONT_D" ] || \
[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_GOLDMONT_PLUS" ]; then
_debug "is_cpu_vulnerable: intel family 6 but model known to be immune to itlbmh"
[ -z "$variant_itlbmh" ] && variant_itlbmh=immune
else
_debug "is_cpu_vulnerable: intel family 6 is vuln to itlbmh"
variant_itlbmh=vuln
fi
elif [ "$cpu_family" -lt 6 ]; then
_debug "is_cpu_vulnerable: intel family < 6 is immune to itlbmh"
[ -z "$variant_itlbmh" ] && variant_itlbmh=immune
fi
else
_debug "is_cpu_vulnerable: non-intel not vulnerable to itlbmh"
[ -z "$variant_itlbmh" ] && variant_itlbmh=immune
fi
_debug "is_cpu_vulnerable: temp results are <$variant1> <$variant2> <$variant3> <$variant3a> <$variant4> <$variantl1tf>"
[ "$variant1" = "immune" ] && variant1=1 || variant1=0
[ "$variant2" = "immune" ] && variant2=1 || variant2=0
[ "$variant3" = "immune" ] && variant3=1 || variant3=0
[ "$variant3a" = "immune" ] && variant3a=1 || variant3a=0
[ "$variant4" = "immune" ] && variant4=1 || variant4=0
[ "$variantl1tf" = "immune" ] && variantl1tf=1 || variantl1tf=0
[ "$variant_msbds" = "immune" ] && variant_msbds=1 || variant_msbds=0
[ "$variant_mfbds" = "immune" ] && variant_mfbds=1 || variant_mfbds=0
[ "$variant_mlpds" = "immune" ] && variant_mlpds=1 || variant_mlpds=0
[ "$variant_mdsum" = "immune" ] && variant_mdsum=1 || variant_mdsum=0
[ "$variant_taa" = "immune" ] && variant_taa=1 || variant_taa=0
[ "$variant_itlbmh" = "immune" ] && variant_itlbmh=1 || variant_itlbmh=0
[ "$variant_srbds" = "immune" ] && variant_srbds=1 || variant_srbds=0
variantl1tf_sgx="$variantl1tf"
# even if we are vulnerable to L1TF, if there's no SGX, we're not vulnerable to the original foreshadow
[ "$cpuid_sgx" = 0 ] && variantl1tf_sgx=1
_debug "is_cpu_vulnerable: final results are <$variant1> <$variant2> <$variant3> <$variant3a> <$variant4> <$variantl1tf> <$variantl1tf_sgx>"
is_cpu_vulnerable_cached=1
_is_cpu_vulnerable_cached "$1"
return $?
}
is_cpu_specex_free()
{
# return true (0) if the CPU doesn't do speculative execution, false (1) if it does.
# if it's not in the list we know, return false (1).
# source: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/tree/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c#n882
# { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SALTWELL, X86_FEATURE_ANY },
# { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SALTWELL_TABLET, X86_FEATURE_ANY },
# { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_BONNELL_MID, X86_FEATURE_ANY },
# { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SALTWELL_MID, X86_FEATURE_ANY },
# { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_BONNELL, X86_FEATURE_ANY },
# { X86_VENDOR_CENTAUR, 5 },
# { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 5 },
# { X86_VENDOR_NSC, 5 },
# { X86_VENDOR_ANY, 4 },
parse_cpu_details
if is_intel; then
if [ "$cpu_family" = 6 ]; then
if [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SALTWELL" ] || \
[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SALTWELL_TABLET" ] || \
[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_BONNELL_MID" ] || \
[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SALTWELL_MID" ] || \
[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_BONNELL" ]; then
return 0
fi
elif [ "$cpu_family" = 5 ]; then
return 0
fi
fi
[ "$cpu_family" = 4 ] && return 0
return 1
}
is_cpu_mds_free()
{
# return true (0) if the CPU isn't affected by microarchitectural data sampling, false (1) if it does.
# if it's not in the list we know, return false (1).
# source: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/tree/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
#VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT, NO_MDS | NO_L1TF),
#VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT_X, NO_MDS | NO_L1TF),
#VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT_PLUS, NO_MDS | NO_L1TF),
#/* AMD Family 0xf - 0x12 */
#VULNWL_AMD(0x0f, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS),
#VULNWL_AMD(0x10, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS),
#VULNWL_AMD(0x11, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS),
#VULNWL_AMD(0x12, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS),
#/* FAMILY_ANY must be last, otherwise 0x0f - 0x12 matches won't work */
#VULNWL_AMD(X86_FAMILY_ANY, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS),
#VULNWL_HYGON(X86_FAMILY_ANY, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS),
parse_cpu_details
if is_intel; then
if [ "$cpu_family" = 6 ]; then
if [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_GOLDMONT" ] || \
[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_GOLDMONT_D" ] || \
[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_GOLDMONT_PLUS" ]; then
return 0
fi
fi
[ "$capabilities_mds_no" = 1 ] && return 0
fi
# official statement from AMD says none of their CPUs are vulnerable
# https://www.amd.com/en/corporate/product-security
# https://www.amd.com/system/files/documents/security-whitepaper.pdf
if is_amd; then
return 0
elif is_hygon; then
return 0
elif [ "$cpu_vendor" = CAVIUM ]; then
return 0
elif [ "$cpu_vendor" = PHYTIUM ]; then
return 0
elif [ "$cpu_vendor" = ARM ]; then
return 0
fi
return 1
}
is_cpu_taa_free()
{
# return true (0) if the CPU isn't affected by tsx asynchronous aborts, false (1) if it does.
# There are three types of processors that do not require additional mitigations.
# 1. CPUs that do not support Intel TSX are not affected.
# 2. CPUs that enumerate IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES[TAA_NO] (bit 8)=1 are not affected.
# 3. CPUs that support Intel TSX and do not enumerate IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES[MDS_NO] (bit 5)=1
# do not need additional mitigations beyond what is already required to mitigate MDS.
if ! is_intel; then
return 0
# is intel
elif [ "$capabilities_taa_no" = 1 ] || [ "$cpuid_rtm" = 0 ]; then
return 0
fi
return 1
}
is_cpu_srbds_free()
{
# return zero (0) if the CPU isn't affected by special register buffer data sampling, one (1) if it is.
# If it's not in the list we know, return one (1).
# source: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/tree/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
#
# A processor is affected by SRBDS if its Family_Model and stepping is in the
# following list, with the exception of the listed processors
# exporting MDS_NO while Intel TSX is available yet not enabled. The
# latter class of processors are only affected when Intel TSX is enabled
# by software using TSX_CTRL_MSR otherwise they are not affected.
#
# ============= ============ ========
# common name Family_Model Stepping
# ============= ============ ========
# IvyBridge 06_3AH All (INTEL_FAM6_IVYBRIDGE)
#
# Haswell 06_3CH All (INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL)
# Haswell_L 06_45H All (INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_L)
# Haswell_G 06_46H All (INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_G)
#
# Broadwell_G 06_47H All (INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_G)
# Broadwell 06_3DH All (INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL)
#
# Skylake_L 06_4EH All (INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_L)
# Skylake 06_5EH All (INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE)
#
# Kabylake_L 06_8EH <=0xC (MDS_NO) (INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_L)
#
# Kabylake 06_9EH <=0xD (MDS_NO) (INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE)
# ============= ============ ========
parse_cpu_details
if is_intel; then
if [ "$cpu_family" = 6 ]; then
if [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_IVYBRIDGE" ] || \
[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL" ] || \
[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_L" ] || \
[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_G" ] || \
[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_G" ] || \
[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL" ] || \
[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_L" ] || \
[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE" ]; then
return 1
elif [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_L" ] && [ "$cpu_stepping" -le 12 ] || \
[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE" ] && [ "$cpu_stepping" -le 13 ]; then
if [ "$capabilities_mds_no" -eq 1 ] && { [ "$cpuid_rtm" -eq 0 ] || [ "$tsx_ctrl_msr_rtm_disable" -eq 1 ] ;} ; then
return 0
else
return 1
fi
fi
fi
fi
return 0
}
is_cpu_ssb_free()
{
# return true (0) if the CPU isn't affected by speculative store bypass, false (1) if it does.
# if it's not in the list we know, return false (1).
# source1: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/tree/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c#n945
# source2: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip.git/tree/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
# Only list CPUs that speculate but are immune, to avoid duplication of cpus listed in is_cpu_specex_free()
#{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SILVERMONT },
#{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_AIRMONT },
#{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SILVERMONT_X },
#{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SILVERMONT_MID },
#{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_CORE_YONAH },
#{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_XEON_PHI_KNL },
#{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_XEON_PHI_KNM },
#{ X86_VENDOR_AMD, 0x12, },
#{ X86_VENDOR_AMD, 0x11, },
#{ X86_VENDOR_AMD, 0x10, },
#{ X86_VENDOR_AMD, 0xf, },
parse_cpu_details
if is_intel; then
if [ "$cpu_family" = 6 ]; then
if [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_AIRMONT" ] || \
[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SILVERMONT" ] || \
[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SILVERMONT_D" ] || \
[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SILVERMONT_MID" ]; then
return 0
elif [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_CORE_YONAH" ] || \
[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_XEON_PHI_KNL" ] || \
[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_XEON_PHI_KNM" ]; then
return 0
fi
fi
fi
if is_amd; then
if [ "$cpu_family" = "18" ] || \
[ "$cpu_family" = "17" ] || \
[ "$cpu_family" = "16" ] || \
[ "$cpu_family" = "15" ]; then
return 0
fi
fi
if is_hygon; then
return 1
fi
[ "$cpu_family" = 4 ] && return 0
return 1
}
show_header()
{
_info "Spectre and Meltdown mitigation detection tool v$VERSION"
_info
}
[ -z "$HOME" ] && HOME="$(getent passwd "$(whoami)" | cut -d: -f6)"
mcedb_cache="$HOME/.mcedb"
update_fwdb()
{
show_header
set -e
if [ -r "$mcedb_cache" ]; then
previous_dbversion=$(awk '/^# %%% MCEDB / { print $4 }' "$mcedb_cache")
fi
# first, download the MCE.db from the excellent platomav's MCExtractor project
mcedb_tmp="$(mktemp /tmp/mcedb-XXXXXX)"
mcedb_url='https://github.com/platomav/MCExtractor/raw/master/MCE.db'
_info_nol "Fetching MCE.db from the MCExtractor project... "
if command -v wget >/dev/null 2>&1; then
wget -q "$mcedb_url" -O "$mcedb_tmp"; ret=$?
elif command -v curl >/dev/null 2>&1; then
curl -sL "$mcedb_url" -o "$mcedb_tmp"; ret=$?
elif command -v fetch >/dev/null 2>&1; then
fetch -q "$mcedb_url" -o "$mcedb_tmp"; ret=$?
else
echo ERROR "please install one of \`wget\`, \`curl\` of \`fetch\` programs"
return 1
fi
if [ "$ret" != 0 ]; then
echo ERROR "error $ret while downloading MCE.db"
return $ret
fi
echo DONE
# second, get the Intel firmwares from GitHub
intel_tmp="$(mktemp -d /tmp/intelfw-XXXXXX)"
intel_url="https://github.com/intel/Intel-Linux-Processor-Microcode-Data-Files/archive/main.zip"
_info_nol "Fetching Intel firmwares... "
## https://github.com/intel/Intel-Linux-Processor-Microcode-Data-Files.git
if command -v wget >/dev/null 2>&1; then
wget -q "$intel_url" -O "$intel_tmp/fw.zip"; ret=$?
elif command -v curl >/dev/null 2>&1; then
curl -sL "$intel_url" -o "$intel_tmp/fw.zip"; ret=$?
elif command -v fetch >/dev/null 2>&1; then
fetch -q "$intel_url" -o "$intel_tmp/fw.zip"; ret=$?
else
echo ERROR "please install one of \`wget\`, \`curl\` of \`fetch\` programs"
return 1
fi
if [ "$ret" != 0 ]; then
echo ERROR "error $ret while downloading Intel firmwares"
return $ret
fi
echo DONE
# now extract MCEdb contents using sqlite
_info_nol "Extracting MCEdb data... "
if ! command -v sqlite3 >/dev/null 2>&1; then
echo ERROR "please install the \`sqlite3\` program"
return 1
fi
mcedb_revision=$(sqlite3 "$mcedb_tmp" "select revision from MCE")
if [ -z "$mcedb_revision" ]; then
echo ERROR "downloaded file seems invalid"
return 1
fi
sqlite3 "$mcedb_tmp" "alter table Intel add column origin text"
sqlite3 "$mcedb_tmp" "update Intel set origin='mce'"
echo OK "MCExtractor database revision $mcedb_revision"
# parse Intel firmwares to get their versions
_info_nol "Integrating Intel firmwares data to db... "
if ! command -v unzip >/dev/null 2>&1; then
echo ERROR "please install the \`unzip\` program"
return 1
fi
( cd "$intel_tmp" && unzip fw.zip >/dev/null; )
if ! [ -d "$intel_tmp/Intel-Linux-Processor-Microcode-Data-Files-main/intel-ucode" ]; then
echo ERROR "expected the 'intel-ucode' folder in the downloaded zip file"
return 1
fi
if ! command -v iucode_tool >/dev/null 2>&1; then
if ! command -v iucode-tool >/dev/null 2>&1; then
echo ERROR "please install the \`iucode-tool\` program"
return 1
else
iucode_tool="iucode-tool"
fi
else
iucode_tool="iucode_tool"
fi
# 079/001: sig 0x000106c2, pf_mask 0x01, 2009-04-10, rev 0x0217, size 5120
# 078/004: sig 0x000106ca, pf_mask 0x10, 2009-08-25, rev 0x0107, size 5120
$iucode_tool -l "$intel_tmp/Intel-Linux-Processor-Microcode-Data-Files-main/intel-ucode" | grep -wF sig | while read -r _line
do
_line=$( echo "$_line" | tr -d ',')
_cpuid=$( echo "$_line" | awk '{print $3}')
_cpuid=$(( _cpuid ))
_cpuid=$(printf "0x%08X" "$_cpuid")
_date=$( echo "$_line" | awk '{print $6}' | tr -d '-')
_version=$(echo "$_line" | awk '{print $8}')
_version=$(( _version ))
_version=$(printf "0x%08X" "$_version")
_sqlstm="$(printf "INSERT INTO Intel (origin,cpuid,version,yyyymmdd) VALUES (\"%s\",\"%s\",\"%s\",\"%s\");" "intel" "$(printf "%08X" "$_cpuid")" "$(printf "%08X" "$_version")" "$_date")"
sqlite3 "$mcedb_tmp" "$_sqlstm"
done
_intel_timestamp=$(stat -c %Y "$intel_tmp/Intel-Linux-Processor-Microcode-Data-Files-main/license" 2>/dev/null)
if [ -n "$_intel_timestamp" ]; then
# use this date, it matches the last commit date
_intel_latest_date=$(date +%Y%m%d -d @"$_intel_timestamp")
else
echo "Falling back to the latest microcode date"
_intel_latest_date=$(sqlite3 "$mcedb_tmp" "SELECT yyyymmdd from Intel WHERE origin = 'intel' ORDER BY yyyymmdd DESC LIMIT 1;")
fi
echo DONE "(version $_intel_latest_date)"
dbversion="$mcedb_revision+i$_intel_latest_date"
if [ "$1" != builtin ] && [ -n "$previous_dbversion" ] && [ "$previous_dbversion" = "v$dbversion" ]; then
echo "We already have this version locally, no update needed"
return 0
fi
_info_nol "Building local database... "
{
echo "# Spectre & Meltdown Checker";
echo "# %%% MCEDB v$dbversion";
sqlite3 "$mcedb_tmp" "SELECT '# I,0x'||t1.cpuid||',0x'||MAX(t1.version)||','||t1.yyyymmdd FROM Intel AS t1 LEFT OUTER JOIN Intel AS t2 ON t2.cpuid=t1.cpuid AND t2.yyyymmdd > t1.yyyymmdd WHERE t2.yyyymmdd IS NULL GROUP BY t1.cpuid ORDER BY t1.cpuid ASC;" | grep -v '^# .,0x00000000,';
sqlite3 "$mcedb_tmp" "SELECT '# A,0x'||t1.cpuid||',0x'||MAX(t1.version)||','||t1.yyyymmdd FROM AMD AS t1 LEFT OUTER JOIN AMD AS t2 ON t2.cpuid=t1.cpuid AND t2.yyyymmdd > t1.yyyymmdd WHERE t2.yyyymmdd IS NULL GROUP BY t1.cpuid ORDER BY t1.cpuid ASC;" | grep -v '^# .,0x00000000,';
} > "$mcedb_cache"
echo DONE "(version $dbversion)"
if [ "$1" = builtin ]; then
newfile=$(mktemp /tmp/smc-XXXXXX)
awk '/^# %%% MCEDB / { exit }; { print }' "$0" > "$newfile"
awk '{ if (NR>1) { print } }' "$mcedb_cache" >> "$newfile"
cat "$newfile" > "$0"
rm -f "$newfile"
fi
}
parse_opt_file()
{
# parse_opt_file option_name option_value
option_name="$1"
option_value="$2"
if [ -z "$option_value" ]; then
show_header
show_usage
echo "$0: error: --$option_name expects one parameter (a file)" >&2
exit 1
elif [ ! -e "$option_value" ]; then
show_header
echo "$0: error: couldn't find file $option_value" >&2
exit 1
elif [ ! -f "$option_value" ]; then
show_header
echo "$0: error: $option_value is not a file" >&2
exit 1
elif [ ! -r "$option_value" ]; then
show_header
echo "$0: error: couldn't read $option_value (are you root?)" >&2
exit 1
fi
echo "$option_value"
exit 0
}
while [ -n "${1:-}" ]; do
if [ "$1" = "--kernel" ]; then
opt_kernel=$(parse_opt_file kernel "$2"); ret=$?
[ $ret -ne 0 ] && exit 255
shift 2
elif [ "$1" = "--config" ]; then
opt_config=$(parse_opt_file config "$2"); ret=$?
[ $ret -ne 0 ] && exit 255
shift 2
elif [ "$1" = "--map" ]; then
opt_map=$(parse_opt_file map "$2"); ret=$?
[ $ret -ne 0 ] && exit 255
shift 2
elif [ "$1" = "--arch-prefix" ]; then
opt_arch_prefix="$2"
shift 2
elif [ "$1" = "--live" ]; then
opt_live=1
shift
elif [ "$1" = "--no-color" ]; then
opt_no_color=1
shift
elif [ "$1" = "--no-sysfs" ]; then
opt_no_sysfs=1
shift
elif [ "$1" = "--sysfs-only" ]; then
opt_sysfs_only=1
shift
elif [ "$1" = "--coreos" ]; then
opt_coreos=1
shift
elif [ "$1" = "--coreos-within-toolbox" ]; then
# don't use directly: used internally by --coreos
opt_coreos=0
shift
elif [ "$1" = "--paranoid" ]; then
opt_paranoid=1
shift
elif [ "$1" = "--hw-only" ]; then
opt_hw_only=1
shift
elif [ "$1" = "--no-hw" ]; then
opt_no_hw=1
shift
elif [ "$1" = "--cpu" ]; then
opt_cpu=$2
if [ "$opt_cpu" != all ]; then
if echo "$opt_cpu" | grep -Eq '^[0-9]+'; then
opt_cpu=$(( opt_cpu ))
else
echo "$0: error: --cpu should be an integer or 'all', got '$opt_cpu'" >&2
exit 255
fi
fi
shift 2
elif [ "$1" = "--no-explain" ]; then
# deprecated, kept for compatibility
opt_explain=0
shift
elif [ "$1" = "--update-fwdb" ] || [ "$1" = "--update-mcedb" ]; then
update_fwdb
exit $?
elif [ "$1" = "--update-builtin-fwdb" ] || [ "$1" = "--update-builtin-mcedb" ]; then
update_fwdb builtin
exit $?
elif [ "$1" = "--dump-mock-data" ]; then
opt_mock=1
shift
elif [ "$1" = "--explain" ]; then
opt_explain=1
shift
elif [ "$1" = "--batch" ]; then
opt_batch=1
opt_verbose=0
opt_no_color=1
shift
case "$1" in
text|short|nrpe|json|prometheus) opt_batch_format="$1"; shift;;
--*) ;; # allow subsequent flags
'') ;; # allow nothing at all
*)
echo "$0: error: unknown batch format '$1'" >&2
echo "$0: error: --batch expects a format from: text, nrpe, json" >&2
exit 255
;;
esac
elif [ "$1" = "-v" ] || [ "$1" = "--verbose" ]; then
opt_verbose=$(( opt_verbose + 1 ))
[ "$opt_verbose" -ge 2 ] && opt_mock=1
shift
elif [ "$1" = "--cve" ]; then
if [ -z "$2" ]; then
echo "$0: error: option --cve expects a parameter, supported CVEs are: $supported_cve_list" >&2
exit 255
fi
selected_cve=$(echo "$supported_cve_list" | grep -iwo "$2")
if [ -n "$selected_cve" ]; then
opt_cve_list="$opt_cve_list $selected_cve"
opt_cve_all=0
else
echo "$0: error: unsupported CVE specified ('$2'), supported CVEs are: $supported_cve_list" >&2
exit 255
fi
shift 2
elif [ "$1" = "--vmm" ]; then
if [ -z "$2" ]; then
echo "$0: error: option --vmm (auto, yes, no)" >&2
exit 255
fi
case "$2" in
auto) opt_vmm=-1;;
yes) opt_vmm=1;;
no) opt_vmm=0;;
*) echo "$0: error: expected one of (auto, yes, no) to option --vmm instead of '$2'" >&2; exit 255;;
esac
shift 2
elif [ "$1" = "--variant" ]; then
if [ -z "$2" ]; then
echo "$0: error: option --variant expects a parameter (1, 2, 3, 3a, 4 or l1tf)" >&2
exit 255
fi
case "$2" in
1) opt_cve_list="$opt_cve_list CVE-2017-5753"; opt_cve_all=0;;
2) opt_cve_list="$opt_cve_list CVE-2017-5715"; opt_cve_all=0;;
3) opt_cve_list="$opt_cve_list CVE-2017-5754"; opt_cve_all=0;;
3a) opt_cve_list="$opt_cve_list CVE-2018-3640"; opt_cve_all=0;;
4) opt_cve_list="$opt_cve_list CVE-2018-3639"; opt_cve_all=0;;
msbds) opt_cve_list="$opt_cve_list CVE-2018-12126"; opt_cve_all=0;;
mfbds) opt_cve_list="$opt_cve_list CVE-2018-12130"; opt_cve_all=0;;
mlpds) opt_cve_list="$opt_cve_list CVE-2018-12127"; opt_cve_all=0;;
mdsum) opt_cve_list="$opt_cve_list CVE-2019-11091"; opt_cve_all=0;;
l1tf) opt_cve_list="$opt_cve_list CVE-2018-3615 CVE-2018-3620 CVE-2018-3646"; opt_cve_all=0;;
taa) opt_cve_list="$opt_cve_list CVE-2019-11135"; opt_cve_all=0;;
mcepsc) opt_cve_list="$opt_cve_list CVE-2018-12207"; opt_cve_all=0;;
srbds) opt_cve_list="$opt_cve_list CVE-2020-0543"; opt_cve_all=0;;
*)
echo "$0: error: invalid parameter '$2' for --variant, expected either 1, 2, 3, 3a, 4, l1tf, msbds, mfbds, mlpds, mdsum, taa, mcepsc or srbds" >&2;
exit 255
;;
esac
shift 2
elif [ "$1" = "-h" ] || [ "$1" = "--help" ]; then
show_header
show_usage
exit 0
elif [ "$1" = "--version" ]; then
opt_no_color=1
show_header
exit 0
elif [ "$1" = "--disclaimer" ]; then
show_header
show_disclaimer
exit 0
else
show_header
show_usage
echo "$0: error: unknown option '$1'"
exit 255
fi
done
show_header
if [ "$opt_no_sysfs" = 1 ] && [ "$opt_sysfs_only" = 1 ]; then
_warn "Incompatible options specified (--no-sysfs and --sysfs-only), aborting"
exit 255
fi
if [ "$opt_no_hw" = 1 ] && [ "$opt_hw_only" = 1 ]; then
_warn "Incompatible options specified (--no-hw and --hw-only), aborting"
exit 255
fi
if [ "$opt_live" = -1 ]; then
if [ -n "$opt_kernel" ] || [ -n "$opt_config" ] || [ -n "$opt_map" ]; then
# no --live specified and we have a least one of the kernel/config/map files on the cmdline: offline mode
opt_live=0
else
opt_live=1
fi
fi
# print status function
# param1: color
# param2: message to print
# param3(optional): supplement message to print between ()
pstatus()
{
if [ "$opt_no_color" = 1 ]; then
_info_nol "$2"
else
case "$1" in
red) _col="\033[41m\033[30m";;
green) _col="\033[42m\033[30m";;
yellow) _col="\033[43m\033[30m";;
blue) _col="\033[44m\033[30m";;
*) _col="";;
esac
_info_nol "$_col $2 \033[0m"
fi
[ -n "${3:-}" ] && _info_nol " ($3)"
_info
unset _col
}
# Print the final status of a vulnerability (incl. batch mode)
# Arguments are: CVE UNK/OK/VULN description
pvulnstatus()
{
pvulnstatus_last_cve="$1"
if [ "$opt_batch" = 1 ]; then
case "$1" in
CVE-2017-5753) aka="SPECTRE VARIANT 1";;
CVE-2017-5715) aka="SPECTRE VARIANT 2";;
CVE-2017-5754) aka="MELTDOWN";;
CVE-2018-3640) aka="VARIANT 3A";;
CVE-2018-3639) aka="VARIANT 4";;
CVE-2018-3615) aka="L1TF SGX";;
CVE-2018-3620) aka="L1TF OS";;
CVE-2018-3646) aka="L1TF VMM";;
CVE-2018-12126) aka="MSBDS";;
CVE-2018-12130) aka="MFBDS";;
CVE-2018-12127) aka="MLPDS";;
CVE-2019-11091) aka="MDSUM";;
CVE-2019-11135) aka="TAA";;
CVE-2018-12207) aka="ITLBMH";;
CVE-2020-0543) aka="SRBDS";;
*) echo "$0: error: invalid CVE '$1' passed to pvulnstatus()" >&2; exit 255;;
esac
case "$opt_batch_format" in
text) _echo 0 "$1: $2 ($3)";;
short) short_output="${short_output}$1 ";;
json)
case "$2" in
UNK) is_vuln="null";;
VULN) is_vuln="true";;
OK) is_vuln="false";;
*) echo "$0: error: unknown status '$2' passed to pvulnstatus()" >&2; exit 255;;
esac
[ -z "$json_output" ] && json_output='['
json_output="${json_output}{\"NAME\":\"$aka\",\"CVE\":\"$1\",\"VULNERABLE\":$is_vuln,\"INFOS\":\"$3\"},"
;;
nrpe) [ "$2" = VULN ] && nrpe_vuln="$nrpe_vuln $1";;
prometheus)
prometheus_output="${prometheus_output:+$prometheus_output\n}specex_vuln_status{name=\"$aka\",cve=\"$1\",status=\"$2\",info=\"$3\"} 1"
;;
*) echo "$0: error: invalid batch format '$opt_batch_format' specified" >&2; exit 255;;
esac
fi
# always fill global_* vars because we use that do decide the program exit code
case "$2" in
UNK) global_unknown="1";;
VULN) global_critical="1";;
OK) ;;
*) echo "$0: error: unknown status '$2' passed to pvulnstatus()" >&2; exit 255;;
esac
# display info if we're not in quiet/batch mode
vulnstatus="$2"
shift 2
_info_nol "> \033[46m\033[30mSTATUS:\033[0m "
: "${final_summary:=}"
case "$vulnstatus" in
UNK) pstatus yellow 'UNKNOWN' "$@"; final_summary="$final_summary \033[43m\033[30m$pvulnstatus_last_cve:??\033[0m";;
VULN) pstatus red 'VULNERABLE' "$@"; final_summary="$final_summary \033[41m\033[30m$pvulnstatus_last_cve:KO\033[0m";;
OK) pstatus green 'NOT VULNERABLE' "$@"; final_summary="$final_summary \033[42m\033[30m$pvulnstatus_last_cve:OK\033[0m";;
*) echo "$0: error: unknown status '$vulnstatus' passed to pvulnstatus()" >&2; exit 255;;
esac
}
# The 3 below functions are taken from the extract-linux script, available here:
# https://github.com/torvalds/linux/blob/master/scripts/extract-vmlinux
# The functions have been modified for better integration to this script
# The original header of the file has been retained below
# ----------------------------------------------------------------------
# extract-vmlinux - Extract uncompressed vmlinux from a kernel image
#
# Inspired from extract-ikconfig
# (c) 2009,2010 Dick Streefland <dick@streefland.net>
#
# (c) 2011 Corentin Chary <corentin.chary@gmail.com>
#
# Licensed under the GNU General Public License, version 2 (GPLv2).
# ----------------------------------------------------------------------
kernel=''
kernel_err=''
check_kernel()
{
_file="$1"
_mode="${2:-normal}"
# checking the return code of readelf -h is not enough, we could get
# a damaged ELF file and validate it, check for stderr warnings too
# the warning "readelf: Warning: [16]: Link field (0) should index a symtab section./" can appear on valid kernels, ignore it
_readelf_warnings=$("${opt_arch_prefix}readelf" -S "$_file" 2>&1 >/dev/null | grep -v 'should index a symtab section' | tr "\n" "/"); ret=$?
