mirror of
https://github.com/speed47/spectre-meltdown-checker
synced 2024-08-29 23:33:41 +02:00
1925 lines
65 KiB
Bash
Executable File
1925 lines
65 KiB
Bash
Executable File
#! /bin/sh
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# Spectre & Meltdown checker
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#
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# Check for the latest version at:
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# https://github.com/speed47/spectre-meltdown-checker
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# git clone https://github.com/speed47/spectre-meltdown-checker.git
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# or wget meltdown.ovh -O spectre-meltdown-checker.sh
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# or curl -L meltdown.ovh -o spectre-meltdown-checker.sh
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#
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# Stephane Lesimple
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#
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VERSION='0.35'
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trap 'exit_cleanup' EXIT
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trap '_warn "interrupted, cleaning up..."; exit_cleanup; exit 1' INT
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exit_cleanup()
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{
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# cleanup the temp decompressed config & kernel image
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[ -n "$dumped_config" ] && [ -f "$dumped_config" ] && rm -f "$dumped_config"
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[ -n "$vmlinuxtmp" ] && [ -f "$vmlinuxtmp" ] && rm -f "$vmlinuxtmp"
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[ "$mounted_debugfs" = 1 ] && umount /sys/kernel/debug 2>/dev/null
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[ "$insmod_cpuid" = 1 ] && rmmod cpuid 2>/dev/null
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[ "$insmod_msr" = 1 ] && rmmod msr 2>/dev/null
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}
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show_usage()
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{
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# shellcheck disable=SC2086
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cat <<EOF
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Usage:
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Live mode: $(basename $0) [options] [--live]
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Offline mode: $(basename $0) [options] [--kernel <vmlinux_file>] [--config <kernel_config>] [--map <kernel_map_file>]
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Modes:
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Two modes are available.
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First mode is the "live" mode (default), it does its best to find information about the currently running kernel.
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To run under this mode, just start the script without any option (you can also use --live explicitly)
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Second mode is the "offline" mode, where you can inspect a non-running kernel.
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You'll need to specify the location of the vmlinux file, config and System.map files:
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--kernel vmlinux_file Specify a (possibly compressed) vmlinux file
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--config kernel_config Specify a kernel config file
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--map kernel_map_file Specify a kernel System.map file
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Options:
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--no-color Don't use color codes
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--verbose, -v Increase verbosity level
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--no-sysfs Don't use the /sys interface even if present
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--sysfs-only Only use the /sys interface, don't run our own checks
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--coreos Special mode for CoreOS (use an ephemeral toolbox to inspect kernel)
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--batch text Produce machine readable output, this is the default if --batch is specified alone
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--batch json Produce JSON output formatted for Puppet, Ansible, Chef...
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--batch nrpe Produce machine readable output formatted for NRPE
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--batch prometheus Produce output for consumption by prometheus-node-exporter
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--variant [1,2,3] Specify which variant you'd like to check, by default all variants are checked
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Can be specified multiple times (e.g. --variant 2 --variant 3)
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Return codes:
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0 (not vulnerable), 2 (vulnerable), 3 (unknown), 255 (error)
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IMPORTANT:
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A false sense of security is worse than no security at all.
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Please use the --disclaimer option to understand exactly what this script does.
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EOF
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}
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show_disclaimer()
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{
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cat <<EOF
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Disclaimer:
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This tool does its best to determine whether your system is immune (or has proper mitigations in place) for the
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collectively named "speculative execution" vulnerabilities. It doesn't attempt to run any kind of exploit, and can't guarantee
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that your system is secure, but rather helps you verifying whether your system has the known correct mitigations in place.
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However, some mitigations could also exist in your kernel that this script doesn't know (yet) how to detect, or it might
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falsely detect mitigations that in the end don't work as expected (for example, on backported or modified kernels).
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Your system exposure also depends on your CPU. As of now, AMD and ARM processors are marked as immune to some or all of these
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vulnerabilities (except some specific ARM models). All Intel processors manufactured since circa 1995 are thought to be vulnerable,
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except some specific/old models, such as some early Atoms. Whatever processor one uses, one might seek more information
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from the manufacturer of that processor and/or of the device in which it runs.
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The nature of the discovered vulnerabilities being quite new, the landscape of vulnerable processors can be expected
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to change over time, which is why this script makes the assumption that all CPUs are vulnerable, except if the manufacturer
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explicitly stated otherwise in a verifiable public announcement.
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Please also note that for Spectre vulnerabilities, all software can possibly be exploited, this tool only verifies that the
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kernel (which is the core of the system) you're using has the proper protections in place. Verifying all the other software
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is out of the scope of this tool. As a general measure, ensure you always have the most up to date stable versions of all
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the softwares you use, especially for those who are exposed to the world, such as network daemons and browsers.
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This tool has been released in the hope that it'll be useful, but don't use it to jump to conclusions about your security.
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EOF
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}
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# parse options
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opt_kernel=''
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opt_config=''
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opt_map=''
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opt_live_explicit=0
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opt_live=1
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opt_no_color=0
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opt_batch=0
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opt_batch_format="text"
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opt_verbose=1
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opt_variant1=0
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opt_variant2=0
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opt_variant3=0
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opt_allvariants=1
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opt_no_sysfs=0
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opt_sysfs_only=0
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opt_coreos=0
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global_critical=0
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global_unknown=0
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nrpe_vuln=""
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# find a sane `echo` command
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# we'll try to avoid using shell builtins that might not take options
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if which echo >/dev/null 2>&1; then
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echo_cmd=$(which echo)
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else
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[ -x /bin/echo ] && echo_cmd=/bin/echo
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[ -x /system/bin/echo ] && echo_cmd=/system/bin/echo
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fi
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# still empty ? fallback to builtin
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[ -z "$echo_cmd" ] && echo_cmd=echo
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__echo()
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{
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opt="$1"
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shift
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_msg="$*"
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if [ "$opt_no_color" = 1 ] ; then
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# strip ANSI color codes
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# some sed versions (i.e. toybox) can't seem to handle
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# \033 aka \x1B correctly, so do it for them.
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_ctrlchar=$($echo_cmd -e "\033")
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_msg=$($echo_cmd -e "$_msg" | sed -r "s/$_ctrlchar\[([0-9][0-9]?(;[0-9][0-9]?)?)?m//g")
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fi
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# shellcheck disable=SC2086
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$echo_cmd $opt -e "$_msg"
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}
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_echo()
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{
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if [ "$opt_verbose" -ge "$1" ]; then
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shift
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__echo '' "$*"
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fi
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}
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_echo_nol()
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{
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if [ "$opt_verbose" -ge "$1" ]; then
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shift
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__echo -n "$*"
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fi
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}
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_warn()
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{
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_echo 0 "\033[31m$*\033[0m" >&2
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}
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_info()
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{
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_echo 1 "$*"
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}
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_info_nol()
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{
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_echo_nol 1 "$*"
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}
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_verbose()
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{
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_echo 2 "$*"
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}
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_verbose_nol()
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{
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_echo_nol 2 "$*"
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}
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_debug()
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{
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_echo 3 "\033[34m(debug) $*\033[0m"
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}
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is_cpu_vulnerable_cached=0
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_is_cpu_vulnerable_cached()
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{
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# shellcheck disable=SC2086
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[ "$1" = 1 ] && return $variant1
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# shellcheck disable=SC2086
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[ "$1" = 2 ] && return $variant2
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# shellcheck disable=SC2086
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[ "$1" = 3 ] && return $variant3
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echo "$0: error: invalid variant '$1' passed to is_cpu_vulnerable()" >&2
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exit 255
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}
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is_cpu_vulnerable()
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{
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# param: 1, 2 or 3 (variant)
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# returns 0 if vulnerable, 1 if not vulnerable
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# (note that in shell, a return of 0 is success)
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# by default, everything is vulnerable, we work in a "whitelist" logic here.
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# usage: is_cpu_vulnerable 2 && do something if vulnerable
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if [ "$is_cpu_vulnerable_cached" = 1 ]; then
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_is_cpu_vulnerable_cached "$1"
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return $?
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fi
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variant1=''
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variant2=''
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variant3=''
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if is_cpu_specex_free; then
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variant1=immune
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variant2=immune
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variant3=immune
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elif [ "$cpu_vendor" = GenuineIntel ]; then
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# Intel
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# https://github.com/crozone/SpectrePoC/issues/1 ^F E5200 => spectre 2 not vulnerable
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# https://github.com/paboldin/meltdown-exploit/issues/19 ^F E5200 => meltdown vulnerable
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# model name : Pentium(R) Dual-Core CPU E5200 @ 2.50GHz
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if grep -qE '^model name.+ Pentium\(R\) Dual-Core[[:space:]]+CPU[[:space:]]+E[0-9]{4}K? ' /proc/cpuinfo; then
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variant1=vuln
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[ -z "$variant2" ] && variant2=immune
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variant3=vuln
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fi
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if [ "$capabilities_rdcl_no" = 1 ]; then
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# capability bit for future Intel processor that will explicitly state
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# that they're not vulnerable to Meltdown
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# this var is set in check_cpu()
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variant3=immune
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_debug "is_cpu_vulnerable: RDCL_NO is set so not vuln to meltdown"
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fi
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elif [ "$cpu_vendor" = AuthenticAMD ]; then
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# AMD revised their statement about variant2 => vulnerable
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# https://www.amd.com/en/corporate/speculative-execution
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variant1=vuln
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variant2=vuln
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[ -z "$variant3" ] && variant3=immune
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elif [ "$cpu_vendor" = ARM ]; then
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# ARM
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# reference: https://developer.arm.com/support/security-update
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# some devices (phones or other) have several ARMs and as such different part numbers,
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# an example is "bigLITTLE". we shouldn't rely on the first CPU only, so we check the whole list
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i=0
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for cpupart in $cpu_part_list
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do
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i=$(( i + 1 ))
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# do NOT quote $cpu_arch_list below
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# shellcheck disable=SC2086
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cpuarch=$(echo $cpu_arch_list | awk '{ print $'$i' }')
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_debug "checking cpu$i: <$cpupart> <$cpuarch>"
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# some kernels report AArch64 instead of 8
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[ "$cpuarch" = "AArch64" ] && cpuarch=8
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if [ -n "$cpupart" ] && [ -n "$cpuarch" ]; then
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# Cortex-R7 and Cortex-R8 are real-time and only used in medical devices or such
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# I can't find their CPU part number, but it's probably not that useful anyway
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# model R7 R8 A9 A15 A17 A57 A72 A73 A75
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# part ? ? 0xc09 0xc0f 0xc0e 0xd07 0xd08 0xd09 0xd0a
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# arch 7? 7? 7 7 7 8 8 8 8
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#
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# variant 1 & variant 2
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if [ "$cpuarch" = 7 ] && echo "$cpupart" | grep -Eq '^0x(c09|c0f|c0e)$'; then
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# armv7 vulnerable chips
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_debug "checking cpu$i: this armv7 vulnerable to spectre 1 & 2"
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variant1=vuln
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variant2=vuln
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elif [ "$cpuarch" = 8 ] && echo "$cpupart" | grep -Eq '^0x(d07|d08|d09|d0a)$'; then
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# armv8 vulnerable chips
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_debug "checking cpu$i: this armv8 vulnerable to spectre 1 & 2"
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variant1=vuln
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variant2=vuln
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else
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_debug "checking cpu$i: this arm non vulnerable to 1 & 2"
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# others are not vulnerable
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[ -z "$variant1" ] && variant1=immune
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[ -z "$variant2" ] && variant2=immune
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fi
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# for variant3, only A75 is vulnerable
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if [ "$cpuarch" = 8 ] && [ "$cpupart" = 0xd0a ]; then
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_debug "checking cpu$i: arm A75 vulnerable to meltdown"
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variant3=vuln
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else
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_debug "checking cpu$i: this arm non vulnerable to meltdown"
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[ -z "$variant3" ] && variant3=immune
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fi
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fi
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_debug "is_cpu_vulnerable: for cpu$i and so far, we have <$variant1> <$variant2> <$variant3>"
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done
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fi
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_debug "is_cpu_vulnerable: temp results are <$variant1> <$variant2> <$variant3>"
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# if at least one of the cpu is vulnerable, then the system is vulnerable
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[ "$variant1" = "immune" ] && variant1=1 || variant1=0
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[ "$variant2" = "immune" ] && variant2=1 || variant2=0
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[ "$variant3" = "immune" ] && variant3=1 || variant3=0
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_debug "is_cpu_vulnerable: final results are <$variant1> <$variant2> <$variant3>"
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is_cpu_vulnerable_cached=1
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_is_cpu_vulnerable_cached "$1"
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return $?
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}
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is_cpu_specex_free()
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{
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# return true (0) if the CPU doesn't do speculative execution, false (1) if it does.
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# if it's not in the list we know, return false (1).
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# source: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/tree/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c#n882
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# { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_CEDARVIEW, X86_FEATURE_ANY },
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# { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_CLOVERVIEW, X86_FEATURE_ANY },
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# { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_LINCROFT, X86_FEATURE_ANY },
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# { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_PENWELL, X86_FEATURE_ANY },
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# { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_PINEVIEW, X86_FEATURE_ANY },
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# { X86_VENDOR_CENTAUR, 5 },
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# { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 5 },
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# { X86_VENDOR_NSC, 5 },
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# { X86_VENDOR_ANY, 4 },
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parse_cpu_details
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if [ "$cpu_vendor" = GenuineIntel ]; then
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if [ "$cpu_family" = 6 ]; then
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if [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_CEDARVIEW" ] || \
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[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_CLOVERVIEW" ] || \
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[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_LINCROFT" ] || \
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[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_PENWELL" ] || \
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[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_PINEVIEW" ]; then
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return 0
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fi
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elif [ "$cpu_family" = 5 ]; then
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return 0
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fi
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fi
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[ "$cpu_family" -eq 4 ] && return 0
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return 1
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}
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show_header()
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{
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_info "Spectre and Meltdown mitigation detection tool v$VERSION"
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_info
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}
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parse_opt_file()
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{
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# parse_opt_file option_name option_value
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option_name="$1"
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option_value="$2"
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if [ -z "$option_value" ]; then
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show_header
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show_usage
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echo "$0: error: --$option_name expects one parameter (a file)" >&2
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exit 1
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elif [ ! -e "$option_value" ]; then
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show_header
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echo "$0: error: couldn't find file $option_value" >&2
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exit 1
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elif [ ! -f "$option_value" ]; then
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show_header
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echo "$0: error: $option_value is not a file" >&2
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exit 1
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elif [ ! -r "$option_value" ]; then
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show_header
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echo "$0: error: couldn't read $option_value (are you root?)" >&2
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exit 1
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fi
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echo "$option_value"
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exit 0
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}
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while [ -n "$1" ]; do
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if [ "$1" = "--kernel" ]; then
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opt_kernel=$(parse_opt_file kernel "$2"); ret=$?
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[ $ret -ne 0 ] && exit 255
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shift 2
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opt_live=0
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elif [ "$1" = "--config" ]; then
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opt_config=$(parse_opt_file config "$2"); ret=$?
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[ $ret -ne 0 ] && exit 255
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shift 2
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opt_live=0
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elif [ "$1" = "--map" ]; then
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opt_map=$(parse_opt_file map "$2"); ret=$?
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[ $ret -ne 0 ] && exit 255
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shift 2
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opt_live=0
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elif [ "$1" = "--live" ]; then
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opt_live_explicit=1
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shift
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elif [ "$1" = "--no-color" ]; then
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opt_no_color=1
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shift
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elif [ "$1" = "--no-sysfs" ]; then
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opt_no_sysfs=1
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shift
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elif [ "$1" = "--sysfs-only" ]; then
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opt_sysfs_only=1
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shift
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elif [ "$1" = "--coreos" ]; then
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opt_coreos=1
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shift
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elif [ "$1" = "--coreos-within-toolbox" ]; then
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# don't use directly: used internally by --coreos
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opt_coreos=0
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shift
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elif [ "$1" = "--batch" ]; then
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opt_batch=1
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opt_verbose=0
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shift
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case "$1" in
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text|nrpe|json|prometheus) opt_batch_format="$1"; shift;;
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--*) ;; # allow subsequent flags
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'') ;; # allow nothing at all
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*)
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echo "$0: error: unknown batch format '$1'" >&2
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echo "$0: error: --batch expects a format from: text, nrpe, json" >&2
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exit 255
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;;
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esac
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elif [ "$1" = "-v" ] || [ "$1" = "--verbose" ]; then
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opt_verbose=$(( opt_verbose + 1 ))
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shift
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elif [ "$1" = "--variant" ]; then
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if [ -z "$2" ]; then
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echo "$0: error: option --variant expects a parameter (1, 2 or 3)" >&2
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exit 255
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fi
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case "$2" in
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1) opt_variant1=1; opt_allvariants=0;;
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2) opt_variant2=1; opt_allvariants=0;;
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3) opt_variant3=1; opt_allvariants=0;;
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*)
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echo "$0: error: invalid parameter '$2' for --variant, expected either 1, 2 or 3" >&2;
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exit 255
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;;
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esac
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shift 2
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elif [ "$1" = "-h" ] || [ "$1" = "--help" ]; then
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show_header
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show_usage
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exit 0
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elif [ "$1" = "--version" ]; then
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opt_no_color=1
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show_header
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exit 0
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elif [ "$1" = "--disclaimer" ]; then
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show_header
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show_disclaimer
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exit 0
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else
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show_header
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|
show_usage
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echo "$0: error: unknown option '$1'"
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exit 255
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
show_header
|
|
|
|
if [ "$opt_no_sysfs" = 1 ] && [ "$opt_sysfs_only" = 1 ]; then
|
|
_warn "Incompatible options specified (--no-sysfs and --sysfs-only), aborting"
|
|
exit 255
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# print status function
|
|
pstatus()
|
|
{
|
|
if [ "$opt_no_color" = 1 ]; then
|
|
_info_nol "$2"
|
|
else
|
|
case "$1" in
|
|
red) col="\033[41m\033[30m";;
|
|
green) col="\033[42m\033[30m";;
|
|
yellow) col="\033[43m\033[30m";;
|
|
blue) col="\033[44m\033[30m";;
|
|
*) col="";;
|
|
esac
|
|
_info_nol "$col $2 \033[0m"
|
|
fi
|
|
[ -n "$3" ] && _info_nol " ($3)"
|
|
_info
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# Print the final status of a vulnerability (incl. batch mode)
|
|
# Arguments are: CVE UNK/OK/VULN description
|
|
pvulnstatus()
|
|
{
|
|
if [ "$opt_batch" = 1 ]; then
|
|
case "$1" in
|
|
CVE-2017-5753) aka="SPECTRE VARIANT 1";;
|
|
CVE-2017-5715) aka="SPECTRE VARIANT 2";;
|
|
CVE-2017-5754) aka="MELTDOWN";;
|
|
esac
|
|
|
|
case "$opt_batch_format" in
|
|
text) _echo 0 "$1: $2 ($3)";;
|
|
json)
|
|
case "$2" in
|
|
UNK) is_vuln="null";;
|
|
VULN) is_vuln="true";;
|
|
OK) is_vuln="false";;
|
|
esac
|
|
json_output="${json_output:-[}{\"NAME\":\"$aka\",\"CVE\":\"$1\",\"VULNERABLE\":$is_vuln,\"INFOS\":\"$3\"},"
|
|
;;
|
|
|
|
nrpe) [ "$2" = VULN ] && nrpe_vuln="$nrpe_vuln $1";;
|
|
prometheus)
|
|
prometheus_output="${prometheus_output:+$prometheus_output\n}specex_vuln_status{name=\"$aka\",cve=\"$1\",status=\"$2\",info=\"$3\"} 1"
|
|
;;
|
|
esac
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# always fill global_* vars because we use that do decide the program exit code
|
|
case "$2" in
|
|
UNK) global_unknown="1";;
|
|
VULN) global_critical="1";;
|
|
esac
|
|
|
|
# display info if we're not in quiet/batch mode
|
|
vulnstatus="$2"
|
|
shift 2
|
|
_info_nol "> \033[46m\033[30mSTATUS:\033[0m "
|
|
case "$vulnstatus" in
|
|
UNK) pstatus yellow 'UNKNOWN' "$@";;
|
|
VULN) pstatus red 'VULNERABLE' "$@";;
|
|
OK) pstatus green 'NOT VULNERABLE' "$@";;