_readelf_sections=$("${opt_arch_prefix}readelf" -S "$_file" 2>/dev/null | grep -c -e data -e text -e init)
_kernel_size=$(stat -c %s "$_file" 2>/dev/null || stat -f %z "$_file" 2>/dev/null || echo 10000)
_debug "check_kernel: ret=$? size=$_kernel_size sections=$_readelf_sections warnings=$_readelf_warnings"
if [ "$_mode" = desperate ]; then
if "${opt_arch_prefix}strings" "$_file" | grep -Eq '^Linux version '; then
_debug "check_kernel (desperate): ... matched!"
if [ "$_readelf_sections" = 0 ] && grep -qF -e armv6 -e armv7 "$_file"; then
_debug "check_kernel (desperate): raw arm binary found, adjusting objdump options"
objdump_options="-D -b binary -marm"
else
objdump_options="-d"
fi
return 0
else
_debug "check_kernel (desperate): ... invalid"
fi
else
if [ $ret -eq 0 ] && [ -z "$_readelf_warnings" ] && [ "$_readelf_sections" -gt 0 ]; then
if [ "$_kernel_size" -ge 100000 ]; then
_debug "check_kernel: ... file is valid"
objdump_options="-d"
return 0
else
_debug "check_kernel: ... file seems valid but is too small, ignoring"
fi
else
_debug "check_kernel: ... file is invalid"
fi
fi
return 1
}
try_decompress()
{
# The obscure use of the "tr" filter is to work around older versions of
# "grep" that report the byte offset of the line instead of the pattern.
# Try to find the header ($1) and decompress from here
_debug "try_decompress: looking for $3 magic in $6"
for pos in $(tr "$1\n$2" "\n$2=" < "$6" | grep -abo "^$2")
do
_debug "try_decompress: magic for $3 found at offset $pos"
if ! command -v "$3" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
if [ "$8" = 1 ]; then
# pass1: if the tool is not installed, just bail out silently
# and hope that the next decompression tool will be, and that
# it'll happen to be the proper one for this kernel
_debug "try_decompress: the '$3' tool is not installed (pass 1), try the next algo"
else
# pass2: if the tool is not installed, populate kernel_err this time
kernel_err="missing '$3' tool, please install it, usually it's in the '$5' package"
_debug "try_decompress: $kernel_err"
fi
return 1
fi
pos=${pos%%:*}
# shellcheck disable=SC2086
tail -c+$pos "$6" 2>/dev/null | $3 $4 > "$kerneltmp" 2>/dev/null; ret=$?
if [ ! -s "$kerneltmp" ]; then
# don't rely on $ret, sometimes it's != 0 but worked
# (e.g. gunzip ret=2 just means there was trailing garbage)
_debug "try_decompress: decompression with $3 failed (err=$ret)"
elif check_kernel "$kerneltmp" "$7"; then
kernel="$kerneltmp"
_debug "try_decompress: decompressed with $3 successfully!"
return 0
elif [ "$3" != "cat" ]; then
_debug "try_decompress: decompression with $3 worked but result is not a kernel, trying with an offset"
[ -z "$kerneltmp2" ] && kerneltmp2=$(mktemp /tmp/kernel-XXXXXX)
cat "$kerneltmp" > "$kerneltmp2"
try_decompress '\177ELF' xxy 'cat' '' cat "$kerneltmp2" && return 0
else
_debug "try_decompress: decompression with $3 worked but result is not a kernel"
fi
done
return 1
}
extract_kernel()
{
[ -n "${1:-}" ] || return 1
# Prepare temp files:
kerneltmp="$(mktemp /tmp/kernel-XXXXXX)"
# Initial attempt for uncompressed images or objects:
if check_kernel "$1"; then
_debug "extract_kernel: found kernel is valid, no decompression needed"
cat "$1" > "$kerneltmp"
kernel=$kerneltmp
return 0
fi
# That didn't work, so retry after decompression.
for pass in 1 2; do
for mode in normal desperate; do
_debug "extract_kernel: pass $pass $mode mode"
try_decompress '\037\213\010' xy gunzip '' gunzip "$1" "$mode" "$pass" && return 0
try_decompress '\002\041\114\030' xyy 'lz4' '-d -l' liblz4-tool "$1" "$mode" "$pass" && return 0
try_decompress '\3757zXZ\000' abcde unxz '' xz-utils "$1" "$mode" "$pass" && return 0
try_decompress 'BZh' xy bunzip2 '' bzip2 "$1" "$mode" "$pass" && return 0
try_decompress '\135\0\0\0' xxx unlzma '' xz-utils "$1" "$mode" "$pass" && return 0
try_decompress '\211\114\132' xy 'lzop' '-d' lzop "$1" "$mode" "$pass" && return 0
try_decompress '\177ELF' xxy 'cat' '' cat "$1" "$mode" "$pass" && return 0
try_decompress '(\265/\375' xxy unzstd '' zstd "$1" "$mode" "$pass" && return 0
done
done
# kernel_err might already have been populated by try_decompress() if we're missing one of the tools
if [ -z "$kernel_err" ]; then
kernel_err="kernel compression format is unknown or image is invalid"
fi
_verbose "Couldn't extract the kernel image ($kernel_err), accuracy might be reduced"
return 1
}
# end of extract-vmlinux functions
mount_debugfs()
{
if [ ! -e /sys/kernel/debug/sched_features ]; then
# try to mount the debugfs hierarchy ourselves and remember it to umount afterwards
mount -t debugfs debugfs /sys/kernel/debug 2>/dev/null && mounted_debugfs=1
fi
}
load_msr()
{
# only attempt to do it once even if called multiple times
[ "${load_msr_once:-}" = 1 ] && return
load_msr_once=1
if [ "$os" = Linux ]; then
if ! grep -qw msr "$procfs/modules" 2>/dev/null; then
modprobe msr 2>/dev/null && insmod_msr=1
_debug "attempted to load module msr, insmod_msr=$insmod_msr"
else
_debug "msr module already loaded"
fi
else
if ! kldstat -q -m cpuctl; then
kldload cpuctl 2>/dev/null && kldload_cpuctl=1
_debug "attempted to load module cpuctl, kldload_cpuctl=$kldload_cpuctl"
else
_debug "cpuctl module already loaded"
fi
fi
}
load_cpuid()
{
# only attempt to do it once even if called multiple times
[ "${load_cpuid_once:-}" = 1 ] && return
load_cpuid_once=1
if [ "$os" = Linux ]; then
if ! grep -qw cpuid "$procfs/modules" 2>/dev/null; then
modprobe cpuid 2>/dev/null && insmod_cpuid=1
_debug "attempted to load module cpuid, insmod_cpuid=$insmod_cpuid"
else
_debug "cpuid module already loaded"
fi
else
if ! kldstat -q -m cpuctl; then
kldload cpuctl 2>/dev/null && kldload_cpuctl=1
_debug "attempted to load module cpuctl, kldload_cpuctl=$kldload_cpuctl"
else
_debug "cpuctl module already loaded"
fi
fi
}
# shellcheck disable=SC2034
EAX=1; EBX=2; ECX=3; EDX=4;
READ_CPUID_RET_OK=0
READ_CPUID_RET_KO=1
READ_CPUID_RET_ERR=2
read_cpuid()
{
if [ "$opt_cpu" != all ]; then
# we only have one core to read, do it and return the result
read_cpuid_one_core $opt_cpu "$@"
return $?
fi
# otherwise we must read all cores
for _core in $(seq 0 "$max_core_id"); do
read_cpuid_one_core "$_core" "$@"; ret=$?
if [ "$_core" = 0 ]; then
# save the result of the first core, for comparison with the others
_first_core_ret=$ret
_first_core_value=$read_cpuid_value
else
# compare first core with the other ones
if [ $_first_core_ret != $ret ] || [ "$_first_core_value" != "$read_cpuid_value" ]; then
read_cpuid_msg="result is not homogeneous between all cores, at least core 0 and $_core differ!"
return $READ_CPUID_RET_ERR
fi
fi
done
# if we're here, all cores agree, return the result
return $ret
}
read_cpuid_one_core()
{
# on which core to send the CPUID instruction
_core="$1"
# leaf is the value of the eax register when calling the cpuid instruction:
_leaf="$2"
# subleaf is the value of the ecx register when calling the cpuid instruction:
_subleaf="$3"
# eax=1 ebx=2 ecx=3 edx=4:
_register="$4"
# number of bits to shift the register right to, 0-31:
_shift="$5"
# mask to apply as an AND operand to the shifted register value
_mask="$6"
# wanted value (optional), if present we return 0(true) if the obtained value is equal, 1 otherwise:
_wanted="${7:-}"
# in any case, the read value is globally available in $read_cpuid_value
read_cpuid_value=''
read_cpuid_msg='unknown error'
if [ $# -lt 6 ]; then
read_cpuid_msg="read_cpuid: missing arguments, got only $#, expected at least 6: $*"
return $READ_CPUID_RET_ERR
fi
if [ "$_register" -gt 4 ]; then
read_cpuid_msg="read_cpuid: register must be 0-4, got $_register"
return $READ_CPUID_RET_ERR
fi
if [ "$_shift" -gt 32 ]; then
read_cpuid_msg="read_cpuid: shift must be 0-31, got $_shift"
return $READ_CPUID_RET_ERR
fi
if [ ! -e /dev/cpu/0/cpuid ] && [ ! -e /dev/cpuctl0 ]; then
# try to load the module ourselves (and remember it so we can rmmod it afterwards)
load_cpuid
fi
if [ -e /dev/cpu/0/cpuid ]; then
# Linux
if [ ! -r /dev/cpu/0/cpuid ]; then
read_cpuid_msg="Couldn't load cpuid module"
return $READ_CPUID_RET_ERR
fi
# on some kernel versions, /dev/cpu/0/cpuid doesn't imply that the cpuid module is loaded, in that case dd returns an error,
# we use that fact to load the module if dd returns an error
if ! dd if=/dev/cpu/0/cpuid bs=16 count=1 >/dev/null 2>&1; then
load_cpuid
fi
# we need _leaf to be converted to decimal for dd
_leaf=$(( _leaf ))
_subleaf=$(( _subleaf ))
_position=$(( _leaf + (_subleaf << 32) ))
# to avoid using iflag=skip_bytes, which doesn't exist on old versions of dd, seek to the closer multiple-of-16
_ddskip=$(( _position / 16 ))
_odskip=$(( _position - _ddskip * 16 ))
# now read the value
_cpuid=$(dd if="/dev/cpu/$_core/cpuid" bs=16 skip=$_ddskip count=$((_odskip + 1)) 2>/dev/null | od -j $((_odskip * 16)) -A n -t u4)
elif [ -e /dev/cpuctl0 ]; then
# BSD
if [ ! -r /dev/cpuctl0 ]; then
read_cpuid_msg="Couldn't read cpuid info from cpuctl"
return $READ_CPUID_RET_ERR
fi
_cpuid=$(cpucontrol -i "$_leaf","$_subleaf" "/dev/cpuctl$_core" 2>/dev/null | cut -d: -f2-)
# cpuid level 0x4, level_type 0x2: 0x1c004143 0x01c0003f 0x000001ff 0x00000000
else
read_cpuid_msg="Found no way to read cpuid info"
return $READ_CPUID_RET_ERR
fi
_debug "cpuid: leaf$_leaf subleaf$_subleaf on cpu$_core, eax-ebx-ecx-edx: $_cpuid"
_mockvarname="SMC_MOCK_CPUID_${_leaf}_${_subleaf}"
# shellcheck disable=SC1083
if [ -n "$(eval echo \${$_mockvarname:-})" ]; then
_cpuid="$(eval echo \$$_mockvarname)"
_debug "read_cpuid: MOCKING enabled for leaf $_leaf subleaf $_subleaf, will return $_cpuid"
mocked=1
else
mockme=$(printf "%b\n%b" "$mockme" "SMC_MOCK_CPUID_${_leaf}_${_subleaf}='$_cpuid'")
fi
if [ -z "$_cpuid" ]; then
read_cpuid_msg="Failed to get cpuid data"
return $READ_CPUID_RET_ERR
fi
# get the value of the register we want
_reg=$(echo "$_cpuid" | awk '{print $'"$_register"'}')
# Linux returns it as decimal, BSD as hex, normalize to decimal
_reg=$(( _reg ))
# shellcheck disable=SC2046
_debug "cpuid: wanted register ($_register) has value $_reg aka "$(printf "%08x" "$_reg")
_reg_shifted=$(( _reg >> _shift ))
# shellcheck disable=SC2046
_debug "cpuid: shifted value by $_shift is $_reg_shifted aka "$(printf "%x" "$_reg_shifted")
read_cpuid_value=$(( _reg_shifted & _mask ))
# shellcheck disable=SC2046
_debug "cpuid: after AND $_mask, final value is $read_cpuid_value aka "$(printf "%x" "$read_cpuid_value")
if [ -n "$_wanted" ]; then
_debug "cpuid: wanted $_wanted and got $read_cpuid_value"
if [ "$read_cpuid_value" = "$_wanted" ]; then
return $READ_CPUID_RET_OK
else
return $READ_CPUID_RET_KO
fi
fi
return $READ_CPUID_RET_OK
}
dmesg_grep()
{
# grep for something in dmesg, ensuring that the dmesg buffer
# has not been truncated
dmesg_grepped=''
if ! dmesg | grep -qE -e '(^|\] )Linux version [0-9]' -e '^FreeBSD is a registered' ; then
# dmesg truncated
return 2
fi
dmesg_grepped=$(dmesg | grep -E "$1" | head -1)
# not found:
[ -z "$dmesg_grepped" ] && return 1
# found, output is in $dmesg_grepped
return 0
}
is_coreos()
{
command -v coreos-install >/dev/null 2>&1 && command -v toolbox >/dev/null 2>&1 && return 0
return 1
}
parse_cpu_details()
{
[ "${parse_cpu_details_done:-}" = 1 ] && return 0
if command -v nproc >/dev/null; then
number_of_cores=$(nproc)
elif echo "$os" | grep -q BSD; then
number_of_cores=$(sysctl -n hw.ncpu 2>/dev/null || echo 1)
elif [ -e "$procfs/cpuinfo" ]; then
number_of_cores=$(grep -c ^processor "$procfs/cpuinfo" 2>/dev/null || echo 1)
else
# if we don't know, default to 1 CPU
number_of_cores=1
fi
max_core_id=$(( number_of_cores - 1 ))
if [ -e "$procfs/cpuinfo" ]; then
cpu_vendor=$( grep '^vendor_id' "$procfs/cpuinfo" | awk '{print $3}' | head -1)
cpu_friendly_name=$(grep '^model name' "$procfs/cpuinfo" | cut -d: -f2- | head -1 | sed -e 's/^ *//')
# special case for ARM follows
if grep -qi 'CPU implementer[[:space:]]*:[[:space:]]*0x41' "$procfs/cpuinfo"; then
cpu_vendor='ARM'
# some devices (phones or other) have several ARMs and as such different part numbers,
# an example is "bigLITTLE", so we need to store the whole list, this is needed for is_cpu_vulnerable
cpu_part_list=$(awk '/CPU part/ {print $4}' "$procfs/cpuinfo")
cpu_arch_list=$(awk '/CPU architecture/ {print $3}' "$procfs/cpuinfo")
# take the first one to fill the friendly name, do NOT quote the vars below
# shellcheck disable=SC2086
cpu_arch=$(echo $cpu_arch_list | awk '{ print $1 }')
# shellcheck disable=SC2086
cpu_part=$(echo $cpu_part_list | awk '{ print $1 }')
[ "$cpu_arch" = "AArch64" ] && cpu_arch=8
cpu_friendly_name="ARM"
[ -n "$cpu_arch" ] && cpu_friendly_name="$cpu_friendly_name v$cpu_arch"
[ -n "$cpu_part" ] && cpu_friendly_name="$cpu_friendly_name model $cpu_part"
elif grep -qi 'CPU implementer[[:space:]]*:[[:space:]]*0x43' "$procfs/cpuinfo"; then
cpu_vendor='CAVIUM'
elif grep -qi 'CPU implementer[[:space:]]*:[[:space:]]*0x70' "$procfs/cpuinfo"; then
cpu_vendor='PHYTIUM'
fi
cpu_family=$( grep '^cpu family' "$procfs/cpuinfo" | awk '{print $4}' | grep -E '^[0-9]+$' | head -1)
cpu_model=$( grep '^model' "$procfs/cpuinfo" | awk '{print $3}' | grep -E '^[0-9]+$' | head -1)
cpu_stepping=$(grep '^stepping' "$procfs/cpuinfo" | awk '{print $3}' | grep -E '^[0-9]+$' | head -1)
cpu_ucode=$( grep '^microcode' "$procfs/cpuinfo" | awk '{print $3}' | head -1)
else
cpu_vendor=$( dmesg | grep -i -m1 'Origin=' | cut -f2 -w | cut -f2 -d= | cut -f2 -d\" )
cpu_family=$( dmesg | grep -i -m1 'Family=' | cut -f4 -w | cut -f2 -d= )
cpu_family=$(( cpu_family ))
cpu_model=$( dmesg | grep -i -m1 'Model=' | cut -f5 -w | cut -f2 -d= )
cpu_model=$(( cpu_model ))
cpu_stepping=$( dmesg | grep -i -m1 'Stepping=' | cut -f6 -w | cut -f2 -d= )
cpu_friendly_name=$(sysctl -n hw.model 2>/dev/null)
fi
if [ -n "${SMC_MOCK_CPU_FRIENDLY_NAME:-}" ]; then
cpu_friendly_name="$SMC_MOCK_CPU_FRIENDLY_NAME"
_debug "parse_cpu_details: MOCKING cpu friendly name to $cpu_friendly_name"
mocked=1
else
mockme=$(printf "%b\n%b" "$mockme" "SMC_MOCK_CPU_FRIENDLY_NAME='$cpu_friendly_name'")
fi
if [ -n "${SMC_MOCK_CPU_VENDOR:-}" ]; then
cpu_vendor="$SMC_MOCK_CPU_VENDOR"
_debug "parse_cpu_details: MOCKING cpu vendor to $cpu_vendor"
mocked=1
else
mockme=$(printf "%b\n%b" "$mockme" "SMC_MOCK_CPU_VENDOR='$cpu_vendor'")
fi
if [ -n "${SMC_MOCK_CPU_FAMILY:-}" ]; then
cpu_family="$SMC_MOCK_CPU_FAMILY"
_debug "parse_cpu_details: MOCKING cpu family to $cpu_family"
mocked=1
else
mockme=$(printf "%b\n%b" "$mockme" "SMC_MOCK_CPU_FAMILY='$cpu_family'")
fi
if [ -n "${SMC_MOCK_CPU_MODEL:-}" ]; then
cpu_model="$SMC_MOCK_CPU_MODEL"
_debug "parse_cpu_details: MOCKING cpu model to $cpu_model"
mocked=1
else
mockme=$(printf "%b\n%b" "$mockme" "SMC_MOCK_CPU_MODEL='$cpu_model'")
fi
if [ -n "${SMC_MOCK_CPU_STEPPING:-}" ]; then
cpu_stepping="$SMC_MOCK_CPU_STEPPING"
_debug "parse_cpu_details: MOCKING cpu stepping to $cpu_stepping"
mocked=1
else
mockme=$(printf "%b\n%b" "$mockme" "SMC_MOCK_CPU_STEPPING='$cpu_stepping'")
fi
# get raw cpuid, it's always useful (referenced in the Intel doc for firmware updates for example)
if read_cpuid 0x1 0x0 $EAX 0 0xFFFFFFFF; then
cpu_cpuid="$read_cpuid_value"
else
cpu_cpuid=0
fi
# under BSD, linprocfs often doesn't export ucode information, so fetch it ourselves the good old way
if [ -z "$cpu_ucode" ] && [ "$os" != Linux ]; then
load_cpuid
if [ -e /dev/cpuctl0 ]; then
# init MSR with NULLs
cpucontrol -m 0x8b=0 /dev/cpuctl0
# call CPUID
cpucontrol -i 1 /dev/cpuctl0 >/dev/null
# read MSR
cpu_ucode=$(cpucontrol -m 0x8b /dev/cpuctl0 | awk '{print $3}')
# convert to decimal
cpu_ucode=$(( cpu_ucode ))
# convert back to hex
cpu_ucode=$(printf "0x%x" "$cpu_ucode")
fi
fi
# if we got no cpu_ucode (e.g. we're in a vm), fall back to 0x0
: "${cpu_ucode:=0x0}"
if [ -n "${SMC_MOCK_CPU_UCODE:-}" ]; then
cpu_ucode="$SMC_MOCK_CPU_UCODE"
_debug "parse_cpu_details: MOCKING cpu ucode to $cpu_ucode"
mocked=1
else
mockme=$(printf "%b\n%b" "$mockme" "SMC_MOCK_CPU_UCODE='$cpu_ucode'")
fi
echo "$cpu_ucode" | grep -q ^0x && cpu_ucode=$(( cpu_ucode ))
ucode_found=$(printf "family 0x%x model 0x%x stepping 0x%x ucode 0x%x cpuid 0x%x" "$cpu_family" "$cpu_model" "$cpu_stepping" "$cpu_ucode" "$cpu_cpuid")
# also define those that we will need in other funcs
# taken from https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/tree/arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h
# curl -s 'https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/plain/arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h' | awk '/#define INTEL_FAM6/ {print $2"=$(( "$3" )) # "$4,$5,$6,$7,$8,$9}' | sed -re 's/ +$//'
# shellcheck disable=SC2034
{
INTEL_FAM6_CORE_YONAH=$(( 0x0E )) #
INTEL_FAM6_CORE2_MEROM=$(( 0x0F )) #
INTEL_FAM6_CORE2_MEROM_L=$(( 0x16 )) #
INTEL_FAM6_CORE2_PENRYN=$(( 0x17 )) #
INTEL_FAM6_CORE2_DUNNINGTON=$(( 0x1D )) #
INTEL_FAM6_NEHALEM=$(( 0x1E )) #
INTEL_FAM6_NEHALEM_G=$(( 0x1F )) # /* Auburndale / Havendale */
INTEL_FAM6_NEHALEM_EP=$(( 0x1A )) #
INTEL_FAM6_NEHALEM_EX=$(( 0x2E )) #
INTEL_FAM6_WESTMERE=$(( 0x25 )) #
INTEL_FAM6_WESTMERE_EP=$(( 0x2C )) #
INTEL_FAM6_WESTMERE_EX=$(( 0x2F )) #
INTEL_FAM6_SANDYBRIDGE=$(( 0x2A )) #
INTEL_FAM6_SANDYBRIDGE_X=$(( 0x2D )) #
INTEL_FAM6_IVYBRIDGE=$(( 0x3A )) #
INTEL_FAM6_IVYBRIDGE_X=$(( 0x3E )) #
INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL=$(( 0x3C )) #
INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_X=$(( 0x3F )) #
INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_L=$(( 0x45 )) #
INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_G=$(( 0x46 )) #
INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL=$(( 0x3D )) #
INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_G=$(( 0x47 )) #
INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_X=$(( 0x4F )) #
INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_D=$(( 0x56 )) #
INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_L=$(( 0x4E )) # /* Sky Lake */
INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE=$(( 0x5E )) # /* Sky Lake */
INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X=$(( 0x55 )) # /* Sky Lake */
INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_L=$(( 0x8E )) # /* Sky Lake */
INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE=$(( 0x9E )) # /* Sky Lake */
INTEL_FAM6_COMETLAKE=$(( 0xA5 )) # /* Sky Lake */
INTEL_FAM6_COMETLAKE_L=$(( 0xA6 )) # /* Sky Lake */
INTEL_FAM6_CANNONLAKE_L=$(( 0x66 )) # /* Palm Cove */
INTEL_FAM6_ICELAKE_X=$(( 0x6A )) # /* Sunny Cove */
INTEL_FAM6_ICELAKE_D=$(( 0x6C )) # /* Sunny Cove */
INTEL_FAM6_ICELAKE=$(( 0x7D )) # /* Sunny Cove */
INTEL_FAM6_ICELAKE_L=$(( 0x7E )) # /* Sunny Cove */
INTEL_FAM6_ICELAKE_NNPI=$(( 0x9D )) # /* Sunny Cove */
INTEL_FAM6_LAKEFIELD=$(( 0x8A )) # /* Sunny Cove / Tremont */
INTEL_FAM6_ROCKETLAKE=$(( 0xA7 )) # /* Cypress Cove */
INTEL_FAM6_TIGERLAKE_L=$(( 0x8C )) # /* Willow Cove */
INTEL_FAM6_TIGERLAKE=$(( 0x8D )) # /* Willow Cove */
INTEL_FAM6_SAPPHIRERAPIDS_X=$(( 0x8F )) # /* Golden Cove */
INTEL_FAM6_ALDERLAKE=$(( 0x97 )) # /* Golden Cove / Gracemont */
INTEL_FAM6_ALDERLAKE_L=$(( 0x9A )) # /* Golden Cove / Gracemont */
INTEL_FAM6_RAPTORLAKE=$(( 0xB7 )) #
INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_BONNELL=$(( 0x1C )) # /* Diamondville, Pineview */
INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_BONNELL_MID=$(( 0x26 )) # /* Silverthorne, Lincroft */
INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SALTWELL=$(( 0x36 )) # /* Cedarview */
INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SALTWELL_MID=$(( 0x27 )) # /* Penwell */
INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SALTWELL_TABLET=$(( 0x35 )) # /* Cloverview */
INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SILVERMONT=$(( 0x37 )) # /* Bay Trail, Valleyview */
INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SILVERMONT_D=$(( 0x4D )) # /* Avaton, Rangely */
INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SILVERMONT_MID=$(( 0x4A )) # /* Merriefield */
INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_AIRMONT=$(( 0x4C )) # /* Cherry Trail, Braswell */
INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_AIRMONT_MID=$(( 0x5A )) # /* Moorefield */
INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_AIRMONT_NP=$(( 0x75 )) # /* Lightning Mountain */
INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_GOLDMONT=$(( 0x5C )) # /* Apollo Lake */
INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_GOLDMONT_D=$(( 0x5F )) # /* Denverton */
INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_GOLDMONT_PLUS=$(( 0x7A )) # /* Gemini Lake */
INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_TREMONT_D=$(( 0x86 )) # /* Jacobsville */
INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_TREMONT=$(( 0x96 )) # /* Elkhart Lake */
INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_TREMONT_L=$(( 0x9C )) # /* Jasper Lake */
INTEL_FAM6_XEON_PHI_KNL=$(( 0x57 )) # /* Knights Landing */
INTEL_FAM6_XEON_PHI_KNM=$(( 0x85 )) # /* Knights Mill */
}
parse_cpu_details_done=1
}
is_hygon()
{
[ "$cpu_vendor" = HygonGenuine ] && return 0
return 1
}
is_amd()
{
[ "$cpu_vendor" = AuthenticAMD ] && return 0
return 1
}
is_intel()
{
[ "$cpu_vendor" = GenuineIntel ] && return 0
return 1
}
is_cpu_smt_enabled()
{
# SMT / HyperThreading is enabled if siblings != cpucores
if [ -e "$procfs/cpuinfo" ]; then
_siblings=$(awk '/^siblings/ {print $3;exit}' "$procfs/cpuinfo")
_cpucores=$(awk '/^cpu cores/ {print $4;exit}' "$procfs/cpuinfo")
if [ -n "$_siblings" ] && [ -n "$_cpucores" ]; then
if [ "$_siblings" = "$_cpucores" ]; then
return 1
else
return 0
fi
fi
fi
# we can't tell
return 2
}
is_ucode_blacklisted()
{
parse_cpu_details
# if it's not an Intel, don't bother: it's not blacklisted
is_intel || return 1
# it also needs to be family=6
[ "$cpu_family" = 6 ] || return 1
# now, check each known bad microcode
# source: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/tree/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c#n105
# 2018-02-08 update: https://newsroom.intel.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/11/2018/02/microcode-update-guidance.pdf
# model,stepping,microcode
for tuple in \
$INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE,0x0B,0x80 \
$INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE,0x0A,0x80 \
$INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE,0x09,0x80 \
$INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_L,0x0A,0x80 \
$INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_L,0x09,0x80 \
$INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X,0x03,0x0100013e \
$INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X,0x04,0x02000036 \
$INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X,0x04,0x0200003a \
$INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X,0x04,0x0200003c \
$INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL,0x04,0x28 \
$INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_G,0x01,0x1b \
$INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_D,0x02,0x14 \
$INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_D,0x03,0x07000011 \
$INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_X,0x01,0x0b000025 \
$INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_L,0x01,0x21 \
$INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_G,0x01,0x18 \
$INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL,0x03,0x23 \
$INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_X,0x02,0x3b \
$INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_X,0x04,0x10 \
$INTEL_FAM6_IVYBRIDGE_X,0x04,0x42a \
$INTEL_FAM6_SANDYBRIDGE_X,0x06,0x61b \
$INTEL_FAM6_SANDYBRIDGE_X,0x07,0x712
do
model=$(echo "$tuple" | cut -d, -f1)
stepping=$(( $(echo "$tuple" | cut -d, -f2) ))
if [ "$cpu_model" = "$model" ] && [ "$cpu_stepping" = "$stepping" ]; then
ucode=$(( $(echo "$tuple" | cut -d, -f3) ))
if [ "$cpu_ucode" = "$ucode" ]; then
_debug "is_ucode_blacklisted: we have a match! ($cpu_model/$cpu_stepping/$cpu_ucode)"
return 0
fi
fi
done
_debug "is_ucode_blacklisted: no ($cpu_model/$cpu_stepping/$cpu_ucode)"
return 1
}
is_skylake_cpu()
{
# is this a skylake cpu?
# return 0 if yes, 1 otherwise
#if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL &&
# boot_cpu_data.x86 == 6) {
# switch (boot_cpu_data.x86_model) {
# case INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_MOBILE:
# case INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_DESKTOP:
# case INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X:
# case INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_MOBILE:
# case INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_DESKTOP:
# return true;
parse_cpu_details
is_intel || return 1
[ "$cpu_family" = 6 ] || return 1
if [ "$cpu_model" = $INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_L ] || \
[ "$cpu_model" = $INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE ] || \
[ "$cpu_model" = $INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X ] || \
[ "$cpu_model" = $INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_L ] || \
[ "$cpu_model" = $INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE ]; then
return 0
fi
return 1
}
is_vulnerable_to_empty_rsb()
{
if is_intel && [ -z "$capabilities_rsba" ]; then
_warn "is_vulnerable_to_empty_rsb() called before ARCH CAPABILITIES MSR was read"
fi
if is_skylake_cpu || [ "$capabilities_rsba" = 1 ]; then
return 0
fi
return 1
}
is_zen_cpu()
{
# is this CPU from the AMD ZEN family ? (ryzen, epyc, ...)
parse_cpu_details
is_amd || return 1
[ "$cpu_family" = 23 ] && return 0
return 1
}
is_moksha_cpu()
{
parse_cpu_details
is_hygon || return 1
[ "$cpu_family" = 24 ] && return 0
return 1
}
# Test if the current host is a Xen PV Dom0 / DomU
is_xen() {
if [ ! -d "$procfs/xen" ]; then
return 1
fi
# XXX do we have a better way that relying on dmesg?
dmesg_grep 'Booting paravirtualized kernel on Xen$'; ret=$?
if [ $ret -eq 2 ]; then
_warn "dmesg truncated, Xen detection will be unreliable. Please reboot and relaunch this script"
return 1
elif [ $ret -eq 0 ]; then
return 0
else
return 1
fi
}
is_xen_dom0()
{
if ! is_xen; then
return 1
fi
if [ -e "$procfs/xen/capabilities" ] && grep -q "control_d" "$procfs/xen/capabilities"; then
return 0
else
return 1
fi
}
is_xen_domU()
{
if ! is_xen; then
return 1
fi
# PVHVM guests also print 'Booting paravirtualized kernel', so we need this check.
dmesg_grep 'Xen HVM callback vector for event delivery is enabled$'; ret=$?
if [ $ret -eq 0 ]; then
return 1
fi
if ! is_xen_dom0; then
return 0
else
return 1
fi
}
builtin_dbversion=$(awk '/^# %%% MCEDB / { print $4 }' "$0")
if [ -r "$mcedb_cache" ]; then
# we have a local cache file, but it might be older than the builtin version we have
local_dbversion=$( awk '/^# %%% MCEDB / { print $4 }' "$mcedb_cache")
# sort -V sorts by version number
older_dbversion=$(printf "%b\n%b" "$local_dbversion" "$builtin_dbversion" | sort -V | head -n1)
if [ "$older_dbversion" = "$builtin_dbversion" ]; then
mcedb_source="$mcedb_cache"
mcedb_info="local firmwares DB $local_dbversion"
fi
fi
# if mcedb_source is not set, either we don't have a local cached db, or it is older than the builtin db
if [ -z "${mcedb_source:-}" ]; then
mcedb_source="$0"
mcedb_info="builtin firmwares DB $builtin_dbversion"
fi
read_mcedb()
{
awk '{ if (DELIM==1) { print $2 } } /^# %%% MCEDB / { DELIM=1 }' "$mcedb_source"
}
is_latest_known_ucode()
{
# 0: yes, 1: no, 2: unknown
parse_cpu_details
if [ "$cpu_cpuid" = 0 ]; then
ucode_latest="couldn't get your cpuid"
return 2
fi
ucode_latest="latest microcode version for your CPU model is unknown"
if is_intel; then
cpu_brand_prefix=I
elif is_amd; then
cpu_brand_prefix=A
else
return 2
fi
for tuple in $(read_mcedb | grep "$(printf "^$cpu_brand_prefix,0x%08X," "$cpu_cpuid")")
do
ucode=$(( $(echo "$tuple" | cut -d, -f3) ))
ucode_date=$(echo "$tuple" | cut -d, -f4 | sed -r 's=(....)(..)(..)=\1/\2/\3=')
_debug "is_latest_known_ucode: with cpuid $cpu_cpuid has ucode $cpu_ucode, last known is $ucode from $ucode_date"
ucode_latest=$(printf "latest version is 0x%x dated $ucode_date according to $mcedb_info" "$ucode")
if [ "$cpu_ucode" -ge "$ucode" ]; then
return 0
else
return 1
fi
done
_debug "is_latest_known_ucode: this cpuid is not referenced ($cpu_cpuid)"
return 2
}
get_cmdline()
{
if [ -n "${kernel_cmdline:-}" ]; then
return
fi
if [ -n "${SMC_MOCK_CMDLINE:-}" ]; then
mocked=1
_debug "get_cmdline: using mocked cmdline '$SMC_MOCK_CMDLINE'"
kernel_cmdline="$SMC_MOCK_CMDLINE"
return
else
kernel_cmdline=$(cat "$procfs/cmdline")
mockme=$(printf "%b\n%b" "$mockme" "SMC_MOCK_CMDLINE='$kernel_cmdline'")
fi
}
# ENTRYPOINT
# we can't do anything useful under WSL
if uname -a | grep -qE -- '-Microsoft #[0-9]+-Microsoft '; then
_warn "This script doesn't work under Windows Subsystem for Linux"
_warn "You should use the official Microsoft tool instead."