|
|
esac
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
# The 3 below functions are taken from the extract-linux script, available here:
|
|
# https://github.com/torvalds/linux/blob/master/scripts/extract-vmlinux
|
|
# The functions have been modified for better integration to this script
|
|
# The original header of the file has been retained below
|
|
|
|
# ----------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
# extract-vmlinux - Extract uncompressed vmlinux from a kernel image
|
|
#
|
|
# Inspired from extract-ikconfig
|
|
# (c) 2009,2010 Dick Streefland <dick@streefland.net>
|
|
#
|
|
# (c) 2011 Corentin Chary <corentin.chary@gmail.com>
|
|
#
|
|
# Licensed under the GNU General Public License, version 2 (GPLv2).
|
|
# ----------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
vmlinux=''
|
|
vmlinux_err=''
|
|
check_vmlinux()
|
|
{
|
|
readelf -h "$1" >/dev/null 2>&1 && return 0
|
|
return 1
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
try_decompress()
|
|
{
|
|
# The obscure use of the "tr" filter is to work around older versions of
|
|
# "grep" that report the byte offset of the line instead of the pattern.
|
|
|
|
# Try to find the header ($1) and decompress from here
|
|
for pos in $(tr "$1\n$2" "\n$2=" < "$6" | grep -abo "^$2")
|
|
do
|
|
_debug "try_decompress: magic for $3 found at offset $pos"
|
|
if ! which "$3" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
|
|
vmlinux_err="missing '$3' tool, please install it, usually it's in the '$5' package"
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
pos=${pos%%:*}
|
|
# shellcheck disable=SC2086
|
|
tail -c+$pos "$6" 2>/dev/null | $3 $4 > "$vmlinuxtmp" 2>/dev/null
|
|
if check_vmlinux "$vmlinuxtmp"; then
|
|
vmlinux="$vmlinuxtmp"
|
|
_debug "try_decompress: decompressed with $3 successfully!"
|
|
return 0
|
|
else
|
|
_debug "try_decompress: decompression with $3 did not work"
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
return 1
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
extract_vmlinux()
|
|
{
|
|
[ -n "$1" ] || return 1
|
|
# Prepare temp files:
|
|
vmlinuxtmp="$(mktemp /tmp/vmlinux-XXXXXX)"
|
|
|
|
# Initial attempt for uncompressed images or objects:
|
|
if check_vmlinux "$1"; then
|
|
cat "$1" > "$vmlinuxtmp"
|
|
vmlinux=$vmlinuxtmp
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# That didn't work, so retry after decompression.
|
|
try_decompress '\037\213\010' xy gunzip '' gunzip "$1" && return 0
|
|
try_decompress '\3757zXZ\000' abcde unxz '' xz-utils "$1" && return 0
|
|
try_decompress 'BZh' xy bunzip2 '' bzip2 "$1" && return 0
|
|
try_decompress '\135\0\0\0' xxx unlzma '' xz-utils "$1" && return 0
|
|
try_decompress '\211\114\132' xy 'lzop' '-d' lzop "$1" && return 0
|
|
try_decompress '\002\041\114\030' xyy 'lz4' '-d -l' liblz4-tool "$1" && return 0
|
|
try_decompress '\177ELF' xxy 'cat' '' cat "$1" && return 0
|
|
return 1
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# end of extract-vmlinux functions
|
|
|
|
mount_debugfs()
|
|
{
|
|
if [ ! -e /sys/kernel/debug/sched_features ]; then
|
|
# try to mount the debugfs hierarchy ourselves and remember it to umount afterwards
|
|
mount -t debugfs debugfs /sys/kernel/debug 2>/dev/null && mounted_debugfs=1
|
|
fi
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
load_msr()
|
|
{
|
|
modprobe msr 2>/dev/null && insmod_msr=1
|
|
_debug "attempted to load module msr, insmod_msr=$insmod_msr"
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
load_cpuid()
|
|
{
|
|
modprobe cpuid 2>/dev/null && insmod_cpuid=1
|
|
_debug "attempted to load module cpuid, insmod_cpuid=$insmod_cpuid"
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
read_cpuid()
|
|
{
|
|
_leaf="$1"
|
|
_bytenum="$2"
|
|
_and_operand="$3"
|
|
|
|
if [ ! -e /dev/cpu/0/cpuid ]; then
|
|
# try to load the module ourselves (and remember it so we can rmmod it afterwards)
|
|
load_cpuid
|
|
fi
|
|
if [ ! -e /dev/cpu/0/cpuid ]; then
|
|
return 2
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [ "$opt_verbose" -ge 3 ]; then
|
|
dd if=/dev/cpu/0/cpuid bs=16 skip="$_leaf" iflag=skip_bytes count=1 >/dev/null 2>/dev/null
|
|
_debug "cpuid: reading leaf$_leaf of cpuid on cpu0, ret=$?"
|
|
_debug "cpuid: leaf$_leaf eax-ebx-ecx-edx: $( dd if=/dev/cpu/0/cpuid bs=16 skip="$_leaf" iflag=skip_bytes count=1 2>/dev/null | od -x -A n)"
|
|
_debug "cpuid: leaf$_leaf edx higher byte is: $(dd if=/dev/cpu/0/cpuid bs=16 skip="$_leaf" iflag=skip_bytes count=1 2>/dev/null | dd bs=1 skip="$_bytenum" count=1 2>/dev/null | od -x -A n)"
|
|
fi
|
|
# getting proper byte of edx on leaf$_leaf of cpuinfo in decimal
|
|
_reg_byte=$(dd if=/dev/cpu/0/cpuid bs=16 skip="$_leaf" iflag=skip_bytes count=1 2>/dev/null | dd bs=1 skip="$_bytenum" count=1 2>/dev/null | od -t u1 -A n | awk '{print $1}')
|
|
_debug "cpuid: leaf$_leaf byte $_bytenum: $_reg_byte (decimal)"
|
|
_reg_bit=$(( _reg_byte & _and_operand ))
|
|
_debug "cpuid: leaf$_leaf byte $_bytenum & $_and_operand = $_reg_bit"
|
|
[ "$_reg_bit" -eq 0 ] && return 1
|
|
# $_reg_bit is > 0, so the bit was found: return true (aka 0)
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
dmesg_grep()
|
|
{
|
|
# grep for something in dmesg, ensuring that the dmesg buffer
|
|
# has not been truncated
|
|
dmesg_grepped=''
|
|
if ! dmesg | grep -qE '(^|\] )Linux version [0-9]'; then
|
|
# dmesg truncated
|
|
return 2
|
|
fi
|
|
dmesg_grepped=$(dmesg | grep -E "$1" | head -1)
|
|
# not found:
|
|
[ -z "$dmesg_grepped" ] && return 1
|
|
# found, output is in $dmesg_grepped
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
is_coreos()
|
|
{
|
|
which coreos-install >/dev/null 2>&1 && which toolbox >/dev/null 2>&1 && return 0
|
|
return 1
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
parse_cpu_details()
|
|
{
|
|
[ "$parse_cpu_details_done" = 1 ] && return 0
|
|
cpu_vendor=$( grep '^vendor_id' /proc/cpuinfo | awk '{print $3}' | head -1)
|
|
cpu_friendly_name=$(grep '^model name' /proc/cpuinfo | cut -d: -f2- | head -1 | sed -e 's/^ *//')
|
|
# special case for ARM follows
|
|
if grep -qi 'CPU implementer[[:space:]]*:[[:space:]]*0x41' /proc/cpuinfo; then
|
|
cpu_vendor='ARM'
|
|
# some devices (phones or other) have several ARMs and as such different part numbers,
|
|
# an example is "bigLITTLE", so we need to store the whole list, this is needed for is_cpu_vulnerable
|
|
cpu_part_list=$(awk '/CPU part/ {print $4}' /proc/cpuinfo)
|
|
cpu_arch_list=$(awk '/CPU architecture/ {print $3}' /proc/cpuinfo)
|
|
# take the first one to fill the friendly name, do NOT quote the vars below
|
|
# shellcheck disable=SC2086
|
|
cpu_arch=$(echo $cpu_arch_list | awk '{ print $1 }')
|
|
# shellcheck disable=SC2086
|
|
cpu_part=$(echo $cpu_part_list | awk '{ print $1 }')
|
|
[ "$cpu_arch" = "AArch64" ] && cpu_arch=8
|
|
cpu_friendly_name="ARM"
|
|
[ -n "$cpu_arch" ] && cpu_friendly_name="$cpu_friendly_name v$cpu_arch"
|
|
[ -n "$cpu_part" ] && cpu_friendly_name="$cpu_friendly_name model $cpu_part"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
cpu_family=$( grep '^cpu family' /proc/cpuinfo | awk '{print $4}' | grep -E '^[0-9]+$' | head -1)
|
|
cpu_model=$( grep '^model' /proc/cpuinfo | awk '{print $3}' | grep -E '^[0-9]+$' | head -1)
|
|
cpu_stepping=$(grep '^stepping' /proc/cpuinfo | awk '{print $3}' | grep -E '^[0-9]+$' | head -1)
|
|
cpu_ucode=$( grep '^microcode' /proc/cpuinfo | awk '{print $3}' | head -1)
|
|
|
|
# also define those that we will need in other funcs
|
|
# taken from ttps://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/tree/arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h
|
|
# shellcheck disable=SC2034
|
|
{
|
|
INTEL_FAM6_CORE_YONAH=$(( 0x0E ))
|
|
|
|
INTEL_FAM6_CORE2_MEROM=$(( 0x0F ))
|
|
INTEL_FAM6_CORE2_MEROM_L=$(( 0x16 ))
|
|
INTEL_FAM6_CORE2_PENRYN=$(( 0x17 ))
|
|
INTEL_FAM6_CORE2_DUNNINGTON=$(( 0x1D ))
|
|
|
|
INTEL_FAM6_NEHALEM=$(( 0x1E ))
|
|
INTEL_FAM6_NEHALEM_G=$(( 0x1F ))
|
|
INTEL_FAM6_NEHALEM_EP=$(( 0x1A ))
|
|
INTEL_FAM6_NEHALEM_EX=$(( 0x2E ))
|
|
|
|
INTEL_FAM6_WESTMERE=$(( 0x25 ))
|
|
INTEL_FAM6_WESTMERE_EP=$(( 0x2C ))
|
|
INTEL_FAM6_WESTMERE_EX=$(( 0x2F ))