_warn "It can be found under https://aka.ms/SpeculationControlPS"
exit 1
fi
# or other UNIX-ish OSes non-Linux non-supported-BSDs
if [ "$os" = Darwin ] || [ "$os" = VMkernel ]; then
_warn "You're running under the $os OS, but this script"
_warn "only works under Linux and some BSD systems, sorry."
_warn "Please read the README and FAQ for more information."
exit 1
fi
# check for mode selection inconsistency
if [ "$opt_hw_only" = 1 ]; then
if [ "$opt_cve_all" = 0 ]; then
show_usage
echo "$0: error: incompatible modes specified, --hw-only vs --variant" >&2
exit 255
else
opt_cve_all=0
opt_cve_list=''
fi
fi
# coreos mode
if [ "$opt_coreos" = 1 ]; then
if ! is_coreos; then
_warn "CoreOS mode asked, but we're not under CoreOS!"
exit 255
fi
_warn "CoreOS mode, starting an ephemeral toolbox to launch the script"
load_msr
load_cpuid
mount_debugfs
toolbox --ephemeral --bind-ro /dev/cpu:/dev/cpu -- sh -c "dnf install -y binutils which && /media/root$PWD/$0 $* --coreos-within-toolbox"
exitcode=$?
exit $exitcode
else
if is_coreos; then
_warn "You seem to be running CoreOS, you might want to use the --coreos option for better results"
_warn
fi
fi
# if we're under a BSD, try to mount linprocfs for "$procfs/cpuinfo"
procfs=/proc
if echo "$os" | grep -q BSD; then
_debug "We're under BSD, check if we have procfs"
procfs=$(mount | awk '/^linprocfs/ { print $3; exit; }')
if [ -z "$procfs" ]; then
_debug "we don't, try to mount it"
procfs=/proc
[ -d /compat/linux/proc ] && procfs=/compat/linux/proc
test -d $procfs || mkdir $procfs
if mount -t linprocfs linprocfs $procfs 2>/dev/null; then
mounted_procfs=1
_debug "procfs just mounted at $procfs"
else
procfs=''
fi
else
_debug "We do: $procfs"
fi
fi
# define a few vars we might reference later without these being inited
mockme=''
mocked=0
specex_knob_dir=/dev/no_valid_path
parse_cpu_details
get_cmdline
if [ "$opt_cpu" != all ] && [ "$opt_cpu" -gt "$max_core_id" ]; then
echo "$0: error: --cpu can't be higher than $max_core_id, got $opt_cpu" >&2
exit 255
fi
if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
# root check (only for live mode, for offline mode, we already checked if we could read the files)
if [ "$(id -u)" -ne 0 ]; then
_warn "Note that you should launch this script with root privileges to get accurate information."
_warn "We'll proceed but you might see permission denied errors."
_warn "To run it as root, you can try the following command: sudo $0"
_warn
fi
_info "Checking for vulnerabilities on current system"
_info "Kernel is \033[35m$os $(uname -r) $(uname -v) $(uname -m)\033[0m"
_info "CPU is \033[35m$cpu_friendly_name\033[0m"
# try to find the image of the current running kernel
if [ -n "$opt_kernel" ]; then
# specified by user on cmdline, with --live, don't override
:
# first, look for the BOOT_IMAGE hint in the kernel cmdline
elif echo "$kernel_cmdline" | grep -q 'BOOT_IMAGE='; then
opt_kernel=$(echo "$kernel_cmdline" | grep -Eo 'BOOT_IMAGE=[^ ]+' | cut -d= -f2)
_debug "found opt_kernel=$opt_kernel in $procfs/cmdline"
# if the boot partition is within a btrfs subvolume, strip the subvolume name
# if /boot is a separate subvolume, the remainder of the code in this section should handle it
if echo "$opt_kernel" | grep -q "^/@"; then opt_kernel=$(echo "$opt_kernel" | sed "s:/@[^/]*::"); fi
# if we have a dedicated /boot partition, our bootloader might have just called it /
# so try to prepend /boot and see if we find anything
[ -e "/boot/$opt_kernel" ] && opt_kernel="/boot/$opt_kernel"
# special case for CoreOS if we're inside the toolbox
[ -e "/media/root/boot/$opt_kernel" ] && opt_kernel="/media/root/boot/$opt_kernel"
_debug "opt_kernel is now $opt_kernel"
# else, the full path is already there (most probably /boot/something)
fi
# if we didn't find a kernel, default to guessing
if [ ! -e "$opt_kernel" ]; then
# Fedora:
[ -e "/lib/modules/$(uname -r)/vmlinuz" ] && opt_kernel="/lib/modules/$(uname -r)/vmlinuz"
# Slackware:
[ -e "/boot/vmlinuz" ] && opt_kernel="/boot/vmlinuz"
# Arch aarch64:
[ -e "/boot/Image" ] && opt_kernel="/boot/Image"
# Arch armv5/armv7:
[ -e "/boot/zImage" ] && opt_kernel="/boot/zImage"
# Arch arm7:
[ -e "/boot/kernel7.img" ] && opt_kernel="/boot/kernel7.img"
# Linux-Libre:
[ -e "/boot/vmlinuz-linux-libre" ] && opt_kernel="/boot/vmlinuz-linux-libre"
# pine64
[ -e "/boot/pine64/Image" ] && opt_kernel="/boot/pine64/Image"
# generic:
[ -e "/boot/vmlinuz-$(uname -r)" ] && opt_kernel="/boot/vmlinuz-$(uname -r)"
[ -e "/boot/kernel-$( uname -r)" ] && opt_kernel="/boot/kernel-$( uname -r)"
[ -e "/boot/bzImage-$(uname -r)" ] && opt_kernel="/boot/bzImage-$(uname -r)"
# Gentoo:
[ -e "/boot/kernel-genkernel-$(uname -m)-$(uname -r)" ] && opt_kernel="/boot/kernel-genkernel-$(uname -m)-$(uname -r)"
# NixOS:
[ -e "/run/booted-system/kernel" ] && opt_kernel="/run/booted-system/kernel"
# systemd kernel-install:
[ -e "/etc/machine-id" ] && [ -e "/boot/$(cat /etc/machine-id)/$(uname -r)/linux" ] && opt_kernel="/boot/$(cat /etc/machine-id)/$(uname -r)/linux"
# Clear Linux:
str_uname=$(uname -r)
clear_linux_kernel="/lib/kernel/org.clearlinux.${str_uname##*.}.${str_uname%.*}"
[ -e "$clear_linux_kernel" ] && opt_kernel=$clear_linux_kernel
# Custom Arch seems to have the kernel path in its cmdline in the form "\directory\kernelimage",
# with actual \'s instead of /'s:
custom_arch_kernel=$(echo "$kernel_cmdline" | grep -Eo "(^|\s)\\\\[\\\\a-zA-Z0-9_.-]+" | tr "\\\\" "/" | tr -d '[:space:]')
if [ -n "$custom_arch_kernel" ] && [ -e "$custom_arch_kernel" ]; then
opt_kernel="$custom_arch_kernel"
fi
# FreeBSD:
[ -e "/boot/kernel/kernel" ] && opt_kernel="/boot/kernel/kernel"
fi
# system.map
if [ -n "$opt_map" ]; then
# specified by user on cmdline, with --live, don't override
:
elif [ -e "$procfs/kallsyms" ] ; then
opt_map="$procfs/kallsyms"
elif [ -e "/lib/modules/$(uname -r)/System.map" ] ; then
opt_map="/lib/modules/$(uname -r)/System.map"
elif [ -e "/boot/System.map-$(uname -r)" ] ; then
opt_map="/boot/System.map-$(uname -r)"
elif [ -e "/lib/kernel/System.map-$(uname -r)" ]; then
opt_map="/lib/kernel/System.map-$(uname -r)"
fi
# config
if [ -n "$opt_config" ]; then
# specified by user on cmdline, with --live, don't override
:
elif [ -e "$procfs/config.gz" ] ; then
dumped_config="$(mktemp /tmp/config-XXXXXX)"
gunzip -c "$procfs/config.gz" > "$dumped_config"
# dumped_config will be deleted at the end of the script
opt_config="$dumped_config"
elif [ -e "/lib/modules/$(uname -r)/config" ]; then
opt_config="/lib/modules/$(uname -r)/config"
elif [ -e "/boot/config-$(uname -r)" ]; then
opt_config="/boot/config-$(uname -r)"
elif [ -e "/etc/kernels/kernel-config-$(uname -m)-$(uname -r)" ]; then
opt_config="/etc/kernels/kernel-config-$(uname -m)-$(uname -r)"
elif [ -e "/lib/kernel/config-$(uname -r)" ]; then
opt_config="/lib/kernel/config-$(uname -r)"
fi
else
_info "Checking for vulnerabilities against specified kernel"
_info "CPU is \033[35m$cpu_friendly_name\033[0m"
fi
if [ -n "$opt_kernel" ]; then
_verbose "Will use kernel image \033[35m$opt_kernel\033[0m"
else
_verbose "Will use no kernel image (accuracy might be reduced)"
bad_accuracy=1
fi
if [ "$os" = Linux ]; then
if [ -n "$opt_config" ] && ! grep -q '^CONFIG_' "$opt_config"; then
# given file is invalid!
_warn "The kernel config file seems invalid, was expecting a plain-text file, ignoring it!"
opt_config=''
fi
if [ -n "${dumped_config:-}" ] && [ -n "$opt_config" ]; then
_verbose "Will use kconfig \033[35m$procfs/config.gz (decompressed)\033[0m"
elif [ -n "$opt_config" ]; then
_verbose "Will use kconfig \033[35m$opt_config\033[0m"
else
_verbose "Will use no kconfig (accuracy might be reduced)"
bad_accuracy=1
fi
if [ -n "$opt_map" ]; then
_verbose "Will use System.map file \033[35m$opt_map\033[0m"
else
_verbose "Will use no System.map file (accuracy might be reduced)"
bad_accuracy=1
fi
if [ "${bad_accuracy:=0}" = 1 ]; then
_warn "We're missing some kernel info (see -v), accuracy might be reduced"
fi
fi
if [ -e "$opt_kernel" ]; then
if ! command -v "${opt_arch_prefix}readelf" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
_debug "readelf not found"
kernel_err="missing '${opt_arch_prefix}readelf' tool, please install it, usually it's in the 'binutils' package"
elif [ "$opt_sysfs_only" = 1 ] || [ "$opt_hw_only" = 1 ]; then
kernel_err='kernel image decompression skipped'
else
extract_kernel "$opt_kernel"
fi
else
_debug "no opt_kernel defined"
kernel_err="couldn't find your kernel image in /boot, if you used netboot, this is normal"
fi
if [ -z "$kernel" ] || [ ! -r "$kernel" ]; then
[ -z "$kernel_err" ] && kernel_err="couldn't extract your kernel from $opt_kernel"
else
# vanilla kernels have with ^Linux version
# also try harder with some kernels (such as Red Hat) that don't have ^Linux version before their version string
# and check for FreeBSD
kernel_version=$("${opt_arch_prefix}strings" "$kernel" 2>/dev/null | grep -E \
-e '^Linux version ' \
-e '^[[:alnum:]][^[:space:]]+ \([^[:space:]]+\) #[0-9]+ .+ (19|20)[0-9][0-9]$' \
-e '^FreeBSD [0-9]' | head -1)
if [ -z "$kernel_version" ]; then
# try even harder with some kernels (such as ARM) that split the release (uname -r) and version (uname -v) in 2 adjacent strings
kernel_version=$("${opt_arch_prefix}strings" "$kernel" 2>/dev/null | grep -E -B1 '^#[0-9]+ .+ (19|20)[0-9][0-9]$' | tr "\n" " ")
fi
if [ -n "$kernel_version" ]; then
# in live mode, check if the img we found is the correct one
if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
_verbose "Kernel image is \033[35m$kernel_version"
if ! echo "$kernel_version" | grep -qF "$(uname -r)"; then
_warn "Possible discrepancy between your running kernel '$(uname -r)' and the image '$kernel_version' we found ($opt_kernel), results might be incorrect"
fi
else
_info "Kernel image is \033[35m$kernel_version"
fi
else
_verbose "Kernel image version is unknown"
fi
fi
_info
# end of header stuff
# now we define some util functions and the check_*() funcs, as
# the user can choose to execute only some of those
sys_interface_check()
{
file="$1"
regex="${2:-}"
mode="${3:-}"
msg=''
fullmsg=''
if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ] && [ "$opt_no_sysfs" = 0 ] && [ -r "$file" ]; then
:
else
mockme=$(printf "%b\n%b" "$mockme" "SMC_MOCK_SYSFS_$(basename "$file")_RET=1")
return 1
fi
_mockvarname="SMC_MOCK_SYSFS_$(basename "$file")_RET"
# shellcheck disable=SC2086,SC1083
if [ -n "$(eval echo \${$_mockvarname:-})" ]; then
_debug "sysfs: MOCKING enabled for $file func returns $(eval echo \$$_mockvarname)"
mocked=1
return "$(eval echo \$$_mockvarname)"
fi
[ -n "$regex" ] || regex='.*'
_mockvarname="SMC_MOCK_SYSFS_$(basename "$file")"
# shellcheck disable=SC2086,SC1083
if [ -n "$(eval echo \${$_mockvarname:-})" ]; then
fullmsg="$(eval echo \$$_mockvarname)"
msg=$(echo "$fullmsg" | grep -Eo "$regex")
_debug "sysfs: MOCKING enabled for $file, will return $fullmsg"
mocked=1
else
fullmsg=$(cat "$file")
msg=$(grep -Eo "$regex" "$file")
mockme=$(printf "%b\n%b" "$mockme" "SMC_MOCK_SYSFS_$(basename "$file")='$fullmsg'")
fi
if [ "$mode" = silent ]; then
return 0
elif [ "$mode" = quiet ]; then
_info "* Information from the /sys interface: $fullmsg"
return 0
fi
_info_nol "* Mitigated according to the /sys interface: "
if echo "$msg" | grep -qi '^not affected'; then
# Not affected
status=OK
pstatus green YES "$fullmsg"
elif echo "$msg" | grep -qEi '^(kvm: )?mitigation'; then
# Mitigation: PTI
status=OK
pstatus green YES "$fullmsg"
elif echo "$msg" | grep -qi '^vulnerable'; then
# Vulnerable
status=VULN
pstatus yellow NO "$fullmsg"
else
status=UNK
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "$fullmsg"
fi
_debug "sys_interface_check: $file=$msg (re=$regex)"
return 0
}
# write_msr
# param1 (mandatory): MSR, can be in hex or decimal.
# param2 (optional): CPU index, starting from 0. Default 0.
WRITE_MSR_RET_OK=0
WRITE_MSR_RET_KO=1
WRITE_MSR_RET_ERR=2
WRITE_MSR_RET_LOCKDOWN=3
write_msr()
{
if [ "$opt_cpu" != all ]; then
# we only have one core to write to, do it and return the result
write_msr_one_core $opt_cpu "$@"
return $?
fi
# otherwise we must write on all cores
for _core in $(seq 0 $max_core_id); do
write_msr_one_core "$_core" "$@"; ret=$?
if [ "$_core" = 0 ]; then
# save the result of the first core, for comparison with the others
_first_core_ret=$ret
else
# compare first core with the other ones
if [ $_first_core_ret != $ret ]; then
write_msr_msg="result is not homogeneous between all cores, at least core 0 and $_core differ!"
return $WRITE_MSR_RET_ERR
fi
fi
done
# if we're here, all cores agree, return the result
return $ret
}
write_msr_one_core()
{
_core="$1"
_msr_dec=$(( $2 ))
_msr=$(printf "0x%x" "$_msr_dec")
write_msr_msg='unknown error'
: "${msr_locked_down:=0}"
_mockvarname="SMC_MOCK_WRMSR_${_msr}_RET"
# shellcheck disable=SC2086,SC1083
if [ -n "$(eval echo \${$_mockvarname:-})" ]; then
_debug "write_msr: MOCKING enabled for msr $_msr func returns $(eval echo \$$_mockvarname)"
mocked=1
[ "$(eval echo \$$_mockvarname)" = $WRITE_MSR_RET_LOCKDOWN ] && msr_locked_down=1
return "$(eval echo \$$_mockvarname)"
fi
if [ ! -e /dev/cpu/0/msr ] && [ ! -e /dev/cpuctl0 ]; then
# try to load the module ourselves (and remember it so we can rmmod it afterwards)
load_msr
fi
if [ ! -e /dev/cpu/0/msr ] && [ ! -e /dev/cpuctl0 ]; then
read_msr_msg="is msr kernel module available?"
return $WRITE_MSR_RET_ERR
fi
if [ "$os" != Linux ]; then
cpucontrol -m "$_msr=0" "/dev/cpuctl$_core" >/dev/null 2>&1; ret=$?
else
# for Linux
# convert to decimal
if [ ! -w /dev/cpu/"$_core"/msr ]; then
write_msr_msg="No write permission on /dev/cpu/$_core/msr"
return $WRITE_MSR_RET_ERR
# if wrmsr is available, use it
elif command -v wrmsr >/dev/null 2>&1 && [ "${SMC_NO_WRMSR:-}" != 1 ]; then
_debug "write_msr: using wrmsr"
wrmsr $_msr_dec 0 2>/dev/null; ret=$?
# or if we have perl, use it, any 5.x version will work
elif command -v perl >/dev/null 2>&1 && [ "${SMC_NO_PERL:-}" != 1 ]; then
_debug "write_msr: using perl"
ret=1
perl -e "open(M,'>','/dev/cpu/$_core/msr') and seek(M,$_msr_dec,0) and exit(syswrite(M,pack('H16',0)))"; [ $? -eq 8 ] && ret=0
# fallback to dd if it supports seek_bytes
elif dd if=/dev/null of=/dev/null bs=8 count=1 seek="$_msr_dec" oflag=seek_bytes 2>/dev/null; then
_debug "write_msr: using dd"
dd if=/dev/zero of=/dev/cpu/"$_core"/msr bs=8 count=1 seek="$_msr_dec" oflag=seek_bytes 2>/dev/null; ret=$?
else
_debug "write_msr: got no wrmsr, perl or recent enough dd!"
mockme=$(printf "%b\n%b" "$mockme" "SMC_MOCK_WRMSR_${_msr}_RET=$WRITE_MSR_RET_ERR")
write_msr_msg="missing tool, install either msr-tools or perl"
return $WRITE_MSR_RET_ERR
fi
if [ "$ret" != 0 ]; then
# * Fedora (and probably Red Hat) have a "kernel lock down" feature that prevents us to write to MSRs
# when this mode is enabled and EFI secure boot is enabled (see issue #303)
# https://src.fedoraproject.org/rpms/kernel/blob/master/f/efi-lockdown.patch
# when this happens, any write will fail and dmesg will have a msg printed "msr: Direct access to MSR"
# * A version of this patch also made it to vanilla in 5.4+, in that case the message is: 'raw MSR access is restricted'
# * we don't use dmesg_grep() because we don't care if dmesg is truncated here, as the message has just been printed
if dmesg | grep -qF "msr: Direct access to MSR"; then
_debug "write_msr: locked down kernel detected (Red Hat / Fedora)"
mockme=$(printf "%b\n%b" "$mockme" "SMC_MOCK_WRMSR_${_msr}_RET=$WRITE_MSR_RET_LOCKDOWN")
msr_locked_down=1
write_msr_msg="your kernel is locked down (Fedora/Red Hat), please reboot without secure boot and retry"
return $WRITE_MSR_RET_LOCKDOWN
elif dmesg | grep -qF "raw MSR access is restricted"; then
_debug "write_msr: locked down kernel detected (vanilla)"
mockme=$(printf "%b\n%b" "$mockme" "SMC_MOCK_WRMSR_${_msr}_RET=$WRITE_MSR_RET_LOCKDOWN")
msr_locked_down=1
write_msr_msg="your kernel is locked down, please reboot with lockdown=none in the kernel cmdline and retry"
return $WRITE_MSR_RET_LOCKDOWN
fi
fi
fi
# normalize ret
if [ "$ret" = 0 ]; then
ret=$WRITE_MSR_RET_OK
else
ret=$WRITE_MSR_RET_KO
fi
_debug "write_msr: for cpu $_core on msr $_msr, ret=$ret"
mockme=$(printf "%b\n%b" "$mockme" "SMC_MOCK_WRMSR_${_msr}_RET=$ret")
return $ret
}
# read_msr
# param1 (mandatory): MSR, can be in hex or decimal.
# param2 (optional): CPU index, starting from 0. Default 0.
# returned data is available in $read_msr_value
READ_MSR_RET_OK=0
READ_MSR_RET_KO=1
READ_MSR_RET_ERR=2
read_msr()
{
if [ "$opt_cpu" != all ]; then
# we only have one core to read, do it and return the result
read_msr_one_core $opt_cpu "$@"
return $?
fi
# otherwise we must read all cores
for _core in $(seq 0 $max_core_id); do
read_msr_one_core "$_core" "$@"; ret=$?
if [ "$_core" = 0 ]; then
# save the result of the first core, for comparison with the others
_first_core_ret=$ret
_first_core_value=$read_msr_value
else
# compare first core with the other ones
if [ $_first_core_ret != $ret ] || [ "$_first_core_value" != "$read_msr_value" ]; then
read_msr_msg="result is not homogeneous between all cores, at least core 0 and $_core differ!"
return $READ_MSR_RET_ERR
fi
fi
done
# if we're here, all cores agree, return the result
return $ret
}
read_msr_one_core()
{
_core="$1"
_msr_dec=$(( $2 ))
_msr=$(printf "0x%x" "$_msr_dec")
read_msr_value=''
read_msr_msg='unknown error'
_mockvarname="SMC_MOCK_RDMSR_${_msr}"
# shellcheck disable=SC2086,SC1083
if [ -n "$(eval echo \${$_mockvarname:-})" ]; then
read_msr_value="$(eval echo \$$_mockvarname)"
_debug "read_msr: MOCKING enabled for msr $_msr, returning $read_msr_value"
mocked=1
return $READ_MSR_RET_OK
fi
_mockvarname="SMC_MOCK_RDMSR_${_msr}_RET"
# shellcheck disable=SC2086,SC1083
if [ -n "$(eval echo \${$_mockvarname:-})" ] && [ "$(eval echo \$$_mockvarname)" -ne 0 ]; then
_debug "read_msr: MOCKING enabled for msr $_msr func returns $(eval echo \$$_mockvarname)"
mocked=1
return "$(eval echo \$$_mockvarname)"
fi
if [ ! -e /dev/cpu/0/msr ] && [ ! -e /dev/cpuctl0 ]; then
# try to load the module ourselves (and remember it so we can rmmod it afterwards)
load_msr
fi
if [ ! -e /dev/cpu/0/msr ] && [ ! -e /dev/cpuctl0 ]; then
read_msr_msg="is msr kernel module available?"
return $READ_MSR_RET_ERR
fi
if [ "$os" != Linux ]; then
# for BSD
_msr=$(cpucontrol -m "$_msr" "/dev/cpuctl$_core" 2>/dev/null); ret=$?
if [ $ret -ne 0 ]; then
mockme=$(printf "%b\n%b" "$mockme" "SMC_MOCK_RDMSR_${_msr}_RET=$READ_MSR_RET_KO")
return $READ_MSR_RET_KO
fi
# MSR 0x10: 0x000003e1 0xb106dded
_msr_h=$(echo "$_msr" | awk '{print $3}');
_msr_l=$(echo "$_msr" | awk '{print $4}');
read_msr_value=$(( _msr_h << 32 | _msr_l ))
else
# for Linux
if [ ! -r /dev/cpu/"$_core"/msr ]; then
mockme=$(printf "%b\n%b" "$mockme" "SMC_MOCK_RDMSR_${_msr}_RET=$READ_MSR_RET_ERR")
read_msr_msg="No read permission for /dev/cpu/$_core/msr"
return $READ_MSR_RET_ERR
# if rdmsr is available, use it
elif command -v rdmsr >/dev/null 2>&1 && [ "${SMC_NO_RDMSR:-}" != 1 ]; then
_debug "read_msr: using rdmsr on $_msr"
read_msr_value=$(rdmsr -r $_msr_dec 2>/dev/null | od -t u8 -A n)
# or if we have perl, use it, any 5.x version will work
elif command -v perl >/dev/null 2>&1 && [ "${SMC_NO_PERL:-}" != 1 ]; then
_debug "read_msr: using perl on $_msr"
read_msr_value=$(perl -e "open(M,'<','/dev/cpu/$_core/msr') and seek(M,$_msr_dec,0) and read(M,\$_,8) and print" | od -t u8 -A n)
# fallback to dd if it supports skip_bytes
elif dd if=/dev/null of=/dev/null bs=8 count=1 skip="$_msr_dec" iflag=skip_bytes 2>/dev/null; then
_debug "read_msr: using dd on $_msr"
read_msr_value=$(dd if=/dev/cpu/"$_core"/msr bs=8 count=1 skip="$_msr_dec" iflag=skip_bytes 2>/dev/null | od -t u8 -A n)
else
_debug "read_msr: got no rdmsr, perl or recent enough dd!"
mockme=$(printf "%b\n%b" "$mockme" "SMC_MOCK_RDMSR_${_msr}_RET=$READ_MSR_RET_ERR")
read_msr_msg='missing tool, install either msr-tools or perl'
return $READ_MSR_RET_ERR
fi
if [ -z "$read_msr_value" ]; then
# MSR doesn't exist, don't check for $? because some versions of dd still return 0!
mockme=$(printf "%b\n%b" "$mockme" "SMC_MOCK_RDMSR_${_msr}_RET=$READ_MSR_RET_KO")
return $READ_MSR_RET_KO
fi
# remove sparse spaces od might give us
read_msr_value=$(( read_msr_value ))
fi
mockme=$(printf "%b\n%b" "$mockme" "SMC_MOCK_RDMSR_${_msr}='$read_msr_value'")
_debug "read_msr: MSR=$_msr value is $read_msr_value"
return $READ_MSR_RET_OK
}
check_cpu()
{
_info "\033[1;34mHardware check\033[0m"
if ! uname -m | grep -qwE 'x86_64|i[3-6]86|amd64'; then
return
fi
_info "* Hardware support (CPU microcode) for mitigation techniques"
_info " * Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation (IBRS)"
_info_nol " * SPEC_CTRL MSR is available: "
# the new MSR 'SPEC_CTRL' is at offset 0x48
read_msr 0x48; ret=$?