|
|
|
|
INTEL_FAM6_SANDYBRIDGE=$(( 0x2A ))
|
|
INTEL_FAM6_SANDYBRIDGE_X=$(( 0x2D ))
|
|
INTEL_FAM6_IVYBRIDGE=$(( 0x3A ))
|
|
INTEL_FAM6_IVYBRIDGE_X=$(( 0x3E ))
|
|
|
|
INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_CORE=$(( 0x3C ))
|
|
INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_X=$(( 0x3F ))
|
|
INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_ULT=$(( 0x45 ))
|
|
INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_GT3E=$(( 0x46 ))
|
|
|
|
INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_CORE=$(( 0x3D ))
|
|
INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_GT3E=$(( 0x47 ))
|
|
INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_X=$(( 0x4F ))
|
|
INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_XEON_D=$(( 0x56 ))
|
|
|
|
INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_MOBILE=$(( 0x4E ))
|
|
INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_DESKTOP=$(( 0x5E ))
|
|
INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X=$(( 0x55 ))
|
|
INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_MOBILE=$(( 0x8E ))
|
|
INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_DESKTOP=$(( 0x9E ))
|
|
|
|
# /* "Small Core" Processors (Atom) */
|
|
|
|
INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_PINEVIEW=$(( 0x1C ))
|
|
INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_LINCROFT=$(( 0x26 ))
|
|
INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_PENWELL=$(( 0x27 ))
|
|
INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_CLOVERVIEW=$(( 0x35 ))
|
|
INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_CEDARVIEW=$(( 0x36 ))
|
|
INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SILVERMONT1=$(( 0x37 ))
|
|
INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SILVERMONT2=$(( 0x4D ))
|
|
INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_AIRMONT=$(( 0x4C ))
|
|
INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_MERRIFIELD=$(( 0x4A ))
|
|
INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_MOOREFIELD=$(( 0x5A ))
|
|
INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_GOLDMONT=$(( 0x5C ))
|
|
INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_DENVERTON=$(( 0x5F ))
|
|
INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_GEMINI_LAKE=$(( 0x7A ))
|
|
|
|
# /* Xeon Phi */
|
|
|
|
INTEL_FAM6_XEON_PHI_KNL=$(( 0x57 ))
|
|
INTEL_FAM6_XEON_PHI_KNM=$(( 0x85 ))
|
|
}
|
|
parse_cpu_details_done=1
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
is_ucode_blacklisted()
|
|
{
|
|
parse_cpu_details
|
|
# if it's not an Intel, don't bother: it's not blacklisted
|
|
[ "$cpu_vendor" = GenuineIntel ] || return 1
|
|
# it also needs to be family=6
|
|
[ "$cpu_family" = 6 ] || return 1
|
|
# now, check each known bad microcode
|
|
# source: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/tree/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c#n105
|
|
# 2018-02-08 update: https://newsroom.intel.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/11/2018/02/microcode-update-guidance.pdf
|
|
# model,stepping,microcode
|
|
ucode_found="model $cpu_model stepping $cpu_stepping ucode $cpu_ucode"
|
|
for tuple in \
|
|
$INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_DESKTOP,0x0B,0x80 \
|
|
$INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_DESKTOP,0x0A,0x80 \
|
|
$INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_DESKTOP,0x09,0x80 \
|
|
$INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_MOBILE,0x0A,0x80 \
|
|
$INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_MOBILE,0x09,0x80 \
|
|
$INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X,0x03,0x0100013e \
|
|
$INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X,0x04,0x02000036 \
|
|
$INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X,0x04,0x0200003a \
|
|
$INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X,0x04,0x0200003c \
|
|
$INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_CORE,0x04,0x28 \
|
|
$INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_GT3E,0x01,0x1b \
|
|
$INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_XEON_D,0x02,0x14 \
|
|
$INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_XEON_D,0x03,0x07000011 \
|
|
$INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_X,0x01,0x0b000023 \
|
|
$INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_X,0x01,0x0b000025 \
|
|
$INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_ULT,0x01,0x21 \
|
|
$INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_GT3E,0x01,0x18 \
|
|
$INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_CORE,0x03,0x23 \
|
|
$INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_X,0x02,0x3b \
|
|
$INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_X,0x04,0x10 \
|
|
$INTEL_FAM6_IVYBRIDGE_X,0x04,0x42a \
|
|
$INTEL_FAM6_SANDYBRIDGE_X,0x06,0x61b \
|
|
$INTEL_FAM6_SANDYBRIDGE_X,0x07,0x712
|
|
do
|
|
model=$(echo $tuple | cut -d, -f1)
|
|
stepping=$(( $(echo $tuple | cut -d, -f2) ))
|
|
ucode=$(echo $tuple | cut -d, -f3)
|
|
if [ "$cpu_model" = "$model" ] && [ "$cpu_stepping" = "$stepping" ] && echo "$cpu_ucode" | grep -qi "^$ucode$"; then
|
|
_debug "is_ucode_blacklisted: we have a match! ($cpu_model/$cpu_stepping/$cpu_ucode)"
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
_debug "is_ucode_blacklisted: no ($cpu_model/$cpu_stepping/$cpu_ucode)"
|
|
return 1
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
is_skylake_cpu()
|
|
{
|
|
# is this a skylake cpu?
|
|
# return 0 if yes, 1 otherwise
|
|
#if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL &&
|
|
# boot_cpu_data.x86 == 6) {
|
|
# switch (boot_cpu_data.x86_model) {
|
|
# case INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_MOBILE:
|
|
# case INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_DESKTOP:
|
|
# case INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X:
|
|
# case INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_MOBILE:
|
|
# case INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_DESKTOP:
|
|
# return true;
|
|
parse_cpu_details
|
|
[ "$cpu_vendor" = GenuineIntel ] || return 1
|
|
[ "$cpu_family" = 6 ] || return 1
|
|
if [ "$cpu_model" = $INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_MOBILE ] || \
|
|
[ "$cpu_model" = $INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_DESKTOP ] || \
|
|
[ "$cpu_model" = $INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X ] || \
|
|
[ "$cpu_model" = $INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_MOBILE ] || \
|
|
[ "$cpu_model" = $INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_DESKTOP ]; then
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
return 1
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# check for mode selection inconsistency
|
|
if [ "$opt_live_explicit" = 1 ]; then
|
|
if [ -n "$opt_kernel" ] || [ -n "$opt_config" ] || [ -n "$opt_map" ]; then
|
|
show_usage
|
|
echo "$0: error: incompatible modes specified, use either --live or --kernel/--config/--map" >&2
|
|
exit 255
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# coreos mode
|
|
if [ "$opt_coreos" = 1 ]; then
|
|
if ! is_coreos; then
|
|
_warn "CoreOS mode asked, but we're not under CoreOS!"
|
|
exit 255
|
|
fi
|
|
_warn "CoreOS mode, starting an ephemeral toolbox to launch the script"
|
|
load_msr
|
|
load_cpuid
|
|
mount_debugfs
|
|
toolbox --ephemeral --bind-ro /dev/cpu:/dev/cpu -- sh -c "dnf install -y binutils which && /media/root$PWD/$0 $* --coreos-within-toolbox"
|
|
exitcode=$?
|
|
exit $exitcode
|
|
else
|
|
if is_coreos; then
|
|
_warn "You seem to be running CoreOS, you might want to use the --coreos option for better results"
|
|
_warn
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
parse_cpu_details
|
|
if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
|
|
# root check (only for live mode, for offline mode, we already checked if we could read the files)
|
|
if [ "$(id -u)" -ne 0 ]; then
|
|
_warn "Note that you should launch this script with root privileges to get accurate information."
|
|
_warn "We'll proceed but you might see permission denied errors."
|
|
_warn "To run it as root, you can try the following command: sudo $0"
|
|
_warn
|
|
fi
|
|
_info "Checking for vulnerabilities on current system"
|
|
_info "Kernel is \033[35m$(uname -s) $(uname -r) $(uname -v) $(uname -m)\033[0m"
|
|
_info "CPU is \033[35m$cpu_friendly_name\033[0m"
|
|
|
|
# try to find the image of the current running kernel
|
|
# first, look for the BOOT_IMAGE hint in the kernel cmdline
|
|
if [ -r /proc/cmdline ] && grep -q 'BOOT_IMAGE=' /proc/cmdline; then
|
|
opt_kernel=$(grep -Eo 'BOOT_IMAGE=[^ ]+' /proc/cmdline | cut -d= -f2)
|
|
_debug "found opt_kernel=$opt_kernel in /proc/cmdline"
|
|
# if we have a dedicated /boot partition, our bootloader might have just called it /
|
|
# so try to prepend /boot and see if we find anything
|
|
[ -e "/boot/$opt_kernel" ] && opt_kernel="/boot/$opt_kernel"
|
|
# special case for CoreOS if we're inside the toolbox
|
|
[ -e "/media/root/boot/$opt_kernel" ] && opt_kernel="/media/root/boot/$opt_kernel"
|
|
_debug "opt_kernel is now $opt_kernel"
|
|
# else, the full path is already there (most probably /boot/something)
|
|
fi
|
|
# if we didn't find a kernel, default to guessing
|
|
if [ ! -e "$opt_kernel" ]; then
|
|
# Fedora:
|
|
[ -e "/lib/modules/$(uname -r)/vmlinuz" ] && opt_kernel="/lib/modules/$(uname -r)/vmlinuz"
|
|
# Slackare:
|
|
[ -e "/boot/vmlinuz" ] && opt_kernel="/boot/vmlinuz"
|
|
# Arch:
|
|
[ -e "/boot/vmlinuz-linux" ] && opt_kernel="/boot/vmlinuz-linux"
|
|
# Linux-Libre:
|
|
[ -e "/boot/vmlinuz-linux-libre" ] && opt_kernel="/boot/vmlinuz-linux-libre"
|
|
# generic:
|
|
[ -e "/boot/vmlinuz-$(uname -r)" ] && opt_kernel="/boot/vmlinuz-$(uname -r)"
|
|
[ -e "/boot/kernel-$( uname -r)" ] && opt_kernel="/boot/kernel-$( uname -r)"
|
|
[ -e "/boot/bzImage-$(uname -r)" ] && opt_kernel="/boot/bzImage-$(uname -r)"
|
|
# Gentoo:
|
|
[ -e "/boot/kernel-genkernel-$(uname -m)-$(uname -r)" ] && opt_kernel="/boot/kernel-genkernel-$(uname -m)-$(uname -r)"
|
|
# NixOS:
|
|
[ -e "/run/booted-system/kernel" ] && opt_kernel="/run/booted-system/kernel"
|
|
# systemd kernel-install:
|
|
[ -e "/etc/machine-id" ] && [ -e "/boot/$(cat /etc/machine-id)/$(uname -r)/linux" ] && opt_kernel="/boot/$(cat /etc/machine-id)/$(uname -r)/linux"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# system.map
|
|
if [ -e /proc/kallsyms ] ; then
|
|
opt_map=/proc/kallsyms
|
|
elif [ -e "/lib/modules/$(uname -r)/System.map" ] ; then
|
|
opt_map="/lib/modules/$(uname -r)/System.map"
|
|
elif [ -e "/boot/System.map-$(uname -r)" ] ; then
|
|
opt_map="/boot/System.map-$(uname -r)"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# config
|
|
if [ -e /proc/config.gz ] ; then
|
|
dumped_config="$(mktemp /tmp/config-XXXXXX)"
|
|
gunzip -c /proc/config.gz > "$dumped_config"
|
|
# dumped_config will be deleted at the end of the script
|
|
opt_config="$dumped_config"
|
|
elif [ -e "/lib/modules/$(uname -r)/config" ]; then
|
|
opt_config="/lib/modules/$(uname -r)/config"
|
|
elif [ -e "/boot/config-$(uname -r)" ]; then
|
|
opt_config="/boot/config-$(uname -r)"
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
_info "Checking for vulnerabilities against specified kernel"
|
|
_info "CPU is \033[35m$cpu_friendly_name\033[0m"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [ -n "$opt_kernel" ]; then
|
|
_verbose "Will use vmlinux image \033[35m$opt_kernel\033[0m"
|
|
else
|
|
_verbose "Will use no vmlinux image (accuracy might be reduced)"
|
|
bad_accuracy=1
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [ -n "$opt_config" ] && ! grep -q '^CONFIG_' "$opt_config"; then
|
|
# given file is invalid!
|
|
_warn "The kernel config file seems invalid, was expecting a plain-text file, ignoring it!"
|
|
opt_config=''
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [ -n "$dumped_config" ] && [ -n "$opt_config" ]; then
|
|
_verbose "Will use kconfig \033[35m/proc/config.gz (decompressed)\033[0m"
|
|
elif [ -n "$opt_config" ]; then
|
|
_verbose "Will use kconfig \033[35m$opt_config\033[0m"
|
|
else
|
|
_verbose "Will use no kconfig (accuracy might be reduced)"
|
|
bad_accuracy=1
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [ -n "$opt_map" ]; then
|
|
_verbose "Will use System.map file \033[35m$opt_map\033[0m"
|
|
else
|
|
_verbose "Will use no System.map file (accuracy might be reduced)"
|
|
bad_accuracy=1
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [ "$bad_accuracy" = 1 ]; then
|
|
_info "We're missing some kernel info (see -v), accuracy might be reduced"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [ -e "$opt_kernel" ]; then
|
|
if ! which readelf >/dev/null 2>&1; then
|
|
_debug "readelf not found"
|
|
vmlinux_err="missing 'readelf' tool, please install it, usually it's in the 'binutils' package"
|
|
elif [ "$opt_sysfs_only" = 1 ]; then
|
|
vmlinux_err='kernel image decompression skipped'
|
|
else
|
|
extract_vmlinux "$opt_kernel"
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
_debug "no opt_kernel defined"
|
|
vmlinux_err="couldn't find your kernel image in /boot, if you used netboot, this is normal"
|
|
fi
|
|
if [ -z "$vmlinux" ] || [ ! -r "$vmlinux" ]; then
|
|
[ -z "$vmlinux_err" ] && vmlinux_err="couldn't extract your kernel from $opt_kernel"
|
|
else
|
|
vmlinux_version=$(strings "$vmlinux" 2>/dev/null | grep '^Linux version ' | head -1)
|
|
if [ -z "$vmlinux_version" ]; then
|
|
# try harder with some kernels (such as Red Hat) that don't have ^Linux version before their version string
|
|
vmlinux_version=$(strings "$vmlinux" 2>/dev/null | grep -E '^[[:alnum:]][^[:space:]]+ \([^[:space:]]+\) #[0-9]+ .+ (19|20)[0-9][0-9]$' | head -1)
|
|
fi
|
|
if [ -n "$vmlinux_version" ]; then
|
|
# in live mode, check if the img we found is the correct one
|
|
if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
|
|
_verbose "Kernel image is \033[35m$vmlinux_version"
|
|
if ! echo "$vmlinux_version" | grep -qF "$(uname -r)" || \
|
|
! echo "$vmlinux_version" | grep -qF "$(uname -v)"; then
|
|
_warn "Possible disrepancy between your running kernel and the image we found ($opt_kernel), results might be incorrect"
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
_info "Kernel image is \033[35m$vmlinux_version"
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
_verbose "Kernel image version is unknown"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
_info
|
|
|
|
# end of header stuff
|
|
|
|
# now we define some util functions and the check_*() funcs, as
|
|
# the user can choose to execute only some of those
|
|
|
|
sys_interface_check()
|
|
{
|
|
[ "$opt_live" = 1 ] && [ "$opt_no_sysfs" = 0 ] && [ -r "$1" ] || return 1
|
|
_info_nol "* Mitigated according to the /sys interface: "
|
|
if grep -qi '^not affected' "$1"; then
|
|
# Not affected
|
|
status=OK
|
|
pstatus green YES "kernel confirms that your CPU is unaffected"
|
|
elif grep -qi '^mitigation' "$1"; then
|
|
# Mitigation: PTI
|
|
status=OK
|
|
pstatus green YES "kernel confirms that the mitigation is active"
|
|
elif grep -qi '^vulnerable' "$1"; then
|
|
# Vulnerable
|
|
status=VULN
|
|
pstatus red NO "kernel confirms your system is vulnerable"
|
|
else
|
|
status=UNK
|
|
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "unknown value reported by kernel"
|
|
fi
|
|
msg=$(cat "$1")
|
|
_debug "sys_interface_check: $1=$msg"
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
check_cpu()
|
|
{
|
|
_info "\033[1;34mHardware check\033[0m"
|
|
|
|
_info "* Hardware support (CPU microcode) for mitigation techniques"
|
|
_info " * Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation (IBRS)"
|
|
_info_nol " * SPEC_CTRL MSR is available: "
|
|
if [ ! -e /dev/cpu/0/msr ]; then
|
|
# try to load the module ourselves (and remember it so we can rmmod it afterwards)
|
|
load_msr
|
|
fi
|
|
if [ ! -e /dev/cpu/0/msr ]; then
|
|
spec_ctrl_msr=-1
|
|
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't read /dev/cpu/0/msr, is msr support enabled in your kernel?"