if [ $ret = $READ_MSR_RET_OK ]; then
spec_ctrl_msr=1
pstatus green YES
elif [ $ret = $READ_MSR_RET_KO ]; then
spec_ctrl_msr=0
pstatus yellow NO
else
spec_ctrl_msr=-1
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "$read_msr_msg"
fi
_info_nol " * CPU indicates IBRS capability: "
# from kernel src: { X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL, CPUID_EDX,26, 0x00000007, 0 },
# amd: https://developer.amd.com/wp-content/resources/Architecture_Guidelines_Update_Indirect_Branch_Control.pdf
# amd: 8000_0008 EBX[14]=1
cpuid_ibrs=''
if is_intel; then
read_cpuid 0x7 0x0 $EDX 26 1 1; ret=$?
if [ $ret = $READ_CPUID_RET_OK ]; then
pstatus green YES "SPEC_CTRL feature bit"
cpuid_spec_ctrl=1
cpuid_ibrs='SPEC_CTRL'
fi
elif is_amd || is_hygon; then
read_cpuid 0x80000008 0x0 $EBX 14 1 1; ret=$?
if [ $ret = $READ_CPUID_RET_OK ]; then
pstatus green YES "IBRS_SUPPORT feature bit"
cpuid_ibrs='IBRS_SUPPORT'
fi
else
ret=invalid
pstatus yellow NO "unknown CPU"
fi
if [ $ret = $READ_CPUID_RET_KO ]; then
pstatus yellow NO
elif [ $ret = $READ_CPUID_RET_ERR ]; then
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "$read_cpuid_msg"
cpuid_spec_ctrl=-1
fi
if is_amd || is_hygon; then
_info_nol " * CPU indicates preferring IBRS always-on: "
# amd or hygon
read_cpuid 0x80000008 0x0 $EBX 16 1 1; ret=$?
if [ $ret = $READ_CPUID_RET_OK ]; then
pstatus green YES
elif [ $ret = $READ_CPUID_RET_KO ]; then
pstatus yellow NO
else
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "$read_cpuid_msg"
fi
_info_nol " * CPU indicates preferring IBRS over retpoline: "
# amd or hygon
read_cpuid 0x80000008 0x0 $EBX 18 1 1; ret=$?
if [ $ret = $READ_CPUID_RET_OK ]; then
pstatus green YES
elif [ $ret = $READ_CPUID_RET_KO ]; then
pstatus yellow NO
else
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "$read_cpuid_msg"
fi
fi
# IBPB
_info " * Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier (IBPB)"
_info_nol " * PRED_CMD MSR is available: "
# the new MSR 'PRED_CTRL' is at offset 0x49, write-only
write_msr 0x49; ret=$?
if [ $ret = $WRITE_MSR_RET_OK ]; then
pstatus green YES
elif [ $ret = $WRITE_MSR_RET_KO ]; then
pstatus yellow NO
else
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "$write_msr_msg"
fi
_info_nol " * CPU indicates IBPB capability: "
# CPUID EAX=0x80000008, ECX=0x00 return EBX[12] indicates support for just IBPB.
if [ "$cpuid_spec_ctrl" = 1 ]; then
# spec_ctrl implies ibpb
cpuid_ibpb='SPEC_CTRL'
pstatus green YES "SPEC_CTRL feature bit"
elif is_intel; then
if [ "$cpuid_spec_ctrl" = -1 ]; then
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "is cpuid kernel module available?"
else
pstatus yellow NO
fi
elif is_amd || is_hygon; then
read_cpuid 0x80000008 0x0 $EBX 12 1 1; ret=$?
if [ $ret = $READ_CPUID_RET_OK ]; then
cpuid_ibpb='IBPB_SUPPORT'
pstatus green YES "IBPB_SUPPORT feature bit"
elif [ $ret = $READ_CPUID_RET_KO ]; then
pstatus yellow NO
else
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "$read_cpuid_msg"
fi
fi
# STIBP
_info " * Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors (STIBP)"
_info_nol " * SPEC_CTRL MSR is available: "
if [ "$spec_ctrl_msr" = 1 ]; then
pstatus green YES
elif [ "$spec_ctrl_msr" = 0 ]; then
pstatus yellow NO
else
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "is msr kernel module available?"
fi
_info_nol " * CPU indicates STIBP capability: "
# intel: A processor supports STIBP if it enumerates CPUID (EAX=7H,ECX=0):EDX[27] as 1
# amd: 8000_0008 EBX[15]=1
if is_intel; then
read_cpuid 0x7 0x0 $EDX 27 1 1; ret=$?
if [ $ret = $READ_CPUID_RET_OK ]; then
pstatus green YES "Intel STIBP feature bit"
#cpuid_stibp='Intel STIBP'
fi
elif is_amd; then
read_cpuid 0x80000008 0x0 $EBX 15 1 1; ret=$?
if [ $ret = $READ_CPUID_RET_OK ]; then
pstatus green YES "AMD STIBP feature bit"
#cpuid_stibp='AMD STIBP'
fi
elif is_hygon; then
read_cpuid 0x80000008 0x0 $EBX 15 1 1; ret=$?
if [ $ret = $READ_CPUID_RET_OK ]; then
pstatus green YES "HYGON STIBP feature bit"
#cpuid_stibp='HYGON STIBP'
fi
else
ret=invalid
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "unknown CPU"
fi
if [ $ret = $READ_CPUID_RET_KO ]; then
pstatus yellow NO
elif [ $ret = $READ_CPUID_RET_ERR ]; then
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "$read_cpuid_msg"
fi
if is_amd || is_hygon; then
_info_nol " * CPU indicates preferring STIBP always-on: "
read_cpuid 0x80000008 0x0 $EBX 17 1 1; ret=$?
if [ $ret = $READ_CPUID_RET_OK ]; then
pstatus green YES
elif [ $ret = $READ_CPUID_RET_KO ]; then
pstatus yellow NO
else
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "$read_cpuid_msg"
fi
fi
# variant 4
if is_intel; then
_info " * Speculative Store Bypass Disable (SSBD)"
_info_nol " * CPU indicates SSBD capability: "
read_cpuid 0x7 0x0 $EDX 31 1 1; ret24=$?; ret25=$ret24
if [ $ret24 = $READ_CPUID_RET_OK ]; then
cpuid_ssbd='Intel SSBD'
fi
elif is_amd; then
_info " * Speculative Store Bypass Disable (SSBD)"
_info_nol " * CPU indicates SSBD capability: "
read_cpuid 0x80000008 0x0 $EBX 24 1 1; ret24=$?
read_cpuid 0x80000008 0x0 $EBX 25 1 1; ret25=$?
if [ $ret24 = $READ_CPUID_RET_OK ]; then
cpuid_ssbd='AMD SSBD in SPEC_CTRL'
#cpuid_ssbd_spec_ctrl=1
elif [ $ret25 = $READ_CPUID_RET_OK ]; then
cpuid_ssbd='AMD SSBD in VIRT_SPEC_CTRL'
#cpuid_ssbd_virt_spec_ctrl=1
elif [ "$cpu_family" -ge 21 ] && [ "$cpu_family" -le 23 ]; then
cpuid_ssbd='AMD non-architectural MSR'
fi
elif is_hygon; then
_info " * Speculative Store Bypass Disable (SSBD)"
_info_nol " * CPU indicates SSBD capability: "
read_cpuid 0x80000008 0x0 $EBX 24 1 1; ret24=$?
read_cpuid 0x80000008 0x0 $EBX 25 1 1; ret25=$?
if [ $ret24 = $READ_CPUID_RET_OK ]; then
cpuid_ssbd='HYGON SSBD in SPEC_CTRL'
#hygon cpuid_ssbd_spec_ctrl=1
elif [ $ret25 = $READ_CPUID_RET_OK ]; then
cpuid_ssbd='HYGON SSBD in VIRT_SPEC_CTRL'
#hygon cpuid_ssbd_virt_spec_ctrl=1
elif [ "$cpu_family" -ge 24 ]; then
cpuid_ssbd='HYGON non-architectural MSR'
fi
fi
if [ -n "${cpuid_ssbd:=}" ]; then
pstatus green YES "$cpuid_ssbd"
elif [ "$ret24" = $READ_CPUID_RET_ERR ] && [ "$ret25" = $READ_CPUID_RET_ERR ]; then
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "$read_cpuid_msg"
else
pstatus yellow NO
fi
amd_ssb_no=0
hygon_ssb_no=0
if is_amd; then
# similar to SSB_NO for intel
read_cpuid 0x80000008 0x0 $EBX 26 1 1; ret=$?
if [ $ret = $READ_CPUID_RET_OK ]; then
amd_ssb_no=1
elif [ $ret = $READ_CPUID_RET_ERR ]; then
amd_ssb_no=-1
fi
elif is_hygon; then
# indicate when speculative store bypass disable is no longer needed to prevent speculative loads bypassing older stores
read_cpuid 0x80000008 0x0 $EBX 26 1 1; ret=$?
if [ $ret = $READ_CPUID_RET_OK ]; then
hygon_ssb_no=1
elif [ $ret = $READ_CPUID_RET_ERR ]; then
hygon_ssb_no=-1
fi
fi
_info " * L1 data cache invalidation"
_info_nol " * FLUSH_CMD MSR is available: "
# the new MSR 'FLUSH_CMD' is at offset 0x10b, write-only
write_msr 0x10b; ret=$?
if [ $ret = $WRITE_MSR_RET_OK ]; then
pstatus green YES
cpu_flush_cmd=1
elif [ $ret = $WRITE_MSR_RET_KO ]; then
pstatus yellow NO
cpu_flush_cmd=0
else
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "$write_msr_msg"
cpu_flush_cmd=-1
fi
# CPUID of L1D
_info_nol " * CPU indicates L1D flush capability: "
read_cpuid 0x7 0x0 $EDX 28 1 1; ret=$?
if [ $ret = $READ_CPUID_RET_OK ]; then
pstatus green YES "L1D flush feature bit"
cpuid_l1df=1
elif [ $ret = $READ_CPUID_RET_KO ]; then
pstatus yellow NO
cpuid_l1df=0
else
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "$read_cpuid_msg"
cpuid_l1df=-1
fi
if is_intel; then
_info " * Microarchitectural Data Sampling"
_info_nol " * VERW instruction is available: "
read_cpuid 0x7 0x0 $EDX 10 1 1; ret=$?
if [ $ret = $READ_CPUID_RET_OK ]; then
cpuid_md_clear=1
pstatus green YES "MD_CLEAR feature bit"
elif [ $ret = $READ_CPUID_RET_KO ]; then
cpuid_md_clear=0
pstatus yellow NO
else
cpuid_md_clear=-1
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "$read_cpuid_msg"
fi
fi
if is_intel; then
_info " * Indirect Branch Predictor Controls"
_info_nol " * Indirect Predictor Disable feature is available: "
read_cpuid 0x7 0x2 $EDX 1 1 1; ret=$?
if [ $ret = $READ_CPUID_RET_OK ]; then
cpuid_ipred_ctrl=1
pstatus green YES "IPRED_CTRL feature bit"
elif [ $ret = $READ_CPUID_RET_KO ]; then
cpuid_ipred_ctrl=0
pstatus yellow NO
else
cpuid_ipred_ctrl=-1
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "$read_cpuid_msg"
fi
_info_nol " * Bottomless RSB Disable feature is available: "
read_cpuid 0x7 0x2 $EDX 2 1 1; ret=$?
if [ $ret = $READ_CPUID_RET_OK ]; then
cpuid_rrsba=1
pstatus green YES "RRSBA_CTRL feature bit"
elif [ $ret = $READ_CPUID_RET_KO ]; then
cpuid_rrsba=0
pstatus yellow NO
else
cpuid_rrsba=-1
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "$read_cpuid_msg"
fi
_info_nol " * BHB-Focused Indirect Predictor Disable feature is available: "
read_cpuid 0x7 0x2 $EDX 2 1 1; ret=$?
if [ $ret = $READ_CPUID_RET_OK ]; then
cpuid_bhi=1
pstatus green YES "BHI_CTRL feature bit"
elif [ $ret = $READ_CPUID_RET_KO ]; then
cpuid_bhi=0
pstatus yellow NO
else
cpuid_bhi=-1
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "$read_cpuid_msg"
fi
fi
if is_intel; then
_info " * Enhanced IBRS (IBRS_ALL)"
_info_nol " * CPU indicates ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR availability: "
cpuid_arch_capabilities=-1
# A processor supports the ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR if it enumerates CPUID (EAX=7H,ECX=0):EDX[29] as 1
read_cpuid 0x7 0x0 $EDX 29 1 1; ret=$?
if [ $ret = $READ_CPUID_RET_OK ]; then
pstatus green YES
cpuid_arch_capabilities=1
elif [ $ret = $READ_CPUID_RET_KO ]; then
pstatus yellow NO
cpuid_arch_capabilities=0
else
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "$read_cpuid_msg"
fi
_info_nol " * ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR advertises IBRS_ALL capability: "
capabilities_taa_no=-1
capabilities_mds_no=-1
capabilities_rdcl_no=-1
capabilities_ibrs_all=-1
capabilities_rsba=-1
capabilities_l1dflush_no=-1
capabilities_ssb_no=-1
capabilities_pschange_msc_no=-1
capabilities_tsx_ctrl_msr=-1
if [ "$cpuid_arch_capabilities" = -1 ]; then
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN
elif [ "$cpuid_arch_capabilities" != 1 ]; then
capabilities_rdcl_no=0
capabilities_taa_no=0
capabilities_mds_no=0
capabilities_ibrs_all=0
capabilities_rsba=0
capabilities_l1dflush_no=0
capabilities_ssb_no=0
capabilities_pschange_msc_no=0
capabilities_tsx_ctrl_msr=0
pstatus yellow NO
else
# the new MSR 'ARCH_CAPABILITIES' is at offset 0x10a
read_msr 0x10a; ret=$?
capabilities_rdcl_no=0
capabilities_taa_no=0
capabilities_mds_no=0
capabilities_ibrs_all=0
capabilities_rsba=0
capabilities_l1dflush_no=0
capabilities_ssb_no=0
capabilities_pschange_msc_no=0
capabilities_tsx_ctrl_msr=0
if [ $ret = $READ_MSR_RET_OK ]; then
capabilities=$read_msr_value
# https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/tree/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h#n82
_debug "capabilities MSR is $capabilities (decimal)"
[ $(( capabilities >> 0 & 1 )) -eq 1 ] && capabilities_rdcl_no=1
[ $(( capabilities >> 1 & 1 )) -eq 1 ] && capabilities_ibrs_all=1
[ $(( capabilities >> 2 & 1 )) -eq 1 ] && capabilities_rsba=1
[ $(( capabilities >> 3 & 1 )) -eq 1 ] && capabilities_l1dflush_no=1
[ $(( capabilities >> 4 & 1 )) -eq 1 ] && capabilities_ssb_no=1
[ $(( capabilities >> 5 & 1 )) -eq 1 ] && capabilities_mds_no=1
[ $(( capabilities >> 6 & 1 )) -eq 1 ] && capabilities_pschange_msc_no=1
[ $(( capabilities >> 7 & 1 )) -eq 1 ] && capabilities_tsx_ctrl_msr=1
[ $(( capabilities >> 8 & 1 )) -eq 1 ] && capabilities_taa_no=1
_debug "capabilities says rdcl_no=$capabilities_rdcl_no ibrs_all=$capabilities_ibrs_all rsba=$capabilities_rsba l1dflush_no=$capabilities_l1dflush_no ssb_no=$capabilities_ssb_no mds_no=$capabilities_mds_no taa_no=$capabilities_taa_no pschange_msc_no=$capabilities_pschange_msc_no"
if [ "$capabilities_ibrs_all" = 1 ]; then
pstatus green YES
else
pstatus yellow NO
fi
elif [ $ret = $READ_MSR_RET_KO ]; then
pstatus yellow NO
else
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "$read_msr_msg"
fi
fi
_info_nol " * CPU explicitly indicates not being vulnerable to Meltdown/L1TF (RDCL_NO): "
if [ "$capabilities_rdcl_no" = -1 ]; then
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN
elif [ "$capabilities_rdcl_no" = 1 ]; then
pstatus green YES
else
pstatus yellow NO
fi
_info_nol " * CPU explicitly indicates not being vulnerable to Variant 4 (SSB_NO): "
if [ "$capabilities_ssb_no" = -1 ]; then
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN
elif [ "$capabilities_ssb_no" = 1 ] || [ "$amd_ssb_no" = 1 ] || [ "$hygon_ssb_no" = 1 ]; then
pstatus green YES
else
pstatus yellow NO
fi
_info_nol " * CPU/Hypervisor indicates L1D flushing is not necessary on this system: "
if [ "$capabilities_l1dflush_no" = -1 ]; then
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN
elif [ "$capabilities_l1dflush_no" = 1 ]; then
pstatus green YES
else
pstatus yellow NO
fi
_info_nol " * Hypervisor indicates host CPU might be vulnerable to RSB underflow (RSBA): "
if [ "$capabilities_rsba" = -1 ]; then
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN
elif [ "$capabilities_rsba" = 1 ]; then
pstatus yellow YES
else
pstatus blue NO
fi
_info_nol " * CPU explicitly indicates not being vulnerable to Microarchitectural Data Sampling (MDS_NO): "
if [ "$capabilities_mds_no" = -1 ]; then
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN
elif [ "$capabilities_mds_no" = 1 ]; then
pstatus green YES
else
pstatus yellow NO
fi
_info_nol " * CPU explicitly indicates not being vulnerable to TSX Asynchronous Abort (TAA_NO): "
if [ "$capabilities_taa_no" = -1 ]; then
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN
elif [ "$capabilities_taa_no" = 1 ]; then
pstatus green YES
else
pstatus yellow NO
fi
_info_nol " * CPU explicitly indicates not being vulnerable to iTLB Multihit (PSCHANGE_MSC_NO): "
if [ "$capabilities_pschange_msc_no" = -1 ]; then
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN
elif [ "$capabilities_pschange_msc_no" = 1 ]; then
pstatus green YES
else
pstatus yellow NO
fi
_info_nol " * CPU explicitly indicates having MSR for TSX control (TSX_CTRL_MSR): "
if [ "$capabilities_tsx_ctrl_msr" = -1 ]; then
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN
elif [ "$capabilities_tsx_ctrl_msr" = 1 ]; then
pstatus green YES
else
pstatus yellow NO
fi
if [ "$capabilities_tsx_ctrl_msr" = 1 ]; then
read_msr 0x122; ret=$?
if [ "$ret" = $READ_MSR_RET_OK ]; then
tsx_ctrl_msr=$read_msr_value
tsx_ctrl_msr_rtm_disable=$(( tsx_ctrl_msr >> 0 & 1 ))
tsx_ctrl_msr_cpuid_clear=$(( tsx_ctrl_msr >> 1 & 1 ))
fi
_info_nol " * TSX_CTRL MSR indicates TSX RTM is disabled: "
if [ "$tsx_ctrl_msr_rtm_disable" = 1 ]; then
pstatus blue YES
elif [ "$tsx_ctrl_msr_rtm_disable" = 0 ]; then
pstatus blue NO
else
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't read MSR"
fi
_info_nol " * TSX_CTRL MSR indicates TSX CPUID bit is cleared: "
if [ "$tsx_ctrl_msr_cpuid_clear" = 1 ]; then
pstatus blue YES
elif [ "$tsx_ctrl_msr_cpuid_clear" = 0 ]; then
pstatus blue NO
else
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't read MSR"
fi
fi
fi
_info_nol " * CPU supports Transactional Synchronization Extensions (TSX): "
ret=$READ_CPUID_RET_KO
cpuid_rtm=0
if is_intel; then
read_cpuid 0x7 0x0 $EBX 11 1 1; ret=$?
fi
if [ $ret = $READ_CPUID_RET_OK ]; then
cpuid_rtm=1
pstatus green YES "RTM feature bit"
elif [ $ret = $READ_CPUID_RET_KO ]; then
pstatus yellow NO
else
cpuid_rtm=-1
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "$read_cpuid_msg"
fi
_info_nol " * CPU supports Software Guard Extensions (SGX): "
ret=$READ_CPUID_RET_KO
cpuid_sgx=0
if is_intel; then
read_cpuid 0x7 0x0 $EBX 2 1 1; ret=$?
fi
if [ $ret = $READ_CPUID_RET_OK ]; then
pstatus blue YES
cpuid_sgx=1
elif [ $ret = $READ_CPUID_RET_KO ]; then
pstatus green NO
else
cpuid_sgx=-1
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "$read_cpuid_msg"
fi
_info_nol " * CPU supports Special Register Buffer Data Sampling (SRBDS): "
# A processor supports SRBDS if it enumerates CPUID (EAX=7H,ECX=0):EDX[9] as 1
# That means the mitigation disabling SRBDS exists
ret=$READ_CPUID_RET_KO
cpuid_srbds=0
srbds_on=0
if is_intel; then
read_cpuid 0x7 0x0 $EDX 9 1 1; ret=$?
fi
if [ $ret = $READ_CPUID_RET_OK ]; then
pstatus blue YES
cpuid_srbds=1
read_msr 0x123; ret=$?
if [ $ret = $READ_MSR_RET_OK ]; then
if [ $read_msr_value = 0 ]; then
#SRBDS mitigation control exists and is enabled via microcode
srbds_on=1
else
#SRBDS mitigation control exists but is disabled via microcode
srbds_on=0
fi
else
srbds_on=-1
fi
elif [ $ret = $READ_CPUID_RET_KO ]; then
pstatus green NO
else
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "$read_cpuid_msg"
cpuid_srbds=0
fi
_info_nol " * CPU microcode is known to cause stability problems: "
if is_ucode_blacklisted; then
pstatus red YES "$ucode_found"
_warn
_warn "The microcode your CPU is running on is known to cause instability problems,"
_warn "such as intempestive reboots or random crashes."
_warn "You are advised to either revert to a previous microcode version (that might not have"
_warn "the mitigations for Spectre), or upgrade to a newer one if available."
_warn
else
pstatus blue NO "$ucode_found"
fi
_info_nol " * CPU microcode is the latest known available version: "
is_latest_known_ucode; ret=$?
if [ $ret -eq 0 ]; then
pstatus green YES "$ucode_latest"
elif [ $ret -eq 1 ]; then
pstatus red NO "$ucode_latest"
else
pstatus blue UNKNOWN "$ucode_latest"
fi
}
check_cpu_vulnerabilities()
{
_info "* CPU vulnerability to the speculative execution attack variants"
for cve in $supported_cve_list; do
_info_nol " * Affected by $cve ($(cve2name "$cve")): "
if is_cpu_vulnerable "$cve"; then
pstatus yellow YES
else
pstatus green NO
fi
done
}
check_redhat_canonical_spectre()
{
# if we were already called, don't do it again
[ -n "${redhat_canonical_spectre:-}" ] && return
if ! command -v "${opt_arch_prefix}strings" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
redhat_canonical_spectre=-1
elif [ -n "$kernel_err" ]; then
redhat_canonical_spectre=-2
else
# Red Hat / Ubuntu specific variant1 patch is difficult to detect,
# let's use the two same tricks than the official Red Hat detection script uses:
if "${opt_arch_prefix}strings" "$kernel" | grep -qw noibrs && "${opt_arch_prefix}strings" "$kernel" | grep -qw noibpb; then
# 1) detect their specific variant2 patch. If it's present, it means
# that the variant1 patch is also present (both were merged at the same time)
_debug "found redhat/canonical version of the variant2 patch (implies variant1)"
redhat_canonical_spectre=1
elif "${opt_arch_prefix}strings" "$kernel" | grep -q 'x86/pti:'; then
# 2) detect their specific variant3 patch. If it's present, but the variant2
# is not, it means that only variant1 is present in addition to variant3
_debug "found redhat/canonical version of the variant3 patch (implies variant1 but not variant2)"
redhat_canonical_spectre=2
else
redhat_canonical_spectre=0
fi
fi
}
check_has_vmm()
{
_info_nol "* This system is a host running a hypervisor: "
has_vmm=$opt_vmm
if [ "$has_vmm" = -1 ] && [ "$opt_paranoid" = 1 ]; then
# In paranoid mode, if --vmm was not specified on the command-line,
# we want to be secure before everything else, so assume we're running
# a hypervisor, as this requires more mitigations
has_vmm=2
elif [ "$has_vmm" = -1 ]; then
# Here, we want to know if we are hosting a hypervisor, and running some VMs on it.
# If we find no evidence that this is the case, assume we're not (to avoid scaring users),
# this can always be overridden with --vmm in any case.
has_vmm=0
if command -v pgrep >/dev/null 2>&1; then
# remove xenbus and xenwatch, also present inside domU
# remove libvirtd as it can also be used to manage containers and not VMs
# for each binary we want to grep, get the pids
for _binary in qemu kvm xenstored xenconsoled
do
for _pid in $(pgrep -x $_binary)
do
# resolve the exe symlink, if it doesn't resolve with -m,
# which doesn't even need the dest to exist, it means the symlink
# is null, which is the case for kernel threads: ignore those to
# avoid false positives (such as [kvm-irqfd-clean] under at least RHEL 7.6/7.7)
if ! [ "$(readlink -m "/proc/$_pid/exe")" = "/proc/$_pid/exe" ]; then
_debug "has_vmm: found PID $_pid"
has_vmm=1
fi
done
done
unset _binary _pid
else
# ignore SC2009 as `ps ax` is actually used as a fallback if `pgrep` isn't installed
# shellcheck disable=SC2009
if command -v ps >/devnull && ps ax | grep -vw grep | grep -q -e '\<qemu' -e '/qemu' -e '<\kvm' -e '/kvm' -e '/xenstored' -e '/xenconsoled'; then
has_vmm=1
fi
fi
fi
if [ "$has_vmm" = 0 ]; then
if [ "$opt_vmm" != -1 ]; then
pstatus green NO "forced from command line"
else
pstatus green NO
fi
else
if [ "$opt_vmm" != -1 ]; then
pstatus blue YES "forced from command line"
elif [ "$has_vmm" = 2 ]; then
pstatus blue YES "paranoid mode"
else
pstatus blue YES
fi
fi
}
###################
# SPECTRE 1 SECTION
# bounds check bypass aka 'Spectre Variant 1'
check_CVE_2017_5753()
{
cve='CVE-2017-5753'
_info "\033[1;34m$cve aka '$(cve2name "$cve")'\033[0m"
if [ "$os" = Linux ]; then
check_CVE_2017_5753_linux
elif echo "$os" | grep -q BSD; then
check_CVE_2017_5753_bsd
else
_warn "Unsupported OS ($os)"
fi
}
check_CVE_2017_5753_linux()
{
status=UNK
sys_interface_available=0
msg=''
if sys_interface_check "/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v1"; then
# this kernel has the /sys interface, trust it over everything
# v0.33+: don't. some kernels have backported the array_index_mask_nospec() workaround without
# modifying the vulnerabilities/spectre_v1 file. that's bad. we can't trust it when it says Vulnerable :(
# see "silent backport" detection at the bottom of this func
sys_interface_available=1
fi
if [ "$opt_sysfs_only" != 1 ]; then
# no /sys interface (or offline mode), fallback to our own ways
_info_nol "* Kernel has array_index_mask_nospec: "
# vanilla: look for the Linus' mask aka array_index_mask_nospec()
# that is inlined at least in raw_copy_from_user (__get_user_X symbols)
#mov PER_CPU_VAR(current_task), %_ASM_DX
#cmp TASK_addr_limit(%_ASM_DX),%_ASM_AX
#jae bad_get_user
# /* array_index_mask_nospec() are the 2 opcodes that follow */
#+sbb %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_DX
#+and %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_AX
#ASM_STAC
# x86 64bits: jae(0x0f 0x83 0x?? 0x?? 0x?? 0x??) sbb(0x48 0x19 0xd2) and(0x48 0x21 0xd0)
# x86 32bits: cmp(0x3b 0x82 0x?? 0x?? 0x00 0x00) jae(0x73 0x??) sbb(0x19 0xd2) and(0x21 0xd0)
#
# arm32
##ifdef CONFIG_THUMB2_KERNEL
##define CSDB ".inst.w 0xf3af8014"
##else
##define CSDB ".inst 0xe320f014" e320f014
##endif
#asm volatile(
# "cmp %1, %2\n" e1500003
#" sbc %0, %1, %1\n" e0c03000
#CSDB
#: "=r" (mask)
#: "r" (idx), "Ir" (sz)
#: "cc");
#
# http://git.arm.linux.org.uk/cgit/linux-arm.git/commit/?h=spectre&id=a78d156587931a2c3b354534aa772febf6c9e855
v1_mask_nospec=''
if [ -n "$kernel_err" ]; then
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't check ($kernel_err)"
elif ! command -v perl >/dev/null 2>&1; then
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "missing 'perl' binary, please install it"
else
perl -ne '/\x0f\x83....\x48\x19\xd2\x48\x21\xd0/ and $found++; END { exit($found) }' "$kernel"; ret=$?
if [ $ret -gt 0 ]; then
pstatus green YES "$ret occurrence(s) found of x86 64 bits array_index_mask_nospec()"
v1_mask_nospec="x86 64 bits array_index_mask_nospec"
else
perl -ne '/\x3b\x82..\x00\x00\x73.\x19\xd2\x21\xd0/ and $found++; END { exit($found) }' "$kernel"; ret=$?