|
|
else
|
|
# the new MSR 'SPEC_CTRL' is at offset 0x48
|
|
# here we use dd, it's the same as using 'rdmsr 0x48' but without needing the rdmsr tool
|
|
# if we get a read error, the MSR is not there. bs has to be 8 for msr
|
|
# skip=9 because 8*9=72=0x48
|
|
dd if=/dev/cpu/0/msr of=/dev/null bs=8 count=1 skip=9 2>/dev/null; ret=$?
|
|
if [ $ret -eq 0 ]; then
|
|
spec_ctrl_msr=1
|
|
pstatus green YES
|
|
else
|
|
spec_ctrl_msr=0
|
|
pstatus red NO
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
_info_nol " * CPU indicates IBRS capability: "
|
|
# from kernel src: { X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL, CPUID_EDX,26, 0x00000007, 0 },
|
|
read_cpuid 7 15 4; ret=$?
|
|
if [ $ret -eq 0 ]; then
|
|
pstatus green YES "SPEC_CTRL feature bit"
|
|
cpuid_spec_ctrl=1
|
|
elif [ $ret -eq 2 ]; then
|
|
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't read /dev/cpu/0/cpuid, is cpuid support enabled in your kernel?"
|
|
else
|
|
pstatus red NO
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# hardware support according to kernel
|
|
if [ "$opt_verbose" -ge 2 ]; then
|
|
# the spec_ctrl flag in cpuinfo is set if and only if the kernel sees
|
|
# that the spec_ctrl cpuinfo bit set. we already check that ourselves above
|
|
# but let's check it anyway (in verbose mode only)
|
|
_verbose_nol " * Kernel has set the spec_ctrl flag in cpuinfo: "
|
|
if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
|
|
if grep ^flags /proc/cpuinfo | grep -qw spec_ctrl; then
|
|
pstatus green YES
|
|
else
|
|
pstatus blue NO
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
pstatus blue N/A "not testable in offline mode"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# IBPB
|
|
_info " * Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier (IBPB)"
|
|
_info_nol " * PRED_CMD MSR is available: "
|
|
if [ ! -e /dev/cpu/0/msr ]; then
|
|
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't read /dev/cpu/0/msr, is msr support enabled in your kernel?"
|
|
else
|
|
# the new MSR 'PRED_CTRL' is at offset 0x49, write-only
|
|
# here we use dd, it's the same as using 'wrmsr 0x49 0' but without needing the wrmsr tool
|
|
# if we get a write error, the MSR is not there
|
|
$echo_cmd -ne "\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0" | dd of=/dev/cpu/0/msr bs=8 count=1 seek=73 oflag=seek_bytes 2>/dev/null; ret=$?
|
|
if [ $ret -eq 0 ]; then
|
|
pstatus green YES
|
|
else
|
|
pstatus red NO
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
|
|
_info_nol " * CPU indicates IBPB capability: "
|
|
# CPUID EAX=0x80000008, ECX=0x00 return EBX[12] indicates support for just IBPB.
|
|
read_cpuid 2147483656 5 16; ret=$?
|
|
if [ $ret -eq 0 ]; then
|
|
pstatus green YES "IBPB_SUPPORT feature bit"
|
|
elif [ "$cpuid_spec_ctrl" = 1 ]; then
|
|
pstatus green YES "SPEC_CTRL feature bit"
|
|
elif [ $ret -eq 2 ]; then
|
|
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't read /dev/cpu/0/cpuid, is cpuid support enabled in your kernel?"
|
|
else
|
|
pstatus red NO
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# STIBP
|
|
_info " * Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors (STIBP)"
|
|
_info_nol " * SPEC_CTRL MSR is available: "
|
|
if [ "$spec_ctrl_msr" = 1 ]; then
|
|
pstatus green YES
|
|
elif [ "$spec_ctrl_msr" = 0 ]; then
|
|
pstatus red NO
|
|
else
|
|
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't read /dev/cpu/0/msr, is msr support enabled in your kernel?"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
_info_nol " * CPU indicates STIBP capability: "
|
|
# A processor supports STIBP if it enumerates CPUID (EAX=7H,ECX=0):EDX[27] as 1
|
|
read_cpuid 7 15 8; ret=$?
|
|
if [ $ret -eq 0 ]; then
|
|
pstatus green YES
|
|
elif [ $ret -eq 2 ]; then
|
|
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't read /dev/cpu/0/cpuid, is cpuid support enabled in your kernel?"
|
|
else
|
|
pstatus red NO
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
_info " * Enhanced IBRS (IBRS_ALL)"
|
|
_info_nol " * CPU indicates ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR availability: "
|
|
cpuid_arch_capabilities=-1
|
|
# A processor supports STIBP if it enumerates CPUID (EAX=7H,ECX=0):EDX[27] as 1
|
|
read_cpuid 7 15 32; ret=$?
|
|
if [ $ret -eq 0 ]; then
|
|
pstatus green YES
|
|
cpuid_arch_capabilities=1
|
|
elif [ $ret -eq 2 ]; then
|
|
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't read /dev/cpu/0/cpuid, is cpuid support enabled in your kernel?"
|
|
else
|
|
pstatus red NO
|
|
cpuid_arch_capabilities=0
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
_info_nol " * ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR advertises IBRS_ALL capability: "
|
|
capabilities_rdcl_no=-1
|
|
capabilities_ibrs_all=-1
|
|
if [ "$cpuid_arch_capabilities" = -1 ]; then
|
|
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN
|
|
elif [ "$cpuid_arch_capabilities" != 1 ]; then
|
|
capabilities_rdcl_no=0
|
|
capabilities_ibrs_all=0
|
|
pstatus red NO
|
|
elif [ ! -e /dev/cpu/0/msr ]; then
|
|
spec_ctrl_msr=-1
|
|
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't read /dev/cpu/0/msr, is msr support enabled in your kernel?"
|
|
else
|
|
# the new MSR 'ARCH_CAPABILITIES' is at offset 0x10a
|
|
# here we use dd, it's the same as using 'rdmsr 0x10a' but without needing the rdmsr tool
|
|
# if we get a read error, the MSR is not there. bs has to be 8 for msr
|
|
capabilities=$(dd if=/dev/cpu/0/msr bs=8 count=1 skip=266 iflag=skip_bytes 2>/dev/null | od -t u1 -A n | awk '{print $8}'); ret=$?
|
|
capabilities_rdcl_no=0
|
|
capabilities_ibrs_all=0
|
|
if [ $ret -eq 0 ]; then
|
|
_debug "capabilities MSR lower byte is $capabilities (decimal)"
|
|
[ $(( capabilities & 1 )) -eq 1 ] && capabilities_rdcl_no=1
|
|
[ $(( capabilities & 2 )) -eq 2 ] && capabilities_ibrs_all=1
|
|
_debug "capabilities says rdcl_no=$capabilities_rdcl_no ibrs_all=$capabilities_ibrs_all"
|
|
if [ "$capabilities_ibrs_all" = 1 ]; then
|
|
pstatus green YES
|
|
else
|
|
pstatus red NO
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
_info_nol " * CPU explicitly indicates not being vulnerable to Meltdown (RDCL_NO): "
|
|
if [ "$capabilities_rdcl_no" = -1 ]; then
|
|
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN
|
|
elif [ "$capabilities_rdcl_no" = 1 ]; then
|
|
pstatus green YES
|
|
else
|
|
pstatus blue NO
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
_info_nol " * CPU microcode is known to cause stability problems: "
|
|
if is_ucode_blacklisted; then
|
|
pstatus red YES "$ucode_found"
|
|
_warn
|
|
_warn "The microcode your CPU is running on is known to cause instability problems,"
|
|
_warn "such as intempestive reboots or random crashes."
|
|
_warn "You are advised to either revert to a previous microcode version (that might not have"
|
|
_warn "the mitigations for Spectre), or upgrade to a newer one if available."
|
|
_warn
|
|
else
|
|
pstatus blue NO "$ucode_found"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
_info "* CPU vulnerability to the three speculative execution attacks variants"
|
|
for v in 1 2 3; do
|
|
_info_nol " * Vulnerable to Variant $v: "
|
|
if is_cpu_vulnerable $v; then
|
|
pstatus red YES
|
|
else
|
|
pstatus green NO
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
|
|
_info
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
check_redhat_canonical_spectre()
|
|
{
|
|
# if we were already called, don't do it again
|
|
[ -n "$redhat_canonical_spectre" ] && return
|
|
|
|
if ! which strings >/dev/null 2>&1; then
|
|
redhat_canonical_spectre=-1
|
|
else
|
|
# Red Hat / Ubuntu specific variant1 patch is difficult to detect,
|
|
# let's use the same way than the official Red Hat detection script,
|
|
# and detect their specific variant2 patch. If it's present, it means
|
|
# that the variant1 patch is also present (both were merged at the same time)
|
|
if strings "$vmlinux" | grep -qw noibrs && strings "$vmlinux" | grep -qw noibpb; then
|
|
_debug "found redhat/canonical version of the variant2 patch (implies variant1)"
|
|
redhat_canonical_spectre=1
|
|
else
|
|
redhat_canonical_spectre=0
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
###################
|
|
# SPECTRE VARIANT 1
|
|
check_variant1()
|
|
{
|
|
_info "\033[1;34mCVE-2017-5753 [bounds check bypass] aka 'Spectre Variant 1'\033[0m"
|
|
|
|
status=UNK
|
|
sys_interface_available=0
|
|
msg=''
|
|
if sys_interface_check "/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v1"; then
|
|
# this kernel has the /sys interface, trust it over everything
|
|
# v0.33+: don't. some kernels have backported the array_index_mask_nospec() workaround without
|
|
# modifying the vulnerabilities/spectre_v1 file. that's bad. we can't trust it when it says Vulnerable :(
|
|
# see "silent backport" detection at the bottom of this func
|
|
sys_interface_available=1
|
|
fi
|
|
if [ "$opt_sysfs_only" != 1 ]; then
|
|
# no /sys interface (or offline mode), fallback to our own ways
|
|
_info_nol "* Kernel has array_index_mask_nospec: "
|
|
# vanilla: look for the Linus' mask aka array_index_mask_nospec()
|
|
# that is inlined at least in raw_copy_from_user (__get_user_X symbols)
|
|
#mov PER_CPU_VAR(current_task), %_ASM_DX
|
|
#cmp TASK_addr_limit(%_ASM_DX),%_ASM_AX
|
|
#jae bad_get_user
|
|
# /* array_index_mask_nospec() are the 2 opcodes that follow */
|
|
#+sbb %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_DX
|
|
#+and %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_AX
|
|
#ASM_STAC
|
|
# x86 64bits: jae(0x0f 0x83 0x?? 0x?? 0x?? 0x??) sbb(0x48 0x19 0xd2) and(0x48 0x21 0xd0)
|
|
# x86 32bits: cmp(0x3b 0x82 0x?? 0x?? 0x00 0x00) jae(0x73 0x??) sbb(0x19 0xd2) and(0x21 0xd0)
|
|
if [ -n "$vmlinux_err" ]; then
|
|
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't check ($vmlinux_err)"
|
|
elif ! which perl >/dev/null 2>&1; then
|
|
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "missing 'perl' binary, please install it"
|
|
else
|
|
perl -ne '/\x0f\x83....\x48\x19\xd2\x48\x21\xd0/ and $found++; END { exit($found) }' "$vmlinux"; ret=$?