if [ $ret -gt 0 ]; then
pstatus green YES "$ret occurrence(s) found of x86 32 bits array_index_mask_nospec()"
v1_mask_nospec="x86 32 bits array_index_mask_nospec"
else
ret=$("${opt_arch_prefix}objdump" $objdump_options "$kernel" | grep -w -e f3af8014 -e e320f014 -B2 | grep -B1 -w sbc | grep -w -c cmp)
if [ "$ret" -gt 0 ]; then
pstatus green YES "$ret occurrence(s) found of arm 32 bits array_index_mask_nospec()"
v1_mask_nospec="arm 32 bits array_index_mask_nospec"
else
pstatus yellow NO
fi
fi
fi
fi
_info_nol "* Kernel has the Red Hat/Ubuntu patch: "
check_redhat_canonical_spectre
if [ "$redhat_canonical_spectre" = -1 ]; then
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "missing '${opt_arch_prefix}strings' tool, please install it, usually it's in the binutils package"
elif [ "$redhat_canonical_spectre" = -2 ]; then
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't check ($kernel_err)"
elif [ "$redhat_canonical_spectre" = 1 ]; then
pstatus green YES
elif [ "$redhat_canonical_spectre" = 2 ]; then
pstatus green YES "but without IBRS"
else
pstatus yellow NO
fi
_info_nol "* Kernel has mask_nospec64 (arm64): "
#.macro mask_nospec64, idx, limit, tmp
#sub \tmp, \idx, \limit
#bic \tmp, \tmp, \idx
#and \idx, \idx, \tmp, asr #63
#csdb
#.endm
#$ aarch64-linux-gnu-objdump -d vmlinux | grep -w bic -A1 -B1 | grep -w sub -A2 | grep -w and -B2
#ffffff8008082e44: cb190353 sub x19, x26, x25
#ffffff8008082e48: 8a3a0273 bic x19, x19, x26
#ffffff8008082e4c: 8a93ff5a and x26, x26, x19, asr #63
#ffffff8008082e50: d503229f hint #0x14
# /!\ can also just be "csdb" instead of "hint #0x14" for native objdump
#
# if we have v1_mask_nospec or redhat_canonical_spectre>0, don't bother disassembling the kernel, the answer is no.
if [ -n "$v1_mask_nospec" ] || [ "$redhat_canonical_spectre" -gt 0 ]; then
pstatus yellow NO
elif [ -n "$kernel_err" ]; then
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't check ($kernel_err)"
elif ! command -v perl >/dev/null 2>&1; then
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "missing 'perl' binary, please install it"
elif ! command -v "${opt_arch_prefix}objdump" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "missing '${opt_arch_prefix}objdump' tool, please install it, usually it's in the binutils package"
else
"${opt_arch_prefix}objdump" $objdump_options "$kernel" | perl -ne 'push @r, $_; /\s(hint|csdb)\s/ && $r[0]=~/\ssub\s+(x\d+)/ && $r[1]=~/\sbic\s+$1,\s+$1,/ && $r[2]=~/\sand\s/ && exit(9); shift @r if @r>3'; ret=$?
if [ "$ret" -eq 9 ]; then
pstatus green YES "mask_nospec64 macro is present and used"
v1_mask_nospec="arm64 mask_nospec64"
else
pstatus yellow NO
fi
fi
_info_nol "* Kernel has array_index_nospec (arm64): "
# in 4.19+ kernels, the mask_nospec64 asm64 macro is replaced by array_index_nospec, defined in nospec.h, and used in invoke_syscall()
# ffffff8008090a4c: 2a0203e2 mov w2, w2
# ffffff8008090a50: eb0200bf cmp x5, x2
# ffffff8008090a54: da1f03e2 ngc x2, xzr
# ffffff8008090a58: d503229f hint #0x14
# /!\ can also just be "csdb" instead of "hint #0x14" for native objdump
#
# if we have v1_mask_nospec or redhat_canonical_spectre>0, don't bother disassembling the kernel, the answer is no.
if [ -n "$v1_mask_nospec" ] || [ "$redhat_canonical_spectre" -gt 0 ]; then
pstatus yellow NO
elif [ -n "$kernel_err" ]; then
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't check ($kernel_err)"
elif ! command -v perl >/dev/null 2>&1; then
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "missing 'perl' binary, please install it"
elif ! command -v "${opt_arch_prefix}objdump" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "missing '${opt_arch_prefix}objdump' tool, please install it, usually it's in the binutils package"
else
"${opt_arch_prefix}objdump" -d "$kernel" | perl -ne 'push @r, $_; /\s(hint|csdb)\s/ && $r[0]=~/\smov\s+(w\d+),\s+(w\d+)/ && $r[1]=~/\scmp\s+(x\d+),\s+(x\d+)/ && $r[2]=~/\sngc\s+$2,/ && exit(9); shift @r if @r>3'; ret=$?
if [ "$ret" -eq 9 ]; then
pstatus green YES "array_index_nospec macro is present and used"
v1_mask_nospec="arm64 array_index_nospec"
else
pstatus yellow NO
fi
fi
if [ "$opt_verbose" -ge 2 ] || { [ -z "$v1_mask_nospec" ] && [ "$redhat_canonical_spectre" != 1 ] && [ "$redhat_canonical_spectre" != 2 ]; }; then
# this is a slow heuristic and we don't need it if we already know the kernel is patched
# but still show it in verbose mode
_info_nol "* Checking count of LFENCE instructions following a jump in kernel... "
if [ -n "$kernel_err" ]; then
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't check ($kernel_err)"
else
if ! command -v "${opt_arch_prefix}objdump" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "missing '${opt_arch_prefix}objdump' tool, please install it, usually it's in the binutils package"
else
# here we disassemble the kernel and count the number of occurrences of the LFENCE opcode
# in non-patched kernels, this has been empirically determined as being around 40-50
# in patched kernels, this is more around 70-80, sometimes way higher (100+)
# v0.13: 68 found in a 3.10.23-xxxx-std-ipv6-64 (with lots of modules compiled-in directly), which doesn't have the LFENCE patches,
# so let's push the threshold to 70.
# v0.33+: now only count lfence opcodes after a jump, way less error-prone
# non patched kernel have between 0 and 20 matches, patched ones have at least 40-45
nb_lfence=$("${opt_arch_prefix}objdump" $objdump_options "$kernel" 2>/dev/null | grep -w -B1 lfence | grep -Ewc 'jmp|jne|je')
if [ "$nb_lfence" -lt 30 ]; then
pstatus yellow NO "only $nb_lfence jump-then-lfence instructions found, should be >= 30 (heuristic)"
else
v1_lfence=1
pstatus green YES "$nb_lfence jump-then-lfence instructions found, which is >= 30 (heuristic)"
fi
fi
fi
fi
else
# we have no sysfs but were asked to use it only!
msg="/sys vulnerability interface use forced, but it's not available!"
status=UNK
fi
# report status
if ! is_cpu_vulnerable "$cve"; then
# override status & msg in case CPU is not vulnerable after all
pvulnstatus $cve OK "your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not affected"
elif [ -z "$msg" ]; then
# if msg is empty, sysfs check didn't fill it, rely on our own test
if [ -n "$v1_mask_nospec" ]; then
pvulnstatus $cve OK "Kernel source has been patched to mitigate the vulnerability ($v1_mask_nospec)"
elif [ "$redhat_canonical_spectre" = 1 ] || [ "$redhat_canonical_spectre" = 2 ]; then
pvulnstatus $cve OK "Kernel source has been patched to mitigate the vulnerability (Red Hat/Ubuntu patch)"
elif [ "$v1_lfence" = 1 ]; then
pvulnstatus $cve OK "Kernel source has PROBABLY been patched to mitigate the vulnerability (jump-then-lfence instructions heuristic)"
elif [ -n "$kernel_err" ]; then
pvulnstatus $cve UNK "Couldn't find kernel image or tools missing to execute the checks"
explain "Re-run this script with root privileges, after installing the missing tools indicated above"
else
pvulnstatus $cve VULN "Kernel source needs to be patched to mitigate the vulnerability"
explain "Your kernel is too old to have the mitigation for Variant 1, you should upgrade to a newer kernel. If you're using a Linux distro and didn't compile the kernel yourself, you should upgrade your distro to get a newer kernel."
fi
else
if [ "$msg" = "Vulnerable" ] && [ -n "$v1_mask_nospec" ]; then
pvulnstatus $cve OK "Kernel source has been patched to mitigate the vulnerability (silent backport of array_index_mask_nospec)"
else
if [ "$msg" = "Vulnerable" ]; then
msg="Kernel source needs to be patched to mitigate the vulnerability"
_explain="Your kernel is too old to have the mitigation for Variant 1, you should upgrade to a newer kernel. If you're using a Linux distro and didn't compile the kernel yourself, you should upgrade your distro to get a newer kernel."
fi
pvulnstatus $cve "$status" "$msg"
[ -n "${_explain:-}" ] && explain "$_explain"
unset _explain
fi
fi
}
check_CVE_2017_5753_bsd()
{
if ! is_cpu_vulnerable "$cve"; then
# override status & msg in case CPU is not vulnerable after all
pvulnstatus $cve OK "your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not affected"
else
pvulnstatus $cve VULN "no mitigation for BSD yet"
fi
}
###################
# SPECTRE 2 SECTION
# branch target injection aka 'Spectre Variant 2'
check_CVE_2017_5715()
{
cve='CVE-2017-5715'
_info "\033[1;34m$cve aka '$(cve2name "$cve")'\033[0m"
if [ "$os" = Linux ]; then
check_CVE_2017_5715_linux
elif echo "$os" | grep -q BSD; then
check_CVE_2017_5715_bsd
else
_warn "Unsupported OS ($os)"
fi
}
check_CVE_2017_5715_linux()
{
status=UNK
sys_interface_available=0
msg=''
if sys_interface_check "/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2"; then
# this kernel has the /sys interface, trust it over everything
sys_interface_available=1
fi
if [ "$opt_sysfs_only" != 1 ]; then
_info "* Mitigation 1"
ibrs_can_tell=0
ibrs_supported=''
ibrs_enabled=''
ibpb_can_tell=0
ibpb_supported=''
ibpb_enabled=''
if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
# in live mode, we can check for the ibrs_enabled file in debugfs
# all versions of the patches have it (NOT the case of IBPB or KPTI)
ibrs_can_tell=1
mount_debugfs
for dir in \
/sys/kernel/debug \
/sys/kernel/debug/x86 \
"$procfs/sys/kernel"; do
if [ -e "$dir/ibrs_enabled" ]; then
# if the file is there, we have IBRS compiled-in
# /sys/kernel/debug/ibrs_enabled: vanilla
# /sys/kernel/debug/x86/ibrs_enabled: Red Hat (see https://access.redhat.com/articles/3311301)
# /proc/sys/kernel/ibrs_enabled: OpenSUSE tumbleweed
specex_knob_dir=$dir
ibrs_supported="$dir/ibrs_enabled exists"
ibrs_enabled=$(cat "$dir/ibrs_enabled" 2>/dev/null)
_debug "ibrs: found $dir/ibrs_enabled=$ibrs_enabled"
# if ibrs_enabled is there, ibpb_enabled will be in the same dir
if [ -e "$dir/ibpb_enabled" ]; then
# if the file is there, we have IBPB compiled-in (see note above for IBRS)
ibpb_supported="$dir/ibpb_enabled exists"
ibpb_enabled=$(cat "$dir/ibpb_enabled" 2>/dev/null)
_debug "ibpb: found $dir/ibpb_enabled=$ibpb_enabled"
else
_debug "ibpb: $dir/ibpb_enabled file doesn't exist"
fi
break
else
_debug "ibrs: $dir/ibrs_enabled file doesn't exist"
fi
done
# on some newer kernels, the spec_ctrl_ibrs flag in "$procfs/cpuinfo"
# is set when ibrs has been administratively enabled (usually from cmdline)
# which in that case means ibrs is supported *and* enabled for kernel & user
# as per the ibrs patch series v3
if [ -z "$ibrs_supported" ]; then
if grep ^flags "$procfs/cpuinfo" | grep -qw spec_ctrl_ibrs; then
_debug "ibrs: found spec_ctrl_ibrs flag in $procfs/cpuinfo"
ibrs_supported="spec_ctrl_ibrs flag in $procfs/cpuinfo"
# enabled=2 -> kernel & user
ibrs_enabled=2
# XXX and what about ibpb ?
fi
fi
if [ -n "$fullmsg" ]; then
# when IBPB is enabled on 4.15+, we can see it in sysfs
if echo "$fullmsg" | grep -q 'IBPB'; then
_debug "ibpb: found enabled in sysfs"
[ -z "$ibpb_supported" ] && ibpb_supported='IBPB found enabled in sysfs'
[ -z "$ibpb_enabled" ] && ibpb_enabled=1
fi
# when IBRS_FW is enabled on 4.15+, we can see it in sysfs
if echo "$fullmsg" | grep -q ', IBRS_FW'; then
_debug "ibrs: found IBRS_FW in sysfs"
[ -z "$ibrs_supported" ] && ibrs_supported='found IBRS_FW in sysfs'
ibrs_fw_enabled=1
fi
# when IBRS is enabled on 4.15+, we can see it in sysfs
# on a more recent kernel, classic "IBRS" is not even longer an option, because of the performance impact.
# only "Enhanced IBRS" is available (on CPUs with the IBRS_ALL flag)
if echo "$fullmsg" | grep -q -e '\<IBRS\>' -e 'Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation'; then
_debug "ibrs: found IBRS in sysfs"
[ -z "$ibrs_supported" ] && ibrs_supported='found IBRS in sysfs'
[ -z "$ibrs_enabled" ] && ibrs_enabled=3
fi
# checking for 'Enhanced IBRS' in sysfs, enabled on CPUs with IBRS_ALL
if echo "$fullmsg" | grep -q -e 'Enhanced IBRS'; then
[ -z "$ibrs_supported" ] && ibrs_supported='found Enhanced IBRS in sysfs'
# 4 isn't actually a valid value of the now extinct "ibrs_enabled" flag file,
# that only went from 0 to 3, so we use 4 as "enhanced ibrs is enabled"
ibrs_enabled=4
fi
fi
# in live mode, if ibrs or ibpb is supported and we didn't find these are enabled, then they are not
[ -n "$ibrs_supported" ] && [ -z "$ibrs_enabled" ] && ibrs_enabled=0
[ -n "$ibpb_supported" ] && [ -z "$ibpb_enabled" ] && ibpb_enabled=0
fi
if [ -z "$ibrs_supported" ]; then
check_redhat_canonical_spectre
if [ "$redhat_canonical_spectre" = 1 ]; then
ibrs_supported="Red Hat/Ubuntu variant"
ibpb_supported="Red Hat/Ubuntu variant"
fi
fi
if [ -z "$ibrs_supported" ] && [ -n "$kernel" ]; then
if ! command -v "${opt_arch_prefix}strings" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
:
else
ibrs_can_tell=1
ibrs_supported=$("${opt_arch_prefix}strings" "$kernel" | grep -Fw -e ', IBRS_FW' | head -1)
if [ -n "$ibrs_supported" ]; then
_debug "ibrs: found ibrs evidence in kernel image ($ibrs_supported)"
ibrs_supported="found '$ibrs_supported' in kernel image"
fi
fi
fi
if [ -z "$ibrs_supported" ] && [ -n "$opt_map" ]; then
ibrs_can_tell=1
if grep -q spec_ctrl "$opt_map"; then
ibrs_supported="found spec_ctrl in symbols file"
_debug "ibrs: found '*spec_ctrl*' symbol in $opt_map"
fi
fi
# recent (4.15) vanilla kernels have IBPB but not IBRS, and without the debugfs tunables of Red Hat
# we can detect it directly in the image
if [ -z "$ibpb_supported" ] && [ -n "$kernel" ]; then
if ! command -v "${opt_arch_prefix}strings" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
:
else
ibpb_can_tell=1
ibpb_supported=$("${opt_arch_prefix}strings" "$kernel" | grep -Fw -e 'ibpb' -e ', IBPB' | head -1)
if [ -n "$ibpb_supported" ]; then
_debug "ibpb: found ibpb evidence in kernel image ($ibpb_supported)"
ibpb_supported="found '$ibpb_supported' in kernel image"
fi
fi
fi
_info_nol " * Kernel is compiled with IBRS support: "
if [ -z "$ibrs_supported" ]; then
if [ "$ibrs_can_tell" = 1 ]; then
pstatus yellow NO
else
# problem obtaining/inspecting kernel or strings not installed, but if the later is true,
# then readelf is not installed either (both in binutils) which makes the former true, so
# either way kernel_err should be set
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't check ($kernel_err)"
fi
else
if [ "$opt_verbose" -ge 2 ]; then
pstatus green YES "$ibrs_supported"
else
pstatus green YES
fi
fi
_info_nol " * IBRS enabled and active: "
if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
if [ "$ibpb_enabled" = 2 ]; then
# if ibpb=2, ibrs is forcefully=0
pstatus blue NO "IBPB used instead of IBRS in all kernel entrypoints"
else
# 0 means disabled
# 1 is enabled only for kernel space
# 2 is enabled for kernel and user space
# 3 is enabled
# 4 is enhanced ibrs enabled
case "$ibrs_enabled" in
0)
if [ "$ibrs_fw_enabled" = 1 ]; then
pstatus blue YES "for firmware code only"
else
pstatus yellow NO
fi
;;
1) if [ "$ibrs_fw_enabled" = 1 ]; then pstatus green YES "for kernel space and firmware code"; else pstatus green YES "for kernel space"; fi;;
2) if [ "$ibrs_fw_enabled" = 1 ]; then pstatus green YES "for kernel, user space, and firmware code" ; else pstatus green YES "for both kernel and user space"; fi;;
3) if [ "$ibrs_fw_enabled" = 1 ]; then pstatus green YES "for kernel and firmware code"; else pstatus green YES; fi;;
4) pstatus green YES "Enhanced flavor, performance impact will be greatly reduced";;
*) if [ "$cpuid_ibrs" != 'SPEC_CTRL' ] && [ "$cpuid_ibrs" != 'IBRS_SUPPORT' ] && [ "$cpuid_spec_ctrl" != -1 ];
then pstatus yellow NO; _debug "ibrs: known cpu not supporting SPEC-CTRL or IBRS";
else
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN; fi;;
esac
fi
else
pstatus blue N/A "not testable in offline mode"
fi
_info_nol " * Kernel is compiled with IBPB support: "
if [ -z "$ibpb_supported" ]; then
if [ "$ibpb_can_tell" = 1 ]; then
pstatus yellow NO
else
# if we're in offline mode without System.map, we can't really know
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "in offline mode, we need the kernel image to be able to tell"
fi
else
if [ "$opt_verbose" -ge 2 ]; then
pstatus green YES "$ibpb_supported"
else
pstatus green YES
fi
fi
_info_nol " * IBPB enabled and active: "
if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
case "$ibpb_enabled" in
"")
if [ "$ibrs_supported" = 1 ]; then
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN
else
pstatus yellow NO
fi
;;
0)
pstatus yellow NO
;;
1) pstatus green YES;;
2) pstatus green YES "IBPB used instead of IBRS in all kernel entrypoints";;
*) pstatus yellow UNKNOWN;;
esac
else
pstatus blue N/A "not testable in offline mode"
fi
_info "* Mitigation 2"
_info_nol " * Kernel has branch predictor hardening (arm): "
bp_harden_can_tell=0
bp_harden=''
if [ -r "$opt_config" ]; then
bp_harden_can_tell=1
bp_harden=$(grep -w 'CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR=y' "$opt_config")
if [ -n "$bp_harden" ]; then
pstatus green YES
_debug "bp_harden: found '$bp_harden' in $opt_config"
fi
fi
if [ -z "$bp_harden" ] && [ -n "$opt_map" ]; then
bp_harden_can_tell=1
bp_harden=$(grep -w bp_hardening_data "$opt_map")
if [ -n "$bp_harden" ]; then
pstatus green YES
_debug "bp_harden: found '$bp_harden' in $opt_map"
fi
fi
if [ -z "$bp_harden" ]; then
if [ "$bp_harden_can_tell" = 1 ]; then
pstatus yellow NO
else
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN
fi
fi
_info_nol " * Kernel compiled with retpoline option: "
# We check the RETPOLINE kernel options
retpoline=0
if [ -r "$opt_config" ]; then
if grep -q '^CONFIG_RETPOLINE=y' "$opt_config"; then
pstatus green YES
retpoline=1
# shellcheck disable=SC2046
_debug 'retpoline: found '$(grep '^CONFIG_RETPOLINE' "$opt_config")" in $opt_config"
else
pstatus yellow NO
fi
else
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't read your kernel configuration"
fi
if [ "$retpoline" = 1 ]; then
# Now check if the compiler used to compile the kernel knows how to insert retpolines in generated asm
# For gcc, this is -mindirect-branch=thunk-extern (detected by the kernel makefiles)
# See gcc commit https://github.com/hjl-tools/gcc/commit/23b517d4a67c02d3ef80b6109218f2aadad7bd79
# In latest retpoline LKML patches, the noretpoline_setup symbol exists only if CONFIG_RETPOLINE is set
# *AND* if the compiler is retpoline-compliant, so look for that symbol
#
# if there is "retpoline" in the file and NOT "minimal", then it's full retpoline
# (works for vanilla and Red Hat variants)
#
# since 5.15.28, this is now "Retpolines" as the implementation was switched to a generic one,
# so we look for both "retpoline" and "retpolines"
if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ] && [ -n "$fullmsg" ]; then
if echo "$fullmsg" | grep -qwi -e retpoline -e retpolines; then
if echo "$fullmsg" | grep -qwi minimal; then
retpoline_compiler=0
retpoline_compiler_reason="kernel reports minimal retpoline compilation"
else
retpoline_compiler=1
retpoline_compiler_reason="kernel reports full retpoline compilation"
fi
fi
elif [ -n "$opt_map" ]; then
# look for the symbol
if grep -qw noretpoline_setup "$opt_map"; then
retpoline_compiler=1
retpoline_compiler_reason="noretpoline_setup symbol found in System.map"
fi
elif [ -n "$kernel" ]; then
# look for the symbol
if command -v "${opt_arch_prefix}nm" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
# the proper way: use nm and look for the symbol
if "${opt_arch_prefix}nm" "$kernel" 2>/dev/null | grep -qw 'noretpoline_setup'; then
retpoline_compiler=1
retpoline_compiler_reason="noretpoline_setup found in kernel symbols"
fi
elif grep -q noretpoline_setup "$kernel"; then
# if we don't have nm, nevermind, the symbol name is long enough to not have
# any false positive using good old grep directly on the binary
retpoline_compiler=1
retpoline_compiler_reason="noretpoline_setup found in kernel"
fi
fi
if [ -n "$retpoline_compiler" ]; then
_info_nol " * Kernel compiled with a retpoline-aware compiler: "
if [ "$retpoline_compiler" = 1 ]; then
if [ -n "$retpoline_compiler_reason" ]; then
pstatus green YES "$retpoline_compiler_reason"
else
pstatus green YES
fi
else
if [ -n "$retpoline_compiler_reason" ]; then
pstatus red NO "$retpoline_compiler_reason"
else
pstatus red NO
fi
fi
fi
fi
# only Red Hat has a tunable to disable it on runtime
retp_enabled=-1
if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
if [ -e "$specex_knob_dir/retp_enabled" ]; then
retp_enabled=$(cat "$specex_knob_dir/retp_enabled" 2>/dev/null)
_debug "retpoline: found $specex_knob_dir/retp_enabled=$retp_enabled"
_info_nol " * Retpoline is enabled: "
if [ "$retp_enabled" = 1 ]; then
pstatus green YES
else
pstatus yellow NO
fi
fi
fi
# only for information, in verbose mode
if [ "$opt_verbose" -ge 2 ]; then
_info_nol " * Local gcc is retpoline-aware: "
if command -v gcc >/dev/null 2>&1; then
if [ -n "$(gcc -mindirect-branch=thunk-extern --version 2>&1 >/dev/null)" ]; then
pstatus blue NO
else
pstatus green YES
fi
else
pstatus blue NO "gcc is not installed"
fi
fi
if is_vulnerable_to_empty_rsb || [ "$opt_verbose" -ge 2 ]; then
_info_nol " * Kernel supports RSB filling: "
rsb_filling=0
if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ] && [ "$opt_no_sysfs" != 1 ]; then
# if we're live and we aren't denied looking into /sys, let's do it
if echo "$msg" | grep -qw RSB; then
rsb_filling=1
pstatus green YES
fi
fi
if [ "$rsb_filling" = 0 ]; then
if [ -n "$kernel_err" ]; then
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't check ($kernel_err)"
else
if grep -qw -e 'Filling RSB on context switch' "$kernel"; then
rsb_filling=1
pstatus green YES
else
rsb_filling=0
pstatus yellow NO
fi
fi
fi
fi
elif [ "$sys_interface_available" = 0 ]; then
# we have no sysfs but were asked to use it only!
msg="/sys vulnerability interface use forced, but it's not available!"
status=UNK
fi
if ! is_cpu_vulnerable "$cve"; then
# override status & msg in case CPU is not vulnerable after all
pvulnstatus $cve OK "your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not affected"
else
if [ "$retpoline" = 1 ] && [ "$retpoline_compiler" = 1 ] && [ "$retp_enabled" != 0 ] && [ -n "$ibpb_enabled" ] && [ "$ibpb_enabled" -ge 1 ] && ( ! is_vulnerable_to_empty_rsb || [ "$rsb_filling" = 1 ] ); then
pvulnstatus $cve OK "Full retpoline + IBPB are mitigating the vulnerability"
elif [ "$retpoline" = 1 ] && [ "$retpoline_compiler" = 1 ] && [ "$retp_enabled" != 0 ] && [ "$opt_paranoid" = 0 ] && ( ! is_vulnerable_to_empty_rsb || [ "$rsb_filling" = 1 ] ); then
pvulnstatus $cve OK "Full retpoline is mitigating the vulnerability"
if [ -n "$cpuid_ibpb" ]; then
_warn "You should enable IBPB to complete retpoline as a Variant 2 mitigation"
else
_warn "IBPB is considered as a good addition to retpoline for Variant 2 mitigation, but your CPU microcode doesn't support it"
fi
elif [ -n "$ibrs_enabled" ] && [ -n "$ibpb_enabled" ] && [ "$ibrs_enabled" -ge 1 ] && [ "$ibpb_enabled" -ge 1 ]; then
if [ "$ibrs_enabled" = 4 ]; then
pvulnstatus $cve OK "Enhanced IBRS + IBPB are mitigating the vulnerability"
else
pvulnstatus $cve OK "IBRS + IBPB are mitigating the vulnerability"
fi
elif [ "$ibpb_enabled" = 2 ] && ! is_cpu_smt_enabled; then
pvulnstatus $cve OK "Full IBPB is mitigating the vulnerability"
elif [ -n "$bp_harden" ]; then
pvulnstatus $cve OK "Branch predictor hardening mitigates the vulnerability"
elif [ -z "$bp_harden" ] && [ "$cpu_vendor" = ARM ]; then
pvulnstatus $cve VULN "Branch predictor hardening is needed to mitigate the vulnerability"
explain "Your kernel has not been compiled with the CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 option, recompile it with this option enabled."
elif [ "$opt_live" != 1 ]; then
if [ "$retpoline" = 1 ] && [ -n "$ibpb_supported" ]; then
pvulnstatus $cve OK "offline mode: kernel supports retpoline + IBPB to mitigate the vulnerability"
elif [ -n "$ibrs_supported" ] && [ -n "$ibpb_supported" ]; then
pvulnstatus $cve OK "offline mode: kernel supports IBRS + IBPB to mitigate the vulnerability"
elif [ "$ibrs_can_tell" != 1 ]; then
pvulnstatus $cve UNK "offline mode: not enough information"
explain "Re-run this script with root privileges, and give it the kernel image (--kernel), the kernel configuration (--config) and the System.map file (--map) corresponding to the kernel you would like to inspect."
fi
fi
# if we arrive here and didn't already call pvulnstatus, then it's VULN, let's explain why
if [ "$pvulnstatus_last_cve" != "$cve" ]; then
# explain what's needed for this CPU
if is_vulnerable_to_empty_rsb; then
pvulnstatus $cve VULN "IBRS+IBPB or retpoline+IBPB+RSB filling, is needed to mitigate the vulnerability"
explain "To mitigate this vulnerability, you need either IBRS + IBPB, both requiring hardware support from your CPU microcode in addition to kernel support, or a kernel compiled with retpoline and IBPB, with retpoline requiring a retpoline-aware compiler (re-run this script with -v to know if your version of gcc is retpoline-aware) and IBPB requiring hardware support from your CPU microcode. You also need a recent-enough kernel that supports RSB filling if you plan to use retpoline. For Skylake+ CPUs, the IBRS + IBPB approach is generally preferred as it guarantees complete protection, and the performance impact is not as high as with older CPUs in comparison with retpoline. More information about how to enable the missing bits for those two possible mitigations on your system follow. You only need to take one of the two approaches."
elif is_zen_cpu || is_moksha_cpu; then
pvulnstatus $cve VULN "retpoline+IBPB is needed to mitigate the vulnerability"
explain "To mitigate this vulnerability, You need a kernel compiled with retpoline + IBPB support, with retpoline requiring a retpoline-aware compiler (re-run this script with -v to know if your version of gcc is retpoline-aware) and IBPB requiring hardware support from your CPU microcode."
elif is_intel || is_amd || is_hygon; then
pvulnstatus $cve VULN "IBRS+IBPB or retpoline+IBPB is needed to mitigate the vulnerability"
explain "To mitigate this vulnerability, you need either IBRS + IBPB, both requiring hardware support from your CPU microcode in addition to kernel support, or a kernel compiled with retpoline and IBPB, with retpoline requiring a retpoline-aware compiler (re-run this script with -v to know if your version of gcc is retpoline-aware) and IBPB requiring hardware support from your CPU microcode. The retpoline + IBPB approach is generally preferred as the performance impact is lower. More information about how to enable the missing bits for those two possible mitigations on your system follow. You only need to take one of the two approaches."
else
# in that case, we might want to trust sysfs if it's there
if [ -n "$msg" ]; then
[ "$msg" = Vulnerable ] && msg="no known mitigation exists for your CPU vendor ($cpu_vendor)"
pvulnstatus $cve $status "$msg"
else
pvulnstatus $cve VULN "no known mitigation exists for your CPU vendor ($cpu_vendor)"
fi
fi
fi
# if we are in live mode, we can check for a lot more stuff and explain further
if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ] && [ "$vulnstatus" != "OK" ]; then
_explain_hypervisor="An updated CPU microcode will have IBRS/IBPB capabilities indicated in the Hardware Check section above. If you're running under a hypervisor (KVM, Xen, VirtualBox, VMware, ...), the hypervisor needs to be up to date to be able to export the new host CPU flags to the guest. You can run this script on the host to check if the host CPU is IBRS/IBPB. If it is, and it doesn't show up in the guest, upgrade the hypervisor. You may need to reconfigure your VM to use a CPU model that has IBRS capability; in Libvirt, such CPUs are listed with an IBRS suffix."
# IBPB (amd & intel)
if { [ -z "$ibpb_enabled" ] || [ "$ibpb_enabled" = 0 ]; } && { is_intel || is_amd || is_hygon; }; then
if [ -z "$cpuid_ibpb" ]; then
explain "The microcode of your CPU needs to be upgraded to be able to use IBPB. This is usually done at boot time by your kernel (the upgrade is not persistent across reboots which is why it's done at each boot). If you're using a distro, make sure you are up to date, as microcode updates are usually shipped alongside with the distro kernel. Availability of a microcode update for you CPU model depends on your CPU vendor. You can usually find out online if a microcode update is available for your CPU by searching for your CPUID (indicated in the Hardware Check section). $_explain_hypervisor"
fi
if [ -z "$ibpb_supported" ]; then
explain "Your kernel doesn't have IBPB support, so you need to either upgrade your kernel (if you're using a distro) or recompiling a more recent kernel."
fi
if [ -n "$cpuid_ibpb" ] && [ -n "$ibpb_supported" ]; then
if [ -e "$specex_knob_dir/ibpb_enabled" ]; then
# newer (April 2018) Red Hat kernels have ibpb_enabled as ro, and automatically enables it with retpoline
if [ ! -w "$specex_knob_dir/ibpb_enabled" ] && [ -e "$specex_knob_dir/retp_enabled" ]; then
explain "Both your CPU and your kernel have IBPB support, but it is currently disabled. You kernel should enable IBPB automatically if you enable retpoline. You may enable it with \`echo 1 > $specex_knob_dir/retp_enabled\`."
else
explain "Both your CPU and your kernel have IBPB support, but it is currently disabled. You may enable it with \`echo 1 > $specex_knob_dir/ibpb_enabled\`."
fi
else
explain "Both your CPU and your kernel have IBPB support, but it is currently disabled. You may enable it. Check in your distro's documentation on how to do this."
fi
fi
elif [ "$ibpb_enabled" = 2 ] && is_cpu_smt_enabled; then
explain "You have ibpb_enabled set to 2, but it only offers sufficient protection when simultaneous multi-threading (aka SMT or HyperThreading) is disabled. You should reboot your system with the kernel parameter \`nosmt\`."
fi
# /IBPB
# IBRS (amd & intel)
if { [ -z "$ibrs_enabled" ] || [ "$ibrs_enabled" = 0 ]; } && { is_intel || is_amd || is_hygon; }; then
if [ -z "$cpuid_ibrs" ]; then
explain "The microcode of your CPU needs to be upgraded to be able to use IBRS. This is usually done at boot time by your kernel (the upgrade is not persistent across reboots which is why it's done at each boot). If you're using a distro, make sure you are up to date, as microcode updates are usually shipped alongside with the distro kernel. Availability of a microcode update for you CPU model depends on your CPU vendor. You can usually find out online if a microcode update is available for your CPU by searching for your CPUID (indicated in the Hardware Check section). $_explain_hypervisor"
fi
if [ -z "$ibrs_supported" ]; then
explain "Your kernel doesn't have IBRS support, so you need to either upgrade your kernel (if you're using a distro) or recompiling a more recent kernel."
fi
if [ -n "$cpuid_ibrs" ] && [ -n "$ibrs_supported" ]; then
if [ -e "$specex_knob_dir/ibrs_enabled" ]; then
explain "Both your CPU and your kernel have IBRS support, but it is currently disabled. You may enable it with \`echo 1 > $specex_knob_dir/ibrs_enabled\`."
else
explain "Both your CPU and your kernel have IBRS support, but it is currently disabled. You may enable it. Check in your distro's documentation on how to do this."
fi
fi
fi
# /IBRS
unset _explain_hypervisor
# RETPOLINE (amd & intel &hygon )
if is_amd || is_intel || is_hygon; then
if [ "$retpoline" = 0 ]; then
explain "Your kernel is not compiled with retpoline support, so you need to either upgrade your kernel (if you're using a distro) or recompile your kernel with the CONFIG_RETPOLINE option enabled. You also need to compile your kernel with a retpoline-aware compiler (re-run this script with -v to know if your version of gcc is retpoline-aware)."
elif [ "$retpoline" = 1 ] && [ "$retpoline_compiler" = 0 ]; then
explain "Your kernel is compiled with retpoline, but without a retpoline-aware compiler (re-run this script with -v to know if your version of gcc is retpoline-aware)."
elif [ "$retpoline" = 1 ] && [ "$retpoline_compiler" = 1 ] && [ "$retp_enabled" = 0 ]; then
explain "Your kernel has retpoline support and has been compiled with a retpoline-aware compiler, but retpoline is disabled. You should enable it with \`echo 1 > $specex_knob_dir/retp_enabled\`."
fi
fi
# /RETPOLINE
fi
fi
# sysfs msgs:
#1 "Vulnerable"
#2 "Vulnerable: Minimal generic ASM retpoline"
#2 "Vulnerable: Minimal AMD ASM retpoline"
# "Mitigation: Full generic retpoline"
# "Mitigation: Full AMD retpoline"
# $MITIGATION + ", IBPB"
# $MITIGATION + ", IBRS_FW"
#5 $MITIGATION + " - vulnerable module loaded"
# Red Hat only:
#2 "Vulnerable: Minimal ASM retpoline",
#3 "Vulnerable: Retpoline without IBPB",
#4 "Vulnerable: Retpoline on Skylake+",
#5 "Vulnerable: Retpoline with unsafe module(s)",
# "Mitigation: Full retpoline",
# "Mitigation: Full retpoline and IBRS (user space)",
# "Mitigation: IBRS (kernel)",
# "Mitigation: IBRS (kernel and user space)",
# "Mitigation: IBP disabled",
}
check_CVE_2017_5715_bsd()
{
_info "* Mitigation 1"
_info_nol " * Kernel supports IBRS: "
ibrs_disabled=$(sysctl -n hw.ibrs_disable 2>/dev/null)
if [ -z "$ibrs_disabled" ]; then
pstatus yellow NO
else
pstatus green YES
fi
_info_nol " * IBRS enabled and active: "
ibrs_active=$(sysctl -n hw.ibrs_active 2>/dev/null)
if [ "$ibrs_active" = 1 ]; then
pstatus green YES
else
pstatus yellow NO
fi
_info "* Mitigation 2"
_info_nol " * Kernel compiled with RETPOLINE: "
retpoline=0
if [ -n "$kernel_err" ]; then
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't check ($kernel_err)"
else
if ! command -v "${opt_arch_prefix}readelf" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "missing '${opt_arch_prefix}readelf' tool, please install it, usually it's in the binutils package"
else
nb_thunks=$("${opt_arch_prefix}readelf" -s "$kernel" | grep -c -e __llvm_retpoline_ -e __llvm_external_retpoline_ -e __x86_indirect_thunk_)
if [ "$nb_thunks" -gt 0 ]; then
retpoline=1
pstatus green YES "found $nb_thunks thunk(s)"
else
pstatus yellow NO
fi
fi
fi
if ! is_cpu_vulnerable "$cve"; then
# override status & msg in case CPU is not vulnerable after all
pvulnstatus $cve OK "your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not affected"
elif [ "$retpoline" = 1 ]; then
pvulnstatus $cve OK "Retpoline mitigates the vulnerability"
elif [ "$ibrs_active" = 1 ]; then
pvulnstatus $cve OK "IBRS mitigates the vulnerability"
elif [ "$ibrs_disabled" = 0 ]; then
pvulnstatus $cve VULN "IBRS is supported by your kernel but your CPU microcode lacks support"
explain "The microcode of your CPU needs to be upgraded to be able to use IBRS. Availability of a microcode update for you CPU model depends on your CPU vendor. You can usually find out online if a microcode update is available for your CPU by searching for your CPUID (indicated in the Hardware Check section). To do a microcode update, you can search the ports for the \`cpupdate\` tool. Microcode updates done this way are not reboot-proof, so be sure to do it every time the system boots up."
elif [ "$ibrs_disabled" = 1 ]; then
pvulnstatus $cve VULN "IBRS is supported but administratively disabled on your system"
explain "To enable IBRS, use \`sysctl hw.ibrs_disable=0\`"
else
pvulnstatus $cve VULN "IBRS is needed to mitigate the vulnerability but your kernel is missing support"
explain "You need to either upgrade your kernel or recompile yourself a more recent version having IBRS support"
fi
}
##################
# MELTDOWN SECTION
# no security impact but give a hint to the user in verbose mode
# about PCID/INVPCID cpuid features that must be present to avoid
# too big a performance impact with PTI
# refs:
# https://marc.info/?t=151532047900001&r=1&w=2
# https://groups.google.com/forum/m/#!topic/mechanical-sympathy/L9mHTbeQLNU
pti_performance_check()
{
_info_nol " * Reduced performance impact of PTI: "
if [ -e "$procfs/cpuinfo" ] && grep ^flags "$procfs/cpuinfo" | grep -qw pcid; then
cpu_pcid=1
else
read_cpuid 0x1 0x0 $ECX 17 1 1; ret=$?
if [ $ret = $READ_CPUID_RET_OK ]; then
cpu_pcid=1
fi
fi
if [ -e "$procfs/cpuinfo" ] && grep ^flags "$procfs/cpuinfo" | grep -qw invpcid; then
cpu_invpcid=1
else
read_cpuid 0x7 0x0 $EBX 10 1 1; ret=$?
if [ $ret = $READ_CPUID_RET_OK ]; then
cpu_invpcid=1
fi
fi
if [ "$cpu_invpcid" = 1 ]; then
pstatus green YES 'CPU supports INVPCID, performance impact of PTI will be greatly reduced'
elif [ "$cpu_pcid" = 1 ]; then
pstatus green YES 'CPU supports PCID, performance impact of PTI will be reduced'
else
pstatus blue NO 'PCID/INVPCID not supported, performance impact of PTI will be significant'
fi
}
# rogue data cache load aka 'Meltdown' aka 'Variant 3'
check_CVE_2017_5754()
{
cve='CVE-2017-5754'
_info "\033[1;34m$cve aka '$(cve2name "$cve")'\033[0m"
if [ "$os" = Linux ]; then
check_CVE_2017_5754_linux
elif echo "$os" | grep -q BSD; then
check_CVE_2017_5754_bsd
else
_warn "Unsupported OS ($os)"
fi
}
check_CVE_2017_5754_linux()
{
status=UNK
sys_interface_available=0
msg=''
if sys_interface_check "/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/meltdown"; then
# this kernel has the /sys interface, trust it over everything
sys_interface_available=1
fi
if [ "$opt_sysfs_only" != 1 ]; then
_info_nol "* Kernel supports Page Table Isolation (PTI): "
kpti_support=''
kpti_can_tell=0
if [ -n "$opt_config" ]; then
kpti_can_tell=1
kpti_support=$(grep -w -e CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION=y -e CONFIG_KAISER=y -e CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0=y "$opt_config")
if [ -n "$kpti_support" ]; then
_debug "kpti_support: found option '$kpti_support' in $opt_config"
fi
fi
if [ -z "$kpti_support" ] && [ -n "$opt_map" ]; then
# it's not an elif: some backports don't have the PTI config but still include the patch
# so we try to find an exported symbol that is part of the PTI patch in System.map
# parse_kpti: arm
kpti_can_tell=1
kpti_support=$(grep -w -e kpti_force_enabled -e parse_kpti "$opt_map")
if [ -n "$kpti_support" ]; then
_debug "kpti_support: found '$kpti_support' in $opt_map"
fi
fi
if [ -z "$kpti_support" ] && [ -n "$kernel" ]; then
# same as above but in case we don't have System.map and only kernel, look for the
# nopti option that is part of the patch (kernel command line option)
# 'kpti=': arm
kpti_can_tell=1
if ! command -v "${opt_arch_prefix}strings" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "missing '${opt_arch_prefix}strings' tool, please install it, usually it's in the binutils package"
else
kpti_support=$("${opt_arch_prefix}strings" "$kernel" | grep -w -e nopti -e kpti=)
if [ -n "$kpti_support" ]; then
_debug "kpti_support: found '$kpti_support' in $kernel"
fi
fi
fi
if [ -n "$kpti_support" ]; then
if [ "$opt_verbose" -ge 2 ]; then
pstatus green YES "found '$kpti_support'"
else
pstatus green YES
fi
elif [ "$kpti_can_tell" = 1 ]; then
pstatus yellow NO
else
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't read your kernel configuration nor System.map file"
fi
mount_debugfs
_info_nol " * PTI enabled and active: "
if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
dmesg_grep="Kernel/User page tables isolation: enabled"
dmesg_grep="$dmesg_grep|Kernel page table isolation enabled"
dmesg_grep="$dmesg_grep|x86/pti: Unmapping kernel while in userspace"
# aarch64
dmesg_grep="$dmesg_grep|CPU features: detected( feature)?: Kernel page table isolation \(KPTI\)"
if grep ^flags "$procfs/cpuinfo" | grep -qw pti; then
# vanilla PTI patch sets the 'pti' flag in cpuinfo
_debug "kpti_enabled: found 'pti' flag in $procfs/cpuinfo"
kpti_enabled=1
elif grep ^flags "$procfs/cpuinfo" | grep -qw kaiser; then
# kernel line 4.9 sets the 'kaiser' flag in cpuinfo
_debug "kpti_enabled: found 'kaiser' flag in $procfs/cpuinfo"
kpti_enabled=1
elif [ -e /sys/kernel/debug/x86/pti_enabled ]; then
# Red Hat Backport creates a dedicated file, see https://access.redhat.com/articles/3311301
kpti_enabled=$(cat /sys/kernel/debug/x86/pti_enabled 2>/dev/null)
_debug "kpti_enabled: file /sys/kernel/debug/x86/pti_enabled exists and says: $kpti_enabled"
elif is_xen_dom0; then
pti_xen_pv_domU=$(xl dmesg | grep 'XPTI' | grep 'DomU enabled' | head -1)
[ -n "$pti_xen_pv_domU" ] && kpti_enabled=1
fi
if [ -z "$kpti_enabled" ]; then
dmesg_grep "$dmesg_grep"; ret=$?
if [ $ret -eq 0 ]; then
_debug "kpti_enabled: found hint in dmesg: $dmesg_grepped"
kpti_enabled=1
elif [ $ret -eq 2 ]; then
_debug "kpti_enabled: dmesg truncated"
kpti_enabled=-1
fi
fi
if [ -z "$kpti_enabled" ]; then
_debug "kpti_enabled: couldn't find any hint that PTI is enabled"
kpti_enabled=0
fi
if [ "$kpti_enabled" = 1 ]; then
pstatus green YES
elif [ "$kpti_enabled" = -1 ]; then
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "dmesg truncated, please reboot and relaunch this script"
else
pstatus yellow NO
fi
else
pstatus blue N/A "not testable in offline mode"
fi
pti_performance_check
elif [ "$sys_interface_available" = 0 ]; then
# we have no sysfs but were asked to use it only!
msg="/sys vulnerability interface use forced, but it's not available!"
status=UNK
fi
# Test if the current host is a Xen PV Dom0 / DomU
xen_pv_domo=0
xen_pv_domu=0
is_xen_dom0 && xen_pv_domo=1
is_xen_domU && xen_pv_domu=1
if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
# checking whether we're running under Xen PV 64 bits. If yes, we are affected by variant3
# (unless we are a Dom0)
_info_nol "* Running as a Xen PV DomU: "
if [ "$xen_pv_domu" = 1 ]; then
pstatus yellow YES
else
pstatus blue NO
fi
fi
if ! is_cpu_vulnerable "$cve"; then
# override status & msg in case CPU is not vulnerable after all
pvulnstatus $cve OK "your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not affected"
elif [ -z "$msg" ]; then
# if msg is empty, sysfs check didn't fill it, rely on our own test
if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
if [ "$kpti_enabled" = 1 ]; then
pvulnstatus $cve OK "PTI mitigates the vulnerability"
elif [ "$xen_pv_domo" = 1 ]; then
pvulnstatus $cve OK "Xen Dom0s are safe and do not require PTI"
elif [ "$xen_pv_domu" = 1 ]; then
pvulnstatus $cve VULN "Xen PV DomUs are vulnerable and need to be run in HVM, PVHVM, PVH mode, or the Xen hypervisor must have the Xen's own PTI patch"
explain "Go to https://blog.xenproject.org/2018/01/22/xen-project-spectre-meltdown-faq-jan-22-update/ for more information"
elif [ "$kpti_enabled" = -1 ]; then
pvulnstatus $cve UNK "couldn't find any clue of PTI activation due to a truncated dmesg, please reboot and relaunch this script"
else
pvulnstatus $cve VULN "PTI is needed to mitigate the vulnerability"
if [ -n "$kpti_support" ]; then
if [ -e "/sys/kernel/debug/x86/pti_enabled" ]; then
explain "Your kernel supports PTI but it's disabled, you can enable it with \`echo 1 > /sys/kernel/debug/x86/pti_enabled\`"
elif echo "$kernel_cmdline" | grep -q -w -e nopti -e pti=off; then
explain "Your kernel supports PTI but it has been disabled on command-line, remove the nopti or pti=off option from your bootloader configuration"
else
explain "Your kernel supports PTI but it has been disabled, check \`dmesg\` right after boot to find clues why the system disabled it"
fi
else
explain "If you're using a distro kernel, upgrade your distro to get the latest kernel available. Otherwise, recompile the kernel with the CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION option (named CONFIG_KAISER for some kernels), or the CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 option (for ARM64)"
fi
fi
else
if [ -n "$kpti_support" ]; then
pvulnstatus $cve OK "offline mode: PTI will mitigate the vulnerability if enabled at runtime"
elif [ "$kpti_can_tell" = 1 ]; then
pvulnstatus $cve VULN "PTI is needed to mitigate the vulnerability"
explain "If you're using a distro kernel, upgrade your distro to get the latest kernel available. Otherwise, recompile the kernel with the CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION option (named CONFIG_KAISER for some kernels), or the CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 option (for ARM64)"
else
pvulnstatus $cve UNK "offline mode: not enough information"
explain "Re-run this script with root privileges, and give it the kernel image (--kernel), the kernel configuration (--config) and the System.map file (--map) corresponding to the kernel you would like to inspect."
fi
fi
else
if [ "$xen_pv_domo" = 1 ]; then
msg="Xen Dom0s are safe and do not require PTI"
status="OK"
elif [ "$xen_pv_domu" = 1 ]; then
msg="Xen PV DomUs are vulnerable and need to be run in HVM, PVHVM, PVH mode, or the Xen hypervisor must have the Xen's own PTI patch"
status="VULN"
_explain="Go to https://blog.xenproject.org/2018/01/22/xen-project-spectre-meltdown-faq-jan-22-update/ for more information"
elif [ "$msg" = "Vulnerable" ]; then
msg="PTI is needed to mitigate the vulnerability"
_explain="If you're using a distro kernel, upgrade your distro to get the latest kernel available. Otherwise, recompile the kernel with the CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION option (named CONFIG_KAISER for some kernels), or the CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 option (for ARM64)"
fi
pvulnstatus $cve "$status" "$msg"
[ -z "${_explain:-}" ] && [ "$msg" = "Vulnerable" ] && _explain="If you're using a distro kernel, upgrade your distro to get the latest kernel available. Otherwise, recompile the kernel with the CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION option (named CONFIG_KAISER for some kernels), or the CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 option (for ARM64)"
[ -n "${_explain:-}" ] && explain "$_explain"
unset _explain
fi
# Warn the user about XSA-254 recommended mitigations
if [ "$xen_pv_domo" = 1 ]; then
_warn
_warn "This host is a Xen Dom0. Please make sure that you are running your DomUs"
_warn "in HVM, PVHVM or PVH mode to prevent any guest-to-host / host-to-guest attacks."
_warn
_warn "See https://blog.xenproject.org/2018/01/22/xen-project-spectre-meltdown-faq-jan-22-update/ and XSA-254 for details."
fi
}
check_CVE_2017_5754_bsd()
{
_info_nol "* Kernel supports Page Table Isolation (PTI): "
kpti_enabled=$(sysctl -n vm.pmap.pti 2>/dev/null)
if [ -z "$kpti_enabled" ]; then
pstatus yellow NO
else
pstatus green YES
fi
_info_nol " * PTI enabled and active: "
if [ "$kpti_enabled" = 1 ]; then
pstatus green YES
else
pstatus yellow NO
fi
pti_performance_check
if ! is_cpu_vulnerable "$cve"; then
# override status & msg in case CPU is not vulnerable after all
pvulnstatus $cve OK "your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not affected"
elif [ "$kpti_enabled" = 1 ]; then
pvulnstatus $cve OK "PTI mitigates the vulnerability"
elif [ -n "$kpti_enabled" ]; then
pvulnstatus $cve VULN "PTI is supported but disabled on your system"
else
pvulnstatus $cve VULN "PTI is needed to mitigate the vulnerability"
fi
}
####################
# VARIANT 3A SECTION
# rogue system register read aka 'Variant 3a'
check_CVE_2018_3640()
{
cve='CVE-2018-3640'
_info "\033[1;34m$cve aka '$(cve2name "$cve")'\033[0m"
status=UNK
sys_interface_available=0
msg=''
_info_nol "* CPU microcode mitigates the vulnerability: "
if [ -n "$cpuid_ssbd" ]; then
# microcodes that ship with SSBD are known to also fix variant3a
# there is no specific cpuid bit as far as we know
pstatus green YES
else
pstatus yellow NO
fi
if ! is_cpu_vulnerable "$cve"; then
# override status & msg in case CPU is not vulnerable after all
pvulnstatus $cve OK "your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not affected"
elif [ -n "$cpuid_ssbd" ]; then
pvulnstatus $cve OK "your CPU microcode mitigates the vulnerability"
else
pvulnstatus $cve VULN "an up-to-date CPU microcode is needed to mitigate this vulnerability"
explain "The microcode of your CPU needs to be upgraded to mitigate this vulnerability. This is usually done at boot time by your kernel (the upgrade is not persistent across reboots which is why it's done at each boot). If you're using a distro, make sure you are up to date, as microcode updates are usually shipped alongside with the distro kernel. Availability of a microcode update for you CPU model depends on your CPU vendor. You can usually find out online if a microcode update is available for your CPU by searching for your CPUID (indicated in the Hardware Check section). The microcode update is enough, there is no additional OS, kernel or software change needed."
fi
}
###################
# VARIANT 4 SECTION
# speculative store bypass aka 'Variant 4'
check_CVE_2018_3639()
{
cve='CVE-2018-3639'
_info "\033[1;34m$cve aka '$(cve2name "$cve")'\033[0m"
if [ "$os" = Linux ]; then
check_CVE_2018_3639_linux
elif echo "$os" | grep -q BSD; then
check_CVE_2018_3639_bsd
else
_warn "Unsupported OS ($os)"
fi
}
check_CVE_2018_3639_linux()
{
status=UNK
sys_interface_available=0
msg=''
if sys_interface_check "/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spec_store_bypass"; then
# this kernel has the /sys interface, trust it over everything
sys_interface_available=1
fi
if [ "$opt_sysfs_only" != 1 ]; then
_info_nol "* Kernel supports disabling speculative store bypass (SSB): "
if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
if grep -Eq 'Speculation.?Store.?Bypass:' "$procfs/self/status" 2>/dev/null; then
kernel_ssb="found in $procfs/self/status"
_debug "found Speculation.Store.Bypass: in $procfs/self/status"
fi
fi
# arm64 kernels can have cpu_show_spec_store_bypass with ARM64_SSBD, so exclude them
if [ -z "$kernel_ssb" ] && [ -n "$kernel" ] && ! grep -q 'arm64_sys_' "$kernel"; then
kernel_ssb=$("${opt_arch_prefix}strings" "$kernel" | grep spec_store_bypass | head -n1);
[ -n "$kernel_ssb" ] && kernel_ssb="found $kernel_ssb in kernel"
fi
# arm64 kernels can have cpu_show_spec_store_bypass with ARM64_SSBD, so exclude them
if [ -z "$kernel_ssb" ] && [ -n "$opt_map" ] && ! grep -q 'arm64_sys_' "$opt_map"; then
kernel_ssb=$(grep spec_store_bypass "$opt_map" | awk '{print $3}' | head -n1)
[ -n "$kernel_ssb" ] && kernel_ssb="found $kernel_ssb in System.map"
fi
# arm64 only:
if [ -z "$kernel_ssb" ] && [ -n "$opt_map" ]; then
kernel_ssb=$(grep -w cpu_enable_ssbs "$opt_map" | awk '{print $3}' | head -n1)
[ -n "$kernel_ssb" ] && kernel_ssb="found $kernel_ssb in System.map"
fi
if [ -z "$kernel_ssb" ] && [ -n "$opt_config" ]; then
kernel_ssb=$(grep -w 'CONFIG_ARM64_SSBD=y' "$opt_config")
[ -n "$kernel_ssb" ] && kernel_ssb="CONFIG_ARM64_SSBD enabled in kconfig"
fi
if [ -z "$kernel_ssb" ] && [ -n "$kernel" ]; then
# this string only appears in kernel if CONFIG_ARM64_SSBD is set
kernel_ssb=$(grep -w "Speculative Store Bypassing Safe (SSBS)" "$kernel")
[ -n "$kernel_ssb" ] && kernel_ssb="found 'Speculative Store Bypassing Safe (SSBS)' in kernel"
fi
# /arm64 only
if [ -n "$kernel_ssb" ]; then
pstatus green YES "$kernel_ssb"
else
pstatus yellow NO
fi
kernel_ssbd_enabled=-1
if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
# https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v5.0/source/fs/proc/array.c#L340
_info_nol "* SSB mitigation is enabled and active: "
if grep -Eq 'Speculation.?Store.?Bypass:[[:space:]]+thread' "$procfs/self/status" 2>/dev/null; then
kernel_ssbd_enabled=1
pstatus green YES "per-thread through prctl"
elif grep -Eq 'Speculation.?Store.?Bypass:[[:space:]]+globally mitigated' "$procfs/self/status" 2>/dev/null; then
kernel_ssbd_enabled=2
pstatus green YES "global"
elif grep -Eq 'Speculation.?Store.?Bypass:[[:space:]]+vulnerable' "$procfs/self/status" 2>/dev/null; then
kernel_ssbd_enabled=0
pstatus yellow NO
elif grep -Eq 'Speculation.?Store.?Bypass:[[:space:]]+not vulnerable' "$procfs/self/status" 2>/dev/null; then
kernel_ssbd_enabled=-2
pstatus blue NO "not vulnerable"
elif grep -Eq 'Speculation.?Store.?Bypass:[[:space:]]+unknown' "$procfs/self/status" 2>/dev/null; then
kernel_ssbd_enabled=0
pstatus blue NO
else
pstatus blue UNKNOWN "unknown value: $(grep -E 'Speculation.?Store.?Bypass:' "$procfs/self/status" 2>/dev/null | cut -d: -f2-)"
fi
if [ "$kernel_ssbd_enabled" = 1 ]; then
_info_nol "* SSB mitigation currently active for selected processes: "
# silence grep's stderr here to avoid ENOENT errors from processes that have exited since the shell's expansion of the *
mitigated_processes=$(find /proc -mindepth 2 -maxdepth 2 -type f -name status -print0 2>/dev/null \
| xargs -r0 grep -El 'Speculation.?Store.?Bypass:[[:space:]]+thread (force )?mitigated' 2>/dev/null \
| sed s/status/exe/ | xargs -r -n1 readlink -f 2>/dev/null | xargs -r -n1 basename | sort -u | tr "\n" " " | sed 's/ $//')
if [ -n "$mitigated_processes" ]; then
pstatus green YES "$mitigated_processes"
else
pstatus yellow NO "no process found using SSB mitigation through prctl"
fi
fi
fi
elif [ "$sys_interface_available" = 0 ]; then
# we have no sysfs but were asked to use it only!
msg="/sys vulnerability interface use forced, but it's not available!"
status=UNK
fi
if ! is_cpu_vulnerable "$cve"; then
# override status & msg in case CPU is not vulnerable after all
pvulnstatus $cve OK "your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not affected"
elif [ -z "$msg" ] || [ "$msg" = "Vulnerable" ]; then
# if msg is empty, sysfs check didn't fill it, rely on our own test
if [ -n "$cpuid_ssbd" ]; then
if [ -n "$kernel_ssb" ]; then
if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
if [ "$kernel_ssbd_enabled" -gt 0 ]; then
pvulnstatus $cve OK "your CPU and kernel both support SSBD and mitigation is enabled"
else
pvulnstatus $cve VULN "your CPU and kernel both support SSBD but the mitigation is not active"
fi
else
pvulnstatus $cve OK "your system provides the necessary tools for software mitigation"
fi
else
pvulnstatus $cve VULN "your kernel needs to be updated"
explain "You have a recent-enough CPU microcode but your kernel is too old to use the new features exported by your CPU's microcode. If you're using a distro kernel, upgrade your distro to get the latest kernel available. Otherwise, recompile the kernel from recent-enough sources."
fi
else
if [ -n "$kernel_ssb" ]; then
pvulnstatus $cve VULN "Your CPU doesn't support SSBD"
explain "Your kernel is recent enough to use the CPU microcode features for mitigation, but your CPU microcode doesn't actually provide the necessary features for the kernel to use. The microcode of your CPU hence needs to be upgraded. This is usually done at boot time by your kernel (the upgrade is not persistent across reboots which is why it's done at each boot). If you're using a distro, make sure you are up to date, as microcode updates are usually shipped alongside with the distro kernel. Availability of a microcode update for you CPU model depends on your CPU vendor. You can usually find out online if a microcode update is available for your CPU by searching for your CPUID (indicated in the Hardware Check section)."
else
pvulnstatus $cve VULN "Neither your CPU nor your kernel support SSBD"
explain "Both your CPU microcode and your kernel are lacking support for mitigation. If you're using a distro kernel, upgrade your distro to get the latest kernel available. Otherwise, recompile the kernel from recent-enough sources. The microcode of your CPU also needs to be upgraded. This is usually done at boot time by your kernel (the upgrade is not persistent across reboots which is why it's done at each boot). If you're using a distro, make sure you are up to date, as microcode updates are usually shipped alongside with the distro kernel. Availability of a microcode update for you CPU model depends on your CPU vendor. You can usually find out online if a microcode update is available for your CPU by searching for your CPUID (indicated in the Hardware Check section)."