|
|
if [ $ret -gt 0 ]; then
|
|
pstatus green YES "$ret occurence(s) found of 64 bits array_index_mask_nospec()"
|
|
v1_mask_nospec=1
|
|
else
|
|
perl -ne '/\x3b\x82..\x00\x00\x73.\x19\xd2\x21\xd0/ and $found++; END { exit($found) }' "$vmlinux"; ret=$?
|
|
if [ $ret -gt 0 ]; then
|
|
pstatus green YES "$ret occurence(s) found of 32 bits array_index_mask_nospec()"
|
|
v1_mask_nospec=1
|
|
else
|
|
pstatus red NO
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
_info_nol "* Kernel has the Red Hat/Ubuntu patch: "
|
|
check_redhat_canonical_spectre
|
|
if [ "$redhat_canonical_spectre" = -1 ]; then
|
|
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "missing 'strings' tool, please install it, usually it's in the binutils package"
|
|
elif [ "$redhat_canonical_spectre" = 1 ]; then
|
|
pstatus green YES
|
|
else
|
|
pstatus red NO
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [ "$opt_verbose" -ge 2 ] || ( [ "$v1_mask_nospec" != 1 ] && [ "$redhat_canonical_spectre" != 1 ] ); then
|
|
# this is a slow heuristic and we don't need it if we already know the kernel is patched
|
|
# but still show it in verbose mode
|
|
_info_nol "* Checking count of LFENCE instructions following a jump in kernel... "
|
|
if [ -n "$vmlinux_err" ]; then
|
|
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't check ($vmlinux_err)"
|
|
else
|
|
if ! which objdump >/dev/null 2>&1; then
|
|
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "missing 'objdump' tool, please install it, usually it's in the binutils package"
|
|
else
|
|
# here we disassemble the kernel and count the number of occurrences of the LFENCE opcode
|
|
# in non-patched kernels, this has been empirically determined as being around 40-50
|
|
# in patched kernels, this is more around 70-80, sometimes way higher (100+)
|
|
# v0.13: 68 found in a 3.10.23-xxxx-std-ipv6-64 (with lots of modules compiled-in directly), which doesn't have the LFENCE patches,
|
|
# so let's push the threshold to 70.
|
|
# v0.33+: now only count lfence opcodes after a jump, way less error-prone
|
|
# non patched kernel have between 0 and 20 matches, patched ones have at least 40-45
|
|
nb_lfence=$(objdump -d "$vmlinux" | grep -w -B1 lfence | grep -Ewc 'jmp|jne|je')
|
|
if [ "$nb_lfence" -lt 30 ]; then
|
|
pstatus red NO "only $nb_lfence jump-then-lfence instructions found, should be >= 30 (heuristic)"
|
|
else
|
|
v1_lfence=1
|
|
pstatus green YES "$nb_lfence jump-then-lfence instructions found, which is >= 30 (heuristic)"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
# we have no sysfs but were asked to use it only!
|
|
msg="/sys vulnerability interface use forced, but it's not available!"
|
|
status=UNK
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# report status
|
|
cve='CVE-2017-5753'
|
|
if ! is_cpu_vulnerable 1; then
|
|
# override status & msg in case CPU is not vulnerable after all
|
|
pvulnstatus $cve OK "your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not vulnerable"
|
|
elif [ -z "$msg" ]; then
|
|
# if msg is empty, sysfs check didn't fill it, rely on our own test
|
|
if [ "$v1_mask_nospec" = 1 ]; then
|
|
pvulnstatus $cve OK "Kernel source has been patched to mitigate the vulnerability (array_index_mask_nospec)"
|
|
elif [ "$redhat_canonical_spectre" = 1 ]; then
|
|
pvulnstatus $cve OK "Kernel source has been patched to mitigate the vulnerability (Red Hat/Ubuntu patch)"
|
|
elif [ "$v1_lfence" = 1 ]; then
|
|
pvulnstatus $cve OK "Kernel source has PROBABLY been patched to mitigate the vulnerability (jump-then-lfence instructions heuristic)"
|
|
elif [ "$vmlinux_err" ]; then
|
|
pvulnstatus $cve UNK "Couldn't find kernel image or tools missing to execute the checks"
|
|
else
|
|
pvulnstatus $cve VULN "Kernel source needs to be patched to mitigate the vulnerability"
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
if [ "$msg" = "Vulnerable" ] && [ "$v1_mask_nospec" = 1 ]; then
|
|
pvulnstatus $cve OK "Kernel source has been patched to mitigate the vulnerability (silent backport of array_index_mask_nospec)"
|
|
else
|
|
[ "$msg" = "Vulnerable" ] && msg="Kernel source needs to be patched to mitigate the vulnerability"
|
|
pvulnstatus $cve "$status" "$msg"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
###################
|
|
# SPECTRE VARIANT 2
|
|
check_variant2()
|
|
{
|
|
_info "\033[1;34mCVE-2017-5715 [branch target injection] aka 'Spectre Variant 2'\033[0m"
|
|
|
|
status=UNK
|
|
sys_interface_available=0
|
|
msg=''
|
|
if sys_interface_check "/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2"; then
|
|
# this kernel has the /sys interface, trust it over everything
|
|
sys_interface_available=1
|
|
fi
|
|
if [ "$opt_sysfs_only" != 1 ]; then
|
|
_info "* Mitigation 1"
|
|
_info_nol " * Kernel is compiled with IBRS/IBPB support: "
|
|
ibrs_can_tell=0
|
|
|
|
if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
|
|
ibrs_can_tell=1
|
|
mount_debugfs
|
|
for dir in \
|
|
/sys/kernel/debug \
|
|
/sys/kernel/debug/x86 \
|
|
/proc/sys/kernel; do
|
|
if [ -e "$dir/ibrs_enabled" ]; then
|
|
# if the file is there, we have IBRS compiled-in
|
|
# /sys/kernel/debug/ibrs_enabled: vanilla
|
|
# /sys/kernel/debug/x86/ibrs_enabled: Red Hat (see https://access.redhat.com/articles/3311301)
|
|
# /proc/sys/kernel/ibrs_enabled: OpenSUSE tumbleweed
|
|
pstatus green YES
|
|
ibrs_knob_dir=$dir
|
|
ibrs_supported=1
|
|
ibrs_enabled=$(cat "$dir/ibrs_enabled" 2>/dev/null)
|
|
_debug "ibrs: found $dir/ibrs_enabled=$ibrs_enabled"
|
|
if [ -e "$dir/ibpb_enabled" ]; then
|
|
ibpb_enabled=$(cat "$dir/ibpb_enabled" 2>/dev/null)
|
|
_debug "ibpb: found $dir/ibpb_enabled=$ibpb_enabled"
|
|
else
|
|
ibpb_enabled=-1
|
|
_debug "ibpb: no ibpb_enabled file in $dir"
|
|
fi
|
|
break
|
|
else
|
|
_debug "ibrs: $dir/ibrs_enabled file doesn't exist"
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
# on some newer kernels, the spec_ctrl_ibrs flag in /proc/cpuinfo
|
|
# is set when ibrs has been administratively enabled (usually from cmdline)
|
|
# which in that case means ibrs is supported *and* enabled for kernel & user
|
|
# as per the ibrs patch series v3
|
|
if [ "$ibrs_supported" = 0 ]; then
|
|
if grep ^flags /proc/cpuinfo | grep -qw spec_ctrl_ibrs; then
|
|
_debug "ibrs: found spec_ctrl_ibrs flag in /proc/cpuinfo"
|
|
ibrs_supported=1
|
|
# enabled=2 -> kernel & user
|
|
ibrs_enabled=2
|
|
# XXX and what about ibpb ?
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
if [ "$ibrs_supported" != 1 ] && [ -n "$opt_map" ]; then
|
|
ibrs_can_tell=1
|
|
if grep -q spec_ctrl "$opt_map"; then
|
|
pstatus green YES
|
|
ibrs_supported=1
|
|
_debug "ibrs: found '*spec_ctrl*' symbol in $opt_map"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
if [ "$ibrs_supported" != 1 ]; then
|
|
check_redhat_canonical_spectre
|
|
if [ "$redhat_canonical_spectre" = 1 ]; then
|
|
pstatus green YES "Red Hat/Ubuntu patch"
|
|
ibrs_supported=1
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
if [ "$ibrs_supported" != 1 ]; then
|
|
if [ "$ibrs_can_tell" = 1 ]; then
|
|
pstatus red NO
|
|
else
|
|
# if we're in offline mode without System.map, we can't really know
|
|
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "in offline mode, we need System.map to be able to tell"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
_info " * Currently enabled features"
|
|
_info_nol " * IBRS enabled for Kernel space: "
|
|
if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
|
|
if [ "$ibpb_enabled" = 2 ]; then
|
|
# if ibpb=2, ibrs is forcefully=0
|
|
pstatus blue NO "IBPB used instead of IBRS in all kernel entrypoints"
|
|
else
|
|
# 0 means disabled
|
|
# 1 is enabled only for kernel space
|
|
# 2 is enabled for kernel and user space
|
|
case "$ibrs_enabled" in
|
|
"")
|
|
if [ "$ibrs_supported" = 1 ]; then
|
|
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN
|
|
else
|
|
pstatus red NO
|
|
fi
|
|
;;
|
|
0)
|
|
pstatus red NO
|
|
_verbose " - To enable, \`echo 1 > $ibrs_knob_dir/ibrs_enabled' as root. If you don't have hardware support, you'll get an error."