fi
fi
else
pvulnstatus $cve "$status" "$msg"
fi
}
check_CVE_2018_3639_bsd()
{
_info_nol "* Kernel supports speculation store bypass: "
if sysctl hw.spec_store_bypass_disable >/dev/null 2>&1; then
kernel_ssb=1
pstatus green YES
else
kernel_ssb=0
pstatus yellow NO
fi
_info_nol "* Speculation store bypass is administratively enabled: "
ssb_enabled=$(sysctl -n hw.spec_store_bypass_disable 2>/dev/null)
_debug "hw.spec_store_bypass_disable=$ssb_enabled"
case "$ssb_enabled" in
0) pstatus yellow NO "disabled";;
1) pstatus green YES "enabled";;
2) pstatus green YES "auto mode";;
*) pstatus yellow NO "unavailable";;
esac
_info_nol "* Speculation store bypass is currently active: "
ssb_active=$(sysctl -n hw.spec_store_bypass_disable_active 2>/dev/null)
_debug "hw.spec_store_bypass_disable_active=$ssb_active"
case "$ssb_active" in
1) pstatus green YES;;
*) pstatus yellow NO;;
esac
if ! is_cpu_vulnerable "$cve"; then
pvulnstatus $cve OK "your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not affected"
else
if [ "$ssb_active" = 1 ]; then
pvulnstatus $cve OK "SSBD mitigates the vulnerability"
elif [ -n "$cpuid_ssbd" ]; then
if [ "$kernel_ssb" = 1 ]; then
pvulnstatus $cve VULN "you need to enable SSBD through sysctl to mitigate the vulnerability"
explain "To enable SSBD right now, you can run \`sysctl hw.spec_store_bypass_disable=2'. To make this change persistent across reboots, you can add 'sysctl hw.spec_store_bypass_disable=2' to /etc/sysctl.conf."
else
pvulnstatus $cve VULN "your kernel needs to be updated"
fi
else
if [ "$kernel_ssb" = 1 ]; then
pvulnstatus $cve VULN "Your CPU doesn't support SSBD"
else
pvulnstatus $cve VULN "Neither your CPU nor your kernel support SSBD"
fi
fi
fi
}
###########################
# L1TF / FORESHADOW SECTION
# L1 terminal fault (SGX) aka 'Foreshadow'
check_CVE_2018_3615()
{
cve='CVE-2018-3615'
_info "\033[1;34m$cve aka '$(cve2name "$cve")'\033[0m"
_info_nol "* CPU microcode mitigates the vulnerability: "
if { [ "$cpu_flush_cmd" = 1 ] || { [ "$msr_locked_down" = 1 ] && [ "$cpuid_l1df" = 1 ]; }; } && [ "$cpuid_sgx" = 1 ]; then
# no easy way to detect a fixed SGX but we know that
# microcodes that have the FLUSH_CMD MSR also have the
# fixed SGX (for CPUs that support it), because Intel
# delivered fixed microcodes for both issues at the same time
#
# if the system we're running on is locked down (no way to write MSRs),
# make the assumption that if the L1D flush CPUID bit is set, probably
# that FLUSH_CMD MSR is here too
pstatus green YES
elif [ "$cpuid_sgx" = 1 ]; then
pstatus red NO
else
pstatus blue N/A
fi
if ! is_cpu_vulnerable "$cve"; then
# override status & msg in case CPU is not vulnerable after all
pvulnstatus $cve OK "your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not affected"
elif [ "$cpu_flush_cmd" = 1 ] || { [ "$msr_locked_down" = 1 ] && [ "$cpuid_l1df" = 1 ]; } ; then
pvulnstatus $cve OK "your CPU microcode mitigates the vulnerability"
else
pvulnstatus $cve VULN "your CPU supports SGX and the microcode is not up to date"
fi
}
# L1 terminal fault (OS) aka 'Foreshadow-NG (OS)'
check_CVE_2018_3620()
{
cve='CVE-2018-3620'
_info "\033[1;34m$cve aka '$(cve2name "$cve")'\033[0m"
if [ "$os" = Linux ]; then
check_CVE_2018_3620_linux
elif echo "$os" | grep -q BSD; then
check_CVE_2018_3620_bsd
else
_warn "Unsupported OS ($os)"
fi
}
check_CVE_2018_3620_linux()
{
status=UNK
sys_interface_available=0
msg=''
if sys_interface_check "/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/l1tf"; then
# this kernel has the /sys interface, trust it over everything
sys_interface_available=1
fi
if [ "$opt_sysfs_only" != 1 ]; then
_info_nol "* Kernel supports PTE inversion: "
if ! command -v "${opt_arch_prefix}strings" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "missing 'strings' tool, please install it"
pteinv_supported=-1
elif [ -n "$kernel_err" ]; then
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "$kernel_err"
pteinv_supported=-1
else
if "${opt_arch_prefix}strings" "$kernel" | grep -Fq 'PTE Inversion'; then
pstatus green YES "found in kernel image"
_debug "pteinv: found pte inversion evidence in kernel image"
pteinv_supported=1
else
pstatus yellow NO
pteinv_supported=0
fi
fi
_info_nol "* PTE inversion enabled and active: "
if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
if [ -n "$fullmsg" ]; then
if echo "$fullmsg" | grep -q 'Mitigation: PTE Inversion'; then
pstatus green YES
pteinv_active=1
else
pstatus yellow NO
pteinv_active=0
fi
else
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "sysfs interface not available"
pteinv_active=-1
fi
else
pstatus blue N/A "not testable in offline mode"
fi
elif [ "$sys_interface_available" = 0 ]; then
# we have no sysfs but were asked to use it only!
msg="/sys vulnerability interface use forced, but it's not available!"
status=UNK
fi
if ! is_cpu_vulnerable "$cve"; then
# override status & msg in case CPU is not vulnerable after all
pvulnstatus $cve OK "your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not affected"
elif [ -z "$msg" ]; then
# if msg is empty, sysfs check didn't fill it, rely on our own test
if [ "$pteinv_supported" = 1 ]; then
if [ "$pteinv_active" = 1 ] || [ "$opt_live" != 1 ]; then
pvulnstatus $cve OK "PTE inversion mitigates the vulnerability"
else
pvulnstatus $cve VULN "Your kernel supports PTE inversion but it doesn't seem to be enabled"
fi
else
pvulnstatus $cve VULN "Your kernel doesn't support PTE inversion, update it"
fi
else
pvulnstatus $cve "$status" "$msg"
fi
}
check_CVE_2018_3620_bsd()
{
_info_nol "* Kernel reserved the memory page at physical address 0x0: "
if ! kldstat -q -m vmm; then
kldload vmm 2>/dev/null && kldload_vmm=1
_debug "attempted to load module vmm, kldload_vmm=$kldload_vmm"
else
_debug "vmm module already loaded"
fi
if sysctl hw.vmm.vmx.l1d_flush >/dev/null 2>&1; then
# https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-18:09/l1tf-11.2.patch
# this is very difficult to detect that the kernel reserved the 0 page, but this fix
# is part of the exact same patch than the other L1TF CVE, so we detect it
# and deem it as OK if the other patch is there
pstatus green YES
bsd_zero_reserved=1
else
pstatus yellow NO
bsd_zero_reserved=0
fi
if ! is_cpu_vulnerable "$cve"; then
pvulnstatus $cve OK "your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not affected"
else
if [ "$bsd_zero_reserved" = 1 ]; then
pvulnstatus $cve OK "kernel mitigates the vulnerability"
else
pvulnstatus $cve VULN "your kernel needs to be updated"
fi
fi
}
# L1TF VMM
check_CVE_2018_3646()
{
cve='CVE-2018-3646'
_info "\033[1;34m$cve aka '$(cve2name "$cve")'\033[0m"
if [ "$os" = Linux ]; then
check_CVE_2018_3646_linux
elif echo "$os" | grep -q BSD; then
check_CVE_2018_3646_bsd
else
_warn "Unsupported OS ($os)"
fi
}
check_CVE_2018_3646_linux()
{
status=UNK
sys_interface_available=0
msg=''
if sys_interface_check "/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/l1tf" '.*' quiet; then
# this kernel has the /sys interface, trust it over everything
sys_interface_available=1
fi
l1d_mode=-1
if [ "$opt_sysfs_only" != 1 ]; then
check_has_vmm
_info "* Mitigation 1 (KVM)"
_info_nol " * EPT is disabled: "
ept_disabled=-1
if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
if ! [ -r /sys/module/kvm_intel/parameters/ept ]; then
pstatus blue N/A "the kvm_intel module is not loaded"
elif [ "$(cat /sys/module/kvm_intel/parameters/ept)" = N ]; then
pstatus green YES
ept_disabled=1
else
pstatus yellow NO
fi
else
pstatus blue N/A "not testable in offline mode"
fi
_info "* Mitigation 2"
_info_nol " * L1D flush is supported by kernel: "
if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ] && grep -qw flush_l1d "$procfs/cpuinfo"; then
l1d_kernel="found flush_l1d in $procfs/cpuinfo"
fi
if [ -z "$l1d_kernel" ]; then
if ! command -v "${opt_arch_prefix}strings" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
l1d_kernel_err="missing '${opt_arch_prefix}strings' tool, please install it, usually it's in the binutils package"
elif [ -n "$kernel_err" ]; then
l1d_kernel_err="$kernel_err"
elif "${opt_arch_prefix}strings" "$kernel" | grep -qw flush_l1d; then
l1d_kernel='found flush_l1d in kernel image'
fi
fi
if [ -n "$l1d_kernel" ]; then
pstatus green YES "$l1d_kernel"
elif [ -n "$l1d_kernel_err" ]; then
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "$l1d_kernel_err"
else
pstatus yellow NO
fi
_info_nol " * L1D flush enabled: "
if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
if [ -n "$fullmsg" ]; then
# vanilla: VMX: $l1dstatus, SMT $smtstatus
# Red Hat: VMX: SMT $smtstatus, L1D $l1dstatus
# $l1dstatus is one of (auto|vulnerable|conditional cache flushes|cache flushes|EPT disabled|flush not necessary)
# $smtstatus is one of (vulnerable|disabled)
# can also just be "Not affected"
if echo "$fullmsg" | grep -Eq -e 'Not affected' -e '(VMX:|L1D) (EPT disabled|vulnerable|flush not necessary)'; then
l1d_mode=0
pstatus yellow NO
elif echo "$fullmsg" | grep -Eq '(VMX:|L1D) conditional cache flushes'; then
l1d_mode=1
pstatus green YES "conditional flushes"
elif echo "$fullmsg" | grep -Eq '(VMX:|L1D) cache flushes'; then
l1d_mode=2
pstatus green YES "unconditional flushes"
else
if is_xen_dom0; then
l1d_xen_hardware=$(xl dmesg | grep 'Hardware features:' | grep 'L1D_FLUSH' | head -1)
l1d_xen_hypervisor=$(xl dmesg | grep 'Xen settings:' | grep 'L1D_FLUSH' | head -1)
l1d_xen_pv_domU=$(xl dmesg | grep 'PV L1TF shadowing:' | grep 'DomU enabled' | head -1)
if [ -n "$l1d_xen_hardware" ] && [ -n "$l1d_xen_hypervisor" ] && [ -n "$l1d_xen_pv_domU" ]; then
l1d_mode=5
pstatus green YES "for XEN guests"
elif [ -n "$l1d_xen_hardware" ] && [ -n "$l1d_xen_hypervisor" ]; then
l1d_mode=4
pstatus yellow YES "for XEN guests (HVM only)"
elif [ -n "$l1d_xen_pv_domU" ]; then
l1d_mode=3
pstatus yellow YES "for XEN guests (PV only)"
else
l1d_mode=0
pstatus yellow NO "for XEN guests"
fi
else
l1d_mode=-1
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "unrecognized mode"
fi
fi
else
l1d_mode=-1
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "can't find or read /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/l1tf"
fi
else
l1d_mode=-1
pstatus blue N/A "not testable in offline mode"
fi
_info_nol " * Hardware-backed L1D flush supported: "
if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
if grep -qw flush_l1d "$procfs/cpuinfo" || [ -n "$l1d_xen_hardware" ]; then
pstatus green YES "performance impact of the mitigation will be greatly reduced"
else
pstatus blue NO "flush will be done in software, this is slower"
fi
else
pstatus blue N/A "not testable in offline mode"
fi
_info_nol " * Hyper-Threading (SMT) is enabled: "
is_cpu_smt_enabled; smt_enabled=$?
if [ "$smt_enabled" = 0 ]; then
pstatus yellow YES
elif [ "$smt_enabled" = 1 ]; then
pstatus green NO
else
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN
fi
elif [ "$sys_interface_available" = 0 ]; then
# we have no sysfs but were asked to use it only!
msg="/sys vulnerability interface use forced, but it's not available!"
status=UNK
l1d_mode=-1
fi
if ! is_cpu_vulnerable "$cve"; then
# override status & msg in case CPU is not vulnerable after all
pvulnstatus $cve OK "your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not affected"
elif [ "$fullmsg" = "Not affected" ]; then
# just in case a very recent kernel knows better than we do
pvulnstatus $cve OK "your kernel reported your CPU model as not affected"
elif [ "$has_vmm" = 0 ]; then
pvulnstatus $cve OK "this system is not running a hypervisor"
else
if [ "$ept_disabled" = 1 ]; then
pvulnstatus $cve OK "EPT is disabled which mitigates the vulnerability"
elif [ "$opt_paranoid" = 0 ]; then
if [ "$l1d_mode" -ge 1 ]; then
pvulnstatus $cve OK "L1D flushing is enabled and mitigates the vulnerability"
else
pvulnstatus $cve VULN "disable EPT or enable L1D flushing to mitigate the vulnerability"
fi
else
if [ "$l1d_mode" -ge 2 ]; then
if [ "$smt_enabled" = 1 ]; then
pvulnstatus $cve OK "L1D unconditional flushing and Hyper-Threading disabled are mitigating the vulnerability"
else
pvulnstatus $cve VULN "Hyper-Threading must be disabled to fully mitigate the vulnerability"
fi
else
if [ "$smt_enabled" = 1 ]; then
pvulnstatus $cve VULN "L1D unconditional flushing should be enabled to fully mitigate the vulnerability"
else
pvulnstatus $cve VULN "enable L1D unconditional flushing and disable Hyper-Threading to fully mitigate the vulnerability"
fi
fi
fi
if [ $l1d_mode -gt 3 ]; then
_warn
_warn "This host is a Xen Dom0. Please make sure that you are running your DomUs"
_warn "with a kernel which contains CVE-2018-3646 mitigations."
_warn
_warn "See https://www.suse.com/support/kb/doc/?id=7023078 and XSA-273 for details."
fi
fi
}
check_CVE_2018_3646_bsd()
{
_info_nol "* Kernel supports L1D flushing: "
if sysctl hw.vmm.vmx.l1d_flush >/dev/null 2>&1; then
pstatus green YES
kernel_l1d_supported=1
else
pstatus yellow NO
kernel_l1d_supported=0
fi
_info_nol "* L1D flushing is enabled: "
kernel_l1d_enabled=$(sysctl -n hw.vmm.vmx.l1d_flush 2>/dev/null)
case "$kernel_l1d_enabled" in
0) pstatus yellow NO;;
1) pstatus green YES;;
"") pstatus yellow NO;;
*) pstatus yellow UNKNOWN;;
esac
if ! is_cpu_vulnerable "$cve"; then
pvulnstatus $cve OK "your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not affected"
else
if [ "$kernel_l1d_enabled" = 1 ]; then
pvulnstatus $cve OK "L1D flushing mitigates the vulnerability"
elif [ "$kernel_l1d_supported" = 1 ]; then
pvulnstatus $cve VULN "L1D flushing is supported by your kernel but is disabled"
else
pvulnstatus $cve VULN "your kernel needs to be updated"
fi
fi
}
###################
# MSBDS SECTION
# Microarchitectural Store Buffer Data Sampling
check_CVE_2018_12126()
{
cve='CVE-2018-12126'
check_mds $cve
}
###################
# MFBDS SECTION
# Microarchitectural Fill Buffer Data Sampling
check_CVE_2018_12130()
{
cve='CVE-2018-12130'
check_mds $cve
}
###################
# MLPDS SECTION
# Microarchitectural Load Port Data Sampling
check_CVE_2018_12127()
{
cve='CVE-2018-12127'
check_mds $cve
}
###################
# MDSUM SECTION
# Microarchitectural Data Sampling Uncacheable Memory
check_CVE_2019_11091()
{
cve='CVE-2019-11091'
check_mds $cve
}
# Microarchitectural Data Sampling
check_mds()
{
cve=$1
_info "\033[1;34m$cve aka '$(cve2name "$cve")'\033[0m"
if [ "$os" = Linux ]; then
check_mds_linux "$cve"
elif echo "$os" | grep -q BSD; then
check_mds_bsd "$cve"
else
_warn "Unsupported OS ($os)"
fi
}
check_mds_bsd()
{
_info_nol "* Kernel supports using MD_CLEAR mitigation: "
if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
if sysctl hw.mds_disable >/dev/null 2>&1; then
pstatus green YES
kernel_md_clear=1
else
pstatus yellow NO
kernel_md_clear=0
fi
else
if grep -Fq hw.mds_disable $opt_kernel; then
pstatus green YES
kernel_md_clear=1
else
kernel_md_clear=0
pstatus yellow NO
fi
fi
_info_nol "* CPU Hyper-Threading (SMT) is disabled: "
if sysctl machdep.hyperthreading_allowed >/dev/null 2>&1; then
kernel_smt_allowed=$(sysctl -n machdep.hyperthreading_allowed 2>/dev/null)
if [ "$kernel_smt_allowed" = 1 ]; then
pstatus yellow NO
else
pstatus green YES
fi
else
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "sysctl machdep.hyperthreading_allowed doesn't exist"
fi
_info_nol "* Kernel mitigation is enabled: "
if [ "$kernel_md_clear" = 1 ]; then
kernel_mds_enabled=$(sysctl -n hw.mds_disable 2>/dev/null)
else
kernel_mds_enabled=0
fi
case "$kernel_mds_enabled" in
0) pstatus yellow NO;;
1) pstatus green YES "with microcode support";;
2) pstatus green YES "software-only support (SLOW)";;
3) pstatus green YES;;
*) pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "unknown value $kernel_mds_enabled"
esac
_info_nol "* Kernel mitigation is active: "
if [ "$kernel_md_clear" = 1 ]; then
kernel_mds_state=$(sysctl -n hw.mds_disable_state 2>/dev/null)
else
kernel_mds_state=inactive
fi
# https://github.com/freebsd/freebsd/blob/master/sys/x86/x86/cpu_machdep.c#L953
case "$kernel_mds_state" in
inactive) pstatus yellow NO;;
VERW) pstatus green YES "with microcode support";;
software*) pstatus green YES "software-only support (SLOW)";;
*) pstatus yellow UNKNOWN
esac
if ! is_cpu_vulnerable "$cve"; then
pvulnstatus "$cve" OK "your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not affected"
else
if [ "$cpuid_md_clear" = 1 ]; then
if [ "$kernel_md_clear" = 1 ]; then
if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
# mitigation must also be enabled
if [ "$kernel_mds_enabled" -ge 1 ]; then
if [ "$opt_paranoid" != 1 ] || [ "$kernel_smt_allowed" = 0 ]; then
pvulnstatus "$cve" OK "Your microcode and kernel are both up to date for this mitigation, and mitigation is enabled"
else
pvulnstatus "$cve" VULN "Your microcode and kernel are both up to date for this mitigation, but you must disable SMT (Hyper-Threading) for a complete mitigation"
fi
else
pvulnstatus "$cve" VULN "Your microcode and kernel are both up to date for this mitigation, but the mitigation is not active"
explain "To enable mitigation, run \`sysctl hw.mds_disable=1'. To make this change persistent across reboots, you can add 'hw.mds_disable=1' to /etc/sysctl.conf."
fi
else
pvulnstatus "$cve" OK "Your microcode and kernel are both up to date for this mitigation"
fi
else
pvulnstatus "$cve" VULN "Your microcode supports mitigation, but your kernel doesn't, upgrade it to mitigate the vulnerability"
fi
else
if [ "$kernel_md_clear" = 1 ]; then
pvulnstatus "$cve" VULN "Your kernel supports mitigation, but your CPU microcode also needs to be updated to mitigate the vulnerability"
else
pvulnstatus "$cve" VULN "Neither your kernel or your microcode support mitigation, upgrade both to mitigate the vulnerability"
fi
fi
fi
}
check_mds_linux()
{
status=UNK
sys_interface_available=0
msg=''
if sys_interface_check "/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mds" '^[^;]+'; then
sys_interface_available=1
fi
if [ "$opt_sysfs_only" != 1 ]; then
_info_nol "* Kernel supports using MD_CLEAR mitigation: "
kernel_md_clear=''
kernel_md_clear_can_tell=1
if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ] && grep ^flags "$procfs/cpuinfo" | grep -qw md_clear; then
kernel_md_clear="md_clear found in $procfs/cpuinfo"
pstatus green YES "$kernel_md_clear"
fi
if [ -z "$kernel_md_clear" ]; then
if ! command -v "${opt_arch_prefix}strings" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
kernel_md_clear_can_tell=0
elif [ -n "$kernel_err" ]; then
kernel_md_clear_can_tell=0
elif "${opt_arch_prefix}strings" "$kernel" | grep -q 'Clear CPU buffers'; then
_debug "md_clear: found 'Clear CPU buffers' string in kernel image"
kernel_md_clear='found md_clear implementation evidence in kernel image'
pstatus green YES "$kernel_md_clear"
fi
fi
if [ -z "$kernel_md_clear" ]; then
if [ "$kernel_md_clear_can_tell" = 1 ]; then
pstatus yellow NO
else
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN
fi
fi
if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ] && [ "$sys_interface_available" = 1 ]; then
_info_nol "* Kernel mitigation is enabled and active: "
if echo "$fullmsg" | grep -qi ^mitigation; then
mds_mitigated=1
pstatus green YES
else
mds_mitigated=0
pstatus yellow NO
fi
_info_nol "* SMT is either mitigated or disabled: "
if echo "$fullmsg" | grep -Eq 'SMT (disabled|mitigated)'; then
mds_smt_mitigated=1
pstatus green YES
else
mds_smt_mitigated=0
pstatus yellow NO
fi
fi
elif [ "$sys_interface_available" = 0 ]; then
# we have no sysfs but were asked to use it only!
msg="/sys vulnerability interface use forced, but it's not available!"
status=UNK
fi
if ! is_cpu_vulnerable "$cve"; then
# override status & msg in case CPU is not vulnerable after all
pvulnstatus "$cve" OK "your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not affected"
else
if [ "$opt_sysfs_only" != 1 ]; then
# compute mystatus and mymsg from our own logic
if [ "$cpuid_md_clear" = 1 ]; then
if [ -n "$kernel_md_clear" ]; then
if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
# mitigation must also be enabled
if [ "$mds_mitigated" = 1 ]; then
if [ "$opt_paranoid" != 1 ] || [ "$mds_smt_mitigated" = 1 ]; then
mystatus=OK
mymsg="Your microcode and kernel are both up to date for this mitigation, and mitigation is enabled"
else
mystatus=VULN
mymsg="Your microcode and kernel are both up to date for this mitigation, but you must disable SMT (Hyper-Threading) for a complete mitigation"
fi
else
mystatus=VULN
mymsg="Your microcode and kernel are both up to date for this mitigation, but the mitigation is not active"
fi
else
mystatus=OK
mymsg="Your microcode and kernel are both up to date for this mitigation"
fi
else
mystatus=VULN
mymsg="Your microcode supports mitigation, but your kernel doesn't, upgrade it to mitigate the vulnerability"
fi
else
if [ -n "$kernel_md_clear" ]; then
mystatus=VULN
mymsg="Your kernel supports mitigation, but your CPU microcode also needs to be updated to mitigate the vulnerability"
else
mystatus=VULN
mymsg="Neither your kernel or your microcode support mitigation, upgrade both to mitigate the vulnerability"
fi
fi
else
# sysfs only: return the status/msg we got
pvulnstatus "$cve" "$status" "$fullmsg"
return
fi
# if we didn't get a msg+status from sysfs, use ours
if [ -z "$msg" ]; then
pvulnstatus "$cve" "$mystatus" "$mymsg"
elif [ "$opt_paranoid" = 1 ]; then
# if paranoid mode is enabled, we now that we won't agree on status, so take ours
pvulnstatus "$cve" "$mystatus" "$mymsg"
elif [ "$status" = "$mystatus" ]; then
# if we agree on status, we'll print the common status and our message (more detailed than the sysfs one)
pvulnstatus "$cve" "$status" "$mymsg"
else
# if we don't agree on status, maybe our logic is flawed due to a new kernel/mitigation? use the one from sysfs
pvulnstatus "$cve" "$status" "$msg"
fi
fi
}
###################
# TAA SECTION
# Transactional Synchronization Extension (TSX) Asynchronous Abort
check_CVE_2019_11135()
{
cve='CVE-2019-11135'
_info "\033[1;34m$cve aka '$(cve2name "$cve")'\033[0m"
if [ "$os" = Linux ]; then
check_CVE_2019_11135_linux
#elif echo "$os" | grep -q BSD; then
# check_CVE_2019_11135_bsd
else
_warn "Unsupported OS ($os)"
fi
}
check_CVE_2019_11135_linux()
{
status=UNK
sys_interface_available=0
msg=''
if sys_interface_check "/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/tsx_async_abort"; then
# this kernel has the /sys interface, trust it over everything
sys_interface_available=1
fi
if [ "$opt_sysfs_only" != 1 ]; then
_info_nol "* TAA mitigation is supported by kernel: "
kernel_taa=''
if [ -n "$kernel_err" ]; then
kernel_taa_err="$kernel_err"
elif grep -q 'tsx_async_abort' "$kernel"; then
kernel_taa="found tsx_async_abort in kernel image"
fi
if [ -n "$kernel_taa" ]; then
pstatus green YES "$kernel_taa"
elif [ -n "$kernel_taa_err" ]; then
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "$kernel_taa_err"
else
pstatus yellow NO
fi
_info_nol "* TAA mitigation enabled and active: "
if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
if [ -n "$fullmsg" ]; then
if echo "$fullmsg" | grep -qE '^Mitigation'; then
pstatus green YES "$fullmsg"
else
pstatus yellow NO
fi
else
pstatus yellow NO "tsx_async_abort not found in sysfs hierarchy"
fi
else
pstatus blue N/A "not testable in offline mode"
fi
elif [ "$sys_interface_available" = 0 ]; then
# we have no sysfs but were asked to use it only!
msg="/sys vulnerability interface use forced, but it's not available!"
status=UNK
fi
if ! is_cpu_vulnerable "$cve" ; then
# override status & msg in case CPU is not vulnerable after all
pvulnstatus "$cve" OK "your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not affected"
elif [ -z "$msg" ]; then
# if msg is empty, sysfs check didn't fill it, rely on our own test
if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
# if we're in live mode and $msg is empty, sysfs file is not there so kernel is too old
pvulnstatus $cve VULN "Your kernel doesn't support TAA mitigation, update it"
else
if [ -n "$kernel_taa" ]; then
pvulnstatus $cve OK "Your kernel supports TAA mitigation"
else
pvulnstatus $cve VULN "Your kernel doesn't support TAA mitigation, update it"
fi
fi
else
if [ "$opt_paranoid" = 1 ]; then
# in paranoid mode, TSX or SMT enabled are not OK, even if TAA is mitigated
if ! echo "$fullmsg" | grep -qF 'TSX disabled'; then
pvulnstatus $cve VULN "TSX must be disabled for full mitigation"
elif echo "$fullmsg" | grep -qF 'SMT vulnerable'; then
pvulnstatus $cve VULN "SMT (HyperThreading) must be disabled for full mitigation"
else
pvulnstatus $cve "$status" "$msg"
fi
else
pvulnstatus $cve "$status" "$msg"
fi
fi
}
#######################
# iTLB Multihit section
check_CVE_2018_12207()
{
cve='CVE-2018-12207'
_info "\033[1;34m$cve aka '$(cve2name "$cve")'\033[0m"
if [ "$os" = Linux ]; then
check_CVE_2018_12207_linux
elif echo "$os" | grep -q BSD; then
check_CVE_2018_12207_bsd
else
_warn "Unsupported OS ($os)"
fi
}
check_CVE_2018_12207_linux()
{
status=UNK
sys_interface_available=0
msg=''
if sys_interface_check "/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/itlb_multihit"; then
# this kernel has the /sys interface, trust it over everything
sys_interface_available=1
fi
if [ "$opt_sysfs_only" != 1 ]; then
check_has_vmm
_info_nol "* iTLB Multihit mitigation is supported by kernel: "
kernel_itlbmh=''
if [ -n "$kernel_err" ]; then
kernel_itlbmh_err="$kernel_err"
# commit 5219505fcbb640e273a0d51c19c38de0100ec5a9
elif grep -q 'itlb_multihit' "$kernel"; then
kernel_itlbmh="found itlb_multihit in kernel image"
fi
if [ -n "$kernel_itlbmh" ]; then
pstatus green YES "$kernel_itlbmh"
elif [ -n "$kernel_itlbmh_err" ]; then
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "$kernel_itlbmh_err"
else
pstatus yellow NO
fi
_info_nol "* iTLB Multihit mitigation enabled and active: "
if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
if [ -n "$fullmsg" ]; then
if echo "$fullmsg" | grep -qF 'Mitigation'; then
pstatus green YES "$fullmsg"
else
pstatus yellow NO
fi
else
pstatus yellow NO "itlb_multihit not found in sysfs hierarchy"
fi
else
pstatus blue N/A "not testable in offline mode"
fi
elif [ "$sys_interface_available" = 0 ]; then
# we have no sysfs but were asked to use it only!
msg="/sys vulnerability interface use forced, but it's not available!"
status=UNK
fi
if ! is_cpu_vulnerable "$cve" ; then
# override status & msg in case CPU is not vulnerable after all
pvulnstatus "$cve" OK "your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not affected"
elif [ "$has_vmm" = 0 ]; then
pvulnstatus "$cve" OK "this system is not running a hypervisor"
elif [ -z "$msg" ]; then
# if msg is empty, sysfs check didn't fill it, rely on our own test
if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
# if we're in live mode and $msg is empty, sysfs file is not there so kernel is too old
pvulnstatus $cve VULN "Your kernel doesn't support iTLB Multihit mitigation, update it"
else
if [ -n "$kernel_itlbmh" ]; then
pvulnstatus $cve OK "Your kernel supports iTLB Multihit mitigation"
else
pvulnstatus $cve VULN "Your kernel doesn't support iTLB Multihit mitigation, update it"
fi
fi
else
pvulnstatus $cve "$status" "$msg"
fi
}
check_CVE_2018_12207_bsd()
{
_info_nol "* Kernel supports disabling superpages for executable mappings under EPT: "
kernel_2m_x_ept=$(sysctl -n vm.pmap.allow_2m_x_ept 2>/dev/null)
if [ -z "$kernel_2m_x_ept" ]; then
pstatus yellow NO
else
pstatus green YES
fi
_info_nol "* Superpages are disabled for executable mappings under EPT: "
if [ "$kernel_2m_x_ept" = 0 ]; then
pstatus green YES
else
pstatus yellow NO
fi
if ! is_cpu_vulnerable "$cve"; then
# override status & msg in case CPU is not vulnerable after all
pvulnstatus $cve OK "your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not affected"
elif [ -z "$kernel_2m_x_ept" ]; then
pvulnstatus $cve VULN "Your kernel doesn't support mitigating this CVE, you should update it"
elif [ "$kernel_2m_x_ept" != 0 ]; then
pvulnstatus $cve VULN "Your kernel supports mitigating this CVE, but the mitigation is disabled"
explain "To enable the mitigation, use \`sysctl vm.pmap.allow_2m_x_ept=0\`"
else
pvulnstatus $cve OK "Your kernel has support for mitigation and the mitigation is enabled"
fi
}
###################
# SRBDS SECTION
# Special Register Buffer Data Sampling (SRBDS)
check_CVE_2020_0543()
{
cve='CVE-2020-0543'
_info "\033[1;34m$cve aka '$(cve2name "$cve")'\033[0m"
if [ "$os" = Linux ]; then
check_CVE_2020_0543_linux
else
_warn "Unsupported OS ($os)"
fi
}
check_CVE_2020_0543_linux()
{
status=UNK
sys_interface_available=0
msg=''
if sys_interface_check "/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/srbds"; then
# this kernel has the /sys interface, trust it over everything
sys_interface_available=1
fi
if [ "$opt_sysfs_only" != 1 ]; then
_info_nol "* SRBDS mitigation control is supported by the kernel: "
kernel_srbds=''
if [ -n "$kernel_err" ]; then
kernel_srbds_err="$kernel_err"
elif grep -q 'Dependent on hypervisor' "$kernel"; then
kernel_srbds="found SRBDS implementation evidence in kernel image. Your kernel is up to date for SRBDS mitigation"
fi
if [ -n "$kernel_srbds" ]; then
pstatus green YES "$kernel_srbds"
elif [ -n "$kernel_srbds_err" ]; then
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "$kernel_srbds_err"
else
pstatus yellow NO
fi
_info_nol "* SRBDS mitigation control is enabled and active: "
if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
if [ -n "$fullmsg" ]; then
if echo "$fullmsg" | grep -qE '^Mitigation'; then
pstatus green YES "$fullmsg"
else
pstatus yellow NO
fi
else
pstatus yellow NO "SRBDS not found in sysfs hierarchy"
fi
else
pstatus blue N/A "not testable in offline mode"
fi
elif [ "$sys_interface_available" = 0 ]; then
# we have no sysfs but were asked to use it only!
msg="/sys vulnerability interface use forced, but it's not available!"
status=UNK
fi
if ! is_cpu_vulnerable "$cve" ; then
# override status & msg in case CPU is not vulnerable after all
pvulnstatus "$cve" OK "your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not affected"
else
if [ "$opt_sysfs_only" != 1 ]; then
if [ "$cpuid_srbds" = 1 ]; then
# SRBDS mitigation control exists
if [ "$srbds_on" = 1 ]; then
# SRBDS mitigation control is enabled
if [ -z "$msg" ]; then
# if msg is empty, sysfs check didn't fill it, rely on our own test
if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
# if we're in live mode and $msg is empty, sysfs file is not there so kernel is too old
pvulnstatus "$cve" OK "Your microcode is up to date for SRBDS mitigation control. The kernel needs to be updated"
fi
else
if [ -n "$kernel_srbds" ]; then
pvulnstatus "$cve" OK "Your microcode and kernel are both up to date for SRBDS mitigation control. Mitigation is enabled"
else
pvulnstatus "$cve" OK "Your microcode is up to date for SRBDS mitigation control. The kernel needs to be updated"
fi
fi
elif [ "$srbds_on" = 0 ]; then
# SRBDS mitigation control is disabled
if [ -z "$msg" ]; then
if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
# if we're in live mode and $msg is empty, sysfs file is not there so kernel is too old
pvulnstatus "$cve" VULN "Your microcode is up to date for SRBDS mitigation control. The kernel needs to be updated. Mitigation is disabled"
fi
else
if [ -n "$kernel_srbds" ]; then
pvulnstatus "$cve" VULN "Your microcode and kernel are both up to date for SRBDS mitigation control. Mitigation is disabled"
else
pvulnstatus "$cve" VULN "Your microcode is up to date for SRBDS mitigation control. The kernel needs to be updated. Mitigation is disabled"
fi
fi
else
# rdmsr: CPU 0 cannot read MSR 0x00000123
pvulnstatus "$cve" UNK "Not able to enumerate MSR for SRBDS mitigation control"
fi
else
# [ $cpuid_srbds != 1 ]
pvulnstatus "$cve" VULN "Your CPU microcode may need to be updated to mitigate the vulnerability"
fi
else
# sysfs only: return the status/msg we got
pvulnstatus "$cve" "$status" "$fullmsg"
return
fi
fi
}
#######################
# END OF VULNS SECTIONS
if [ "$opt_no_hw" = 0 ] && [ -z "$opt_arch_prefix" ]; then
check_cpu
check_cpu_vulnerabilities
_info
fi
# now run the checks the user asked for
for cve in $supported_cve_list
do
if [ "$opt_cve_all" = 1 ] || echo "$opt_cve_list" | grep -qw "$cve"; then
check_"$(echo "$cve" | tr - _)"
_info
fi
done
if [ -n "$final_summary" ]; then
_info "> \033[46m\033[30mSUMMARY:\033[0m$final_summary"
_info ""
fi
if [ "$bad_accuracy" = 1 ]; then
_warn "We're missing some kernel info (see -v), accuracy might be reduced"
fi
_vars=$(set | grep -Ev '^[A-Z_[:space:]]' | grep -v -F 'mockme=' | sort | tr "\n" '|')
_debug "variables at end of script: $_vars"
if [ -n "$mockme" ] && [ "$opt_mock" = 1 ]; then
if command -v "gzip" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
# not a useless use of cat: gzipping cpuinfo directly doesn't work well
# shellcheck disable=SC2002
if command -v "base64" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
mock_cpuinfo="$(cat /proc/cpuinfo | gzip -c | base64 -w0)"
elif command -v "uuencode" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
mock_cpuinfo="$(cat /proc/cpuinfo | gzip -c | uuencode -m - | grep -Fv 'begin-base64' | grep -Fxv -- '====' | tr -d "\n")"
fi
fi
if [ -n "$mock_cpuinfo" ]; then
mockme=$(printf "%b\n%b" "$mockme" "SMC_MOCK_CPUINFO='$mock_cpuinfo'")
unset mock_cpuinfo
fi
_info ""
# shellcheck disable=SC2046
_warn "To mock this CPU, set those vars: "$(echo "$mockme" | sort -u)
fi
if [ "$opt_explain" = 0 ]; then
_info "Need more detailed information about mitigation options? Use --explain"
fi
_info "A false sense of security is worse than no security at all, see --disclaimer"
if [ "$mocked" = 1 ]; then
_info ""
_warn "One or several values have been mocked. This should only be done when debugging/testing this script."
_warn "The results do NOT reflect the actual status of the system we're running on."
fi
if [ "$opt_batch" = 1 ] && [ "$opt_batch_format" = "nrpe" ]; then
if [ -n "$nrpe_vuln" ]; then
echo "Vulnerable:$nrpe_vuln"
else
echo "OK"
fi
fi
if [ "$opt_batch" = 1 ] && [ "$opt_batch_format" = "short" ]; then
_echo 0 "${short_output% }"
fi
if [ "$opt_batch" = 1 ] && [ "$opt_batch_format" = "json" ]; then
_echo 0 "${json_output%?}]"
fi
if [ "$opt_batch" = 1 ] && [ "$opt_batch_format" = "prometheus" ]; then
echo "# TYPE specex_vuln_status untyped"
echo "# HELP specex_vuln_status Exposure of system to speculative execution vulnerabilities"
printf "%b\n" "$prometheus_output"
fi
# exit with the proper exit code
[ "$global_critical" = 1 ] && exit 2 # critical
[ "$global_unknown" = 1 ] && exit 3 # unknown
exit 0 # ok
# We're using MCE.db from the excellent platomav's MCExtractor project
# The builtin version follows, but the user can download an up-to-date copy (to be stored in his $HOME) by using --update-fwdb
# To update the builtin version itself (by *modifying* this very file), use --update-builtin-fwdb
# %%% MCEDB v221+i20220208
# I,0x00000611,0x00000B27,19961218
# I,0x00000612,0x000000C6,19961210
# I,0x00000616,0x000000C6,19961210
# I,0x00000617,0x000000C6,19961210
# I,0x00000619,0x000000D2,19980218
# I,0x00000630,0x00000013,19960827
# I,0x00000632,0x00000020,19960903
# I,0x00000633,0x00000036,19980923
# I,0x00000634,0x00000037,19980923
# I,0x00000650,0x00000045,19990525
# I,0x00000651,0x00000042,19990525
# I,0x00000652,0x0000002D,19990518
# I,0x00000653,0x00000010,19990628
# I,0x00000660,0x0000000A,19990505
# I,0x00000665,0x00000003,19990505
# I,0x0000066A,0x0000000D,19990505
# I,0x0000066D,0x00000007,19990505
# I,0x00000670,0x00000007,19980602
# I,0x00000671,0x00000014,19980811
# I,0x00000672,0x00000038,19990922
# I,0x00000673,0x0000002E,19990910
# I,0x00000680,0x00000017,19990610
# I,0x00000681,0x00000014,19991209
# I,0x00000683,0x00000014,20010206
# I,0x00000686,0x00000008,20000505
# I,0x0000068A,0x00000005,20001207
# I,0x00000690,0x00000004,20000206
# I,0x00000691,0x00000001,20020527
# I,0x00000692,0x00000001,20020620
# I,0x00000694,0x00000002,20020926
# I,0x00000695,0x00000047,20041109
# I,0x00000696,0x00000001,20000707
# I,0x000006A0,0x00000003,20000110
# I,0x000006A1,0x00000001,20000306
# I,0x000006A4,0x00000001,20000616
# I,0x000006B0,0x0000001A,20010129
# I,0x000006B1,0x0000001D,20010220
# I,0x000006B4,0x00000002,20020111
# I,0x000006D0,0x00000006,20030522
# I,0x000006D1,0x00000009,20030709
# I,0x000006D2,0x00000010,20030814
# I,0x000006D6,0x00000018,20041017
# I,0x000006D8,0x00000021,20060831
# I,0x000006E0,0x00000008,20050215
# I,0x000006E1,0x0000000C,20050413
# I,0x000006E4,0x00000026,20050816
# I,0x000006E8,0x0000003C,20060208
# I,0x000006EC,0x0000005B,20070208
# I,0x000006F0,0x00000005,20050818
# I,0x000006F1,0x00000012,20051129
# I,0x000006F2,0x0000005D,20101002
# I,0x000006F4,0x00000028,20060417
# I,0x000006F5,0x00000039,20060727
# I,0x000006F6,0x000000D2,20101001
# I,0x000006F7,0x0000006B,20101002
# I,0x000006F9,0x00000084,20061012
# I,0x000006FA,0x00000095,20101002
# I,0x000006FB,0x000000C1,20111004
# I,0x000006FD,0x000000A4,20101002
# I,0x00000F00,0xFFFF0001,20000130
# I,0x00000F01,0xFFFF0007,20000404
# I,0x00000F02,0xFFFF000B,20000518
# I,0x00000F03,0xFFFF0001,20000518
# I,0x00000F04,0xFFFF0010,20000803
# I,0x00000F05,0x0000000C,20000824
# I,0x00000F06,0x00000004,20000911
# I,0x00000F07,0x00000012,20020716
# I,0x00000F08,0x00000008,20001101
# I,0x00000F09,0x00000008,20010104
# I,0x00000F0A,0x00000015,20020821
# I,0x00000F11,0x0000000A,20030729
# I,0x00000F12,0x0000002F,20030502
# I,0x00000F13,0x00000005,20030508
# I,0x00000F20,0x00000001,20010423
# I,0x00000F21,0x00000003,20010529
# I,0x00000F22,0x00000005,20030729
# I,0x00000F23,0x0000000D,20010817
# I,0x00000F24,0x00000021,20030610
# I,0x00000F25,0x0000002C,20040826
# I,0x00000F26,0x00000010,20040805
# I,0x00000F27,0x00000039,20030604
# I,0x00000F29,0x0000002F,20040811
# I,0x00000F30,0x00000013,20030815
# I,0x00000F31,0x0000000B,20031021
# I,0x00000F32,0x0000000A,20040511
# I,0x00000F33,0x0000000C,20050421
# I,0x00000F34,0x00000017,20050421
# I,0x00000F36,0x00000007,20040309
# I,0x00000F37,0x00000003,20031218
# I,0x00000F40,0x00000006,20040318
# I,0x00000F41,0x00000017,20050422
# I,0x00000F42,0x00000003,20050421
# I,0x00000F43,0x00000005,20050421
# I,0x00000F44,0x00000006,20050421
# I,0x00000F46,0x00000004,20050411
# I,0x00000F47,0x00000003,20050421
# I,0x00000F48,0x0000000E,20080115
# I,0x00000F49,0x00000003,20050421
# I,0x00000F4A,0x00000004,20051214
# I,0x00000F60,0x00000005,20050124
# I,0x00000F61,0x00000008,20050610
# I,0x00000F62,0x0000000F,20051215
# I,0x00000F63,0x00000005,20051010
# I,0x00000F64,0x00000004,20051223
# I,0x00000F65,0x0000000B,20070510
# I,0x00000F66,0x0000001B,20060310
# I,0x00000F68,0x00000009,20060714
# I,0x00001632,0x00000002,19980610
# I,0x00010650,0x00000002,20060513
# I,0x00010660,0x00000004,20060612
# I,0x00010661,0x00000045,20101004
# I,0x00010670,0x00000005,20070209
# I,0x00010671,0x00000106,20070329
# I,0x00010674,0x84050100,20070726
# I,0x00010676,0x00000612,20150802
# I,0x00010677,0x0000070D,20150802
# I,0x0001067A,0x00000A0E,20150729
# I,0x000106A0,0xFFFF001A,20071128
# I,0x000106A1,0xFFFF000B,20080220
# I,0x000106A2,0xFFFF0019,20080714
# I,0x000106A4,0x00000013,20150630
# I,0x000106A5,0x0000001D,20180511
# I,0x000106C0,0x00000007,20070824
# I,0x000106C1,0x00000109,20071203
# I,0x000106C2,0x00000219,20090410
# I,0x000106C9,0x00000007,20090213
# I,0x000106CA,0x00000107,20090825
# I,0x000106D0,0x00000005,20071204
# I,0x000106D1,0x0000002A,20150803
# I,0x000106E0,0xFFFF0022,20090116
# I,0x000106E1,0xFFFF000D,20090206
# I,0x000106E2,0xFFFF0011,20090924
# I,0x000106E3,0xFFFF0011,20090512
# I,0x000106E4,0x00000003,20130701
# I,0x000106E5,0x0000000A,20180508
# I,0x000106F0,0xFFFF0009,20090210
# I,0x000106F1,0xFFFF0007,20090210
# I,0x00020650,0xFFFF0008,20090218
# I,0x00020651,0xFFFF0018,20090818
# I,0x00020652,0x00000011,20180508
# I,0x00020654,0xFFFF0007,20091124
# I,0x00020655,0x00000007,20180423
# I,0x00020661,0x00000105,20110718
# I,0x000206A0,0x00000029,20091102
# I,0x000206A1,0x00000007,20091223
# I,0x000206A2,0x00000027,20100502
# I,0x000206A3,0x00000009,20100609
# I,0x000206A4,0x00000022,20100414
# I,0x000206A5,0x00000007,20100722
# I,0x000206A6,0x90030028,20100924
# I,0x000206A7,0x0000002F,20190217
# I,0x000206C0,0xFFFF001C,20091214
# I,0x000206C1,0x00000006,20091222
# I,0x000206C2,0x0000001F,20180508
# I,0x000206D0,0x80000006,20100816
# I,0x000206D1,0x80000106,20101201
# I,0x000206D2,0xAF506958,20110714
# I,0x000206D3,0xAF50696A,20110816
# I,0x000206D5,0xAF5069E5,20120118
# I,0x000206D6,0x00000621,20200304
# I,0x000206D7,0x0000071A,20200324
# I,0x000206E0,0xE3493401,20090108
# I,0x000206E1,0xE3493402,20090224
# I,0x000206E2,0xFFFF0004,20081001
# I,0x000206E3,0xE4486547,20090701
# I,0x000206E4,0xFFFF0008,20090619
# I,0x000206E5,0xFFFF0018,20091215
# I,0x000206E6,0x0000000D,20180515
# I,0x000206F0,0x00000005,20100729
# I,0x000206F1,0x00000008,20101013
# I,0x000206F2,0x0000003B,20180516
# I,0x00030650,0x00000009,20120118
# I,0x00030651,0x00000110,20131014
# I,0x00030660,0x00000003,20101103
# I,0x00030661,0x0000010F,20150721
# I,0x00030669,0x0000010D,20130515
# I,0x00030671,0x00000117,20130410
# I,0x00030672,0x0000022E,20140401
# I,0x00030673,0x83290100,20190916
# I,0x00030678,0x00000838,20190422
# I,0x00030679,0x0000090D,20190710
# I,0x000306A0,0x00000007,20110407
# I,0x000306A2,0x0000000C,20110725
# I,0x000306A4,0x00000007,20110908
# I,0x000306A5,0x00000009,20111110
# I,0x000306A6,0x00000004,20111114
# I,0x000306A8,0x00000010,20120220
# I,0x000306A9,0x00000021,20190213
# I,0x000306C0,0xFFFF0013,20111110
# I,0x000306C1,0xFFFF0014,20120725
# I,0x000306C2,0xFFFF0006,20121017
# I,0x000306C3,0x00000028,20191112
# I,0x000306D1,0xFFFF0009,20131015
# I,0x000306D2,0xFFFF0009,20131219
# I,0x000306D3,0xE3121338,20140825
# I,0x000306D4,0x0000002F,20191112
# I,0x000306E0,0xE920080F,20121113
# I,0x000306E2,0xE9220827,20130523
# I,0x000306E3,0x00000308,20130321
# I,0x000306E4,0x0000042E,20190314
# I,0x000306E6,0x00000600,20130619
# I,0x000306E7,0x00000715,20190314
# I,0x000306F0,0xFFFF0017,20130730
# I,0x000306F1,0xD141D629,20140416
# I,0x000306F2,0x00000049,20210811
# I,0x000306F3,0x0000000D,20160211
# I,0x000306F4,0x0000001A,20210524
# I,0x00040650,0xFFFF000B,20121206
# I,0x00040651,0x00000026,20191112
# I,0x00040660,0xFFFF0011,20121012
# I,0x00040661,0x0000001C,20191112
# I,0x00040670,0xFFFF0006,20140304
# I,0x00040671,0x00000022,20191112
# I,0x000406A0,0x80124001,20130521
# I,0x000406A8,0x0000081F,20140812
# I,0x000406A9,0x0000081F,20140812
# I,0x000406C1,0x0000010B,20140814
# I,0x000406C2,0x00000221,20150218
# I,0x000406C3,0x00000368,20190423
# I,0x000406C4,0x00000411,20190423
# I,0x000406D0,0x0000000E,20130612
# I,0x000406D8,0x0000012D,20190916
# I,0x000406E1,0x00000020,20141111
# I,0x000406E2,0x0000002C,20150521
# I,0x000406E3,0x000000EC,20210428
# I,0x000406E8,0x00000026,20160414
# I,0x000406F0,0x00000014,20150702
# I,0x000406F1,0x0B000040,20210519
# I,0x00050650,0x8000002B,20160208
# I,0x00050651,0x8000002B,20160208
# I,0x00050652,0x80000037,20170502
# I,0x00050653,0x0100015C,20210526
# I,0x00050654,0x02006C0A,20210616
# I,0x00050655,0x03000012,20190412
# I,0x00050656,0x0400320A,20210813
# I,0x00050657,0x0500320A,20210813
# I,0x0005065A,0x86002302,20210416
# I,0x0005065B,0x07002402,20210604
# I,0x00050661,0xF1000008,20150130
# I,0x00050662,0x0000001C,20190617
# I,0x00050663,0x0700001C,20210612
# I,0x00050664,0x0F00001A,20210612
# I,0x00050665,0x0E000014,20210918
# I,0x00050670,0xFFFF0030,20151113
# I,0x00050671,0x000001B6,20180108
# I,0x000506A0,0x00000038,20150112
# I,0x000506C2,0x00000014,20180511
# I,0x000506C8,0x90011010,20160323
# I,0x000506C9,0x00000046,20210510
# I,0x000506CA,0x00000022,20210622
# I,0x000506D1,0x00000102,20150605
# I,0x000506E0,0x00000018,20141119
# I,0x000506E1,0x0000002A,20150602
# I,0x000506E2,0x0000002E,20150815
# I,0x000506E3,0x000000EC,20210429
# I,0x000506E8,0x00000034,20160710
# I,0x000506F0,0x00000010,20160607
# I,0x000506F1,0x00000036,20210510
# I,0x00060660,0x0000000C,20160821
# I,0x00060661,0x0000000E,20170128
# I,0x00060662,0x00000022,20171129
# I,0x00060663,0x0000002A,20180417
# I,0x000606A0,0x80000031,20200308
# I,0x000606A4,0x0B000280,20200817
# I,0x000606A5,0x0C0002F0,20210308
# I,0x000606A6,0x0D000332,20211217
# I,0x000606E0,0x0000000B,20161104
# I,0x000606E1,0x00000108,20190423
# I,0x000706A0,0x00000026,20170712
# I,0x000706A1,0x00000038,20210510
# I,0x000706A8,0x0000001C,20210510
# I,0x000706E0,0x0000002C,20180614
# I,0x000706E1,0x00000042,20190420
# I,0x000706E2,0x00000042,20190420
# I,0x000706E3,0x81000008,20181002
# I,0x000706E4,0x00000046,20190905
# I,0x000706E5,0x000000A8,20210526
# I,0x00080650,0x00000018,20180108
# I,0x00080664,0x0B00000F,20210217
# I,0x00080665,0x0B00000F,20210217
# I,0x000806A0,0x00000010,20190507
# I,0x000806A1,0x0000002D,20210902
# I,0x000806C0,0x00000068,20200402
# I,0x000806C1,0x0000009C,20211026
# I,0x000806C2,0x00000022,20210716
# I,0x000806D0,0x00000050,20201217
# I,0x000806D1,0x0000003C,20210716
# I,0x000806E9,0x000000EC,20210428
# I,0x000806EA,0x000000EC,20210428
# I,0x000806EB,0x000000EC,20210428
# I,0x000806EC,0x000000EC,20210428
# I,0x00090660,0x00000009,20200617
# I,0x00090661,0x00000015,20210921
# I,0x00090670,0x00000019,20201111
# I,0x00090671,0x0000001C,20210614
# I,0x00090672,0x0000001A,20220103
# I,0x00090674,0x00000219,20210425
# I,0x00090675,0x0000001A,20220103
# I,0x000906A0,0x0000001C,20210614
# I,0x000906A1,0x0000011F,20211104
# I,0x000906A2,0x00000315,20220102
# I,0x000906A3,0x00000419,20220220
# I,0x000906A4,0x00000419,20220220
# I,0x000906C0,0x2400001F,20210809
# I,0x000906E9,0x000000EC,20210429
# I,0x000906EA,0x000000EC,20210428
# I,0x000906EB,0x000000EC,20210428
# I,0x000906EC,0x000000EC,20210428
# I,0x000906ED,0x000000EC,20210428
# I,0x000A0650,0x000000BE,20191010
# I,0x000A0651,0x000000C2,20191113
# I,0x000A0652,0x000000EC,20210428
# I,0x000A0653,0x000000EC,20210428
# I,0x000A0654,0x000000C6,20200123
# I,0x000A0655,0x000000EE,20210428
# I,0x000A0660,0x000000EA,20210428
# I,0x000A0661,0x000000EC,20210429
# I,0x000A0670,0x0000002C,20201124
# I,0x000A0671,0x00000050,20210829
# I,0x000A0680,0x80000002,20200121
# I,0x000B0670,0x00000009,20211115
# A,0x00000F00,0x02000008,20070614
# A,0x00000F01,0x0000001C,20021031
# A,0x00000F10,0x00000003,20020325
# A,0x00000F11,0x0000001F,20030220
# A,0x00000F48,0x00000046,20040719
# A,0x00000F4A,0x00000047,20040719
# A,0x00000F50,0x00000024,20021212
# A,0x00000F51,0x00000025,20030115
# A,0x00010F50,0x00000041,20040225
# A,0x00020F10,0x0000004D,20050428
# A,0x00040F01,0xC0012102,20050916
# A,0x00040F0A,0x00000068,20060920
# A,0x00040F13,0x0000007A,20080508
# A,0x00040F14,0x00000062,20060127
# A,0x00040F1B,0x0000006D,20060920
# A,0x00040F33,0x0000007B,20080514
# A,0x00060F80,0x00000083,20060929
# A,0x000C0F1B,0x0000006E,20060921
# A,0x000F0F00,0x00000005,20020627
# A,0x000F0F01,0x00000015,20020627
# A,0x00100F00,0x01000020,20070326
# A,0x00100F20,0x010000CA,20100331
# A,0x00100F22,0x010000C9,20100331
# A,0x00100F40,0x01000085,20080501
# A,0x00100F41,0x010000DB,20111024
# A,0x00100F42,0x01000092,20081021
# A,0x00100F43,0x010000C8,20100311
# A,0x00100F62,0x010000C7,20100311
# A,0x00100F80,0x010000DA,20111024
# A,0x00100F81,0x010000D9,20111012
# A,0x00100FA0,0x010000DC,20111024
# A,0x00120F00,0x03000002,20100324
# A,0x00200F30,0x02000018,20070921
# A,0x00200F31,0x02000057,20080502
# A,0x00200F32,0x02000034,20080307
# A,0x00300F01,0x0300000E,20101004
# A,0x00300F10,0x03000027,20111309
# A,0x00500F00,0x0500000B,20100601
# A,0x00500F01,0x0500001A,20100908
# A,0x00500F10,0x05000029,20130121
# A,0x00500F20,0x05000119,20130118
# A,0x00580F00,0x0500000B,20100601
# A,0x00580F01,0x0500001A,20100908
# A,0x00580F10,0x05000028,20101124
# A,0x00580F20,0x05000103,20110526
# A,0x00600F00,0x06000017,20101029
# A,0x00600F01,0x0600011F,20110227
# A,0x00600F10,0x06000425,20110408
# A,0x00600F11,0x0600050D,20110627
# A,0x00600F12,0x0600063E,20180207
# A,0x00600F20,0x06000852,20180206
# A,0x00610F00,0x0600100E,20111102
# A,0x00610F01,0x0600111F,20180305
# A,0x00630F00,0x0600301C,20130817
# A,0x00630F01,0x06003109,20180227
# A,0x00660F00,0x06006012,20141014
# A,0x00660F01,0x0600611A,20180126
# A,0x00670F00,0x06006705,20180220
# A,0x00680F00,0x06000017,20101029
# A,0x00680F01,0x0600011F,20110227
# A,0x00680F10,0x06000410,20110314
# A,0x00690F00,0x06001009,20110613
# A,0x00700F00,0x0700002A,20121218
# A,0x00700F01,0x07000110,20180209
# A,0x00730F00,0x07030009,20131206
# A,0x00730F01,0x07030106,20180209
# A,0x00800F00,0x0800002A,20161006
# A,0x00800F10,0x0800100C,20170131
# A,0x00800F11,0x08001138,20190204
# A,0x00800F12,0x0800126E,20211111
# A,0x00800F82,0x0800820D,20190416
# A,0x00810F00,0x08100004,20161120
# A,0x00810F10,0x08101016,20190430
# A,0x00810F11,0x08101103,20190417
# A,0x00810F80,0x08108002,20180605
# A,0x00810F81,0x08108109,20190417
# A,0x00820F00,0x08200002,20180214
# A,0x00820F01,0x08200103,20190417
# A,0x00830F00,0x08300027,20190401
# A,0x00830F10,0x08301052,20211111
# A,0x00850F00,0x08500004,20180212
# A,0x00860F00,0x0860000E,20200127
# A,0x00860F01,0x08600106,20200619
# A,0x00860F81,0x08608103,20200702
# A,0x00870F00,0x08700004,20181206
# A,0x00870F10,0x08701021,20200125
# A,0x00A00F00,0x0A000033,20200413
# A,0x00A00F10,0x0A001053,20211217
# A,0x00A00F11,0x0A00115D,20211119
# A,0x00A00F12,0x0A001227,20211215
# A,0x00A00F80,0x0A008003,20211015
# A,0x00A00F82,0x0A008204,20211015
# A,0x00A20F00,0x0A200025,20200121
# A,0x00A20F10,0x0A201016,20210408
# A,0x00A20F12,0x0A201205,20210719
# A,0x00A50F00,0x0A50000C,20201208
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