|
|
;;
|
|
1 | 2) pstatus green YES;;
|
|
*) pstatus yellow UNKNOWN;;
|
|
esac
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
pstatus blue N/A "not testable in offline mode"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
_info_nol " * IBRS enabled for User space: "
|
|
if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
|
|
if [ "$ibpb_enabled" = 2 ]; then
|
|
# if ibpb=2, ibrs is forcefully=0
|
|
pstatus blue NO "IBPB used instead of IBRS in all kernel entrypoints"
|
|
else
|
|
case "$ibrs_enabled" in
|
|
"")
|
|
if [ "$ibrs_supported" = 1 ]; then
|
|
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN
|
|
else
|
|
pstatus red NO
|
|
fi
|
|
;;
|
|
0 | 1)
|
|
pstatus red NO
|
|
_verbose " - To enable, \`echo 2 > $ibrs_knob_dir/ibrs_enabled' as root. If you don't have hardware support, you'll get an error."
|
|
;;
|
|
2) pstatus green YES;;
|
|
*) pstatus yellow UNKNOWN;;
|
|
esac
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
pstatus blue N/A "not testable in offline mode"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
_info_nol " * IBPB enabled: "
|
|
if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
|
|
case "$ibpb_enabled" in
|
|
"")
|
|
if [ "$ibrs_supported" = 1 ]; then
|
|
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN
|
|
else
|
|
pstatus red NO
|
|
fi
|
|
;;
|
|
0)
|
|
pstatus red NO
|
|
_verbose " - To enable, \`echo 1 > $ibrs_knob_dir/ibpb_enabled' as root. If you don't have hardware support, you'll get an error."
|
|
;;
|
|
1) pstatus green YES;;
|
|
2) pstatus green YES "IBPB used instead of IBRS in all kernel entrypoints";;
|
|
*) pstatus yellow UNKNOWN;;
|
|
esac
|
|
else
|
|
pstatus blue N/A "not testable in offline mode"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
_info "* Mitigation 2"
|
|
_info_nol " * Kernel compiled with retpoline option: "
|
|
# We check the RETPOLINE kernel options
|
|
if [ -r "$opt_config" ]; then
|
|
if grep -q '^CONFIG_RETPOLINE=y' "$opt_config"; then
|
|
pstatus green YES
|
|
retpoline=1
|
|
# shellcheck disable=SC2046
|
|
_debug 'retpoline: found '$(grep '^CONFIG_RETPOLINE' "$opt_config")" in $opt_config"
|
|
else
|
|
pstatus red NO
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't read your kernel configuration"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
_info_nol " * Kernel compiled with a retpoline-aware compiler: "
|
|
# Now check if the compiler used to compile the kernel knows how to insert retpolines in generated asm
|
|
# For gcc, this is -mindirect-branch=thunk-extern (detected by the kernel makefiles)
|
|
# See gcc commit https://github.com/hjl-tools/gcc/commit/23b517d4a67c02d3ef80b6109218f2aadad7bd79
|
|
# In latest retpoline LKML patches, the noretpoline_setup symbol exists only if CONFIG_RETPOLINE is set
|
|
# *AND* if the compiler is retpoline-compliant, so look for that symbol
|
|
if [ -e "/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2" ]; then
|
|
if grep -qw Minimal /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2; then
|
|
pstatus red NO "kernel reports minimal retpoline compilation"
|
|
elif grep -qw Full /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2; then
|
|
retpoline_compiler=1
|
|
pstatus green YES "kernel reports full retpoline compilation"
|
|
else
|
|
if [ "$retpoline" = 1 ]; then
|
|
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN
|
|
else
|
|
pstatus red NO
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
elif [ -n "$opt_map" ]; then
|
|
# look for the symbol
|
|
if grep -qw noretpoline_setup "$opt_map"; then
|
|
retpoline_compiler=1
|
|
pstatus green YES "noretpoline_setup symbol found in System.map"
|
|
else
|
|
if [ "$retpoline" = 1 ]; then
|
|
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN
|
|
else
|
|
pstatus red NO
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
elif [ -n "$vmlinux" ]; then
|
|
# look for the symbol
|
|
if which nm >/dev/null 2>&1; then
|
|
# the proper way: use nm and look for the symbol
|
|
if nm "$vmlinux" 2>/dev/null | grep -qw 'noretpoline_setup'; then
|
|
retpoline_compiler=1
|
|
pstatus green YES "noretpoline_setup found in vmlinux symbols"
|
|
else
|
|
if [ "$retpoline" = 1 ]; then
|
|
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN
|
|
else
|
|
pstatus red NO
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
elif grep -q noretpoline_setup "$vmlinux"; then
|
|
# if we don't have nm, nevermind, the symbol name is long enough to not have
|
|
# any false positive using good old grep directly on the binary
|
|
retpoline_compiler=1
|
|
pstatus green YES "noretpoline_setup found in vmlinux"
|
|
else
|
|
if [ "$retpoline" = 1 ]; then
|
|
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN
|
|
else
|
|
pstatus red NO
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
if [ "$retpoline" = 1 ]; then
|
|
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't find your kernel image or System.map"
|
|
else
|
|
pstatus red NO
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
elif [ "$sys_interface_available" = 0 ]; then
|
|
# we have no sysfs but were asked to use it only!
|
|
msg="/sys vulnerability interface use forced, but it's not available!"
|
|
status=UNK
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
cve='CVE-2017-5715'
|
|
if ! is_cpu_vulnerable 2; then
|
|
# override status & msg in case CPU is not vulnerable after all
|
|
pvulnstatus $cve OK "your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not vulnerable"
|
|
elif [ -z "$msg" ]; then
|
|
# if msg is empty, sysfs check didn't fill it, rely on our own test
|
|
if [ "$retpoline" = 1 ] && [ "$retpoline_compiler" = 1 ]; then
|
|
pvulnstatus $cve OK "retpoline mitigates the vulnerability"
|
|
elif [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
|
|
if ( [ "$ibrs_enabled" = 1 ] || [ "$ibrs_enabled" = 2 ] ) && [ "$ibpb_enabled" = 1 ]; then
|
|
pvulnstatus $cve OK "IBRS/IBPB are mitigating the vulnerability"
|
|
elif ( [ "$ibrs_enabled" = 1 ] || [ "$ibrs_enabled" = 2 ] ) && [ "$ibpb_enabled" = -1 ]; then
|
|
# IBPB doesn't seem here on this kernel
|
|
pvulnstatus $cve OK "IBRS is mitigating the vulnerability"
|
|
elif [ "$ibpb_enabled" = 2 ]; then
|
|
pvulnstatus $cve OK "Full IBPB is mitigating the vulnerability"
|
|
elif [ "$ibrs_supported" = 1 ] && [ "$cpuid_spec_ctrl" != 1 ]; then
|
|
pvulnstatus $cve VULN "Your kernel is compiled with IBRS but your CPU microcode is lacking support to successfully mitigate the vulnerability"
|
|
else
|
|
pvulnstatus $cve VULN "IBRS hardware + kernel support OR kernel with retpoline are needed to mitigate the vulnerability"
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
if [ "$ibrs_supported" = 1 ]; then
|
|
pvulnstatus $cve OK "offline mode: IBRS/IBPB will mitigate the vulnerability if enabled at runtime"
|
|
elif [ "$ibrs_can_tell" = 1 ]; then
|
|
pvulnstatus $cve VULN "IBRS hardware + kernel support OR kernel with retpoline are needed to mitigate the vulnerability"
|
|
else
|
|
pvulnstatus $cve UNK "offline mode: not enough information"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
[ "$msg" = "Vulnerable" ] && msg="IBRS hardware + kernel support OR kernel with retpoline are needed to mitigate the vulnerability"
|
|
pvulnstatus $cve "$status" "$msg"
|
|
fi
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
########################
|
|
# MELTDOWN aka VARIANT 3
|
|
check_variant3()
|
|
{
|
|
_info "\033[1;34mCVE-2017-5754 [rogue data cache load] aka 'Meltdown' aka 'Variant 3'\033[0m"
|
|
|
|
status=UNK
|
|
sys_interface_available=0
|
|
msg=''
|
|
if sys_interface_check "/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/meltdown"; then
|
|
# this kernel has the /sys interface, trust it over everything
|
|
sys_interface_available=1
|
|
fi
|
|
if [ "$opt_sysfs_only" != 1 ]; then
|
|
_info_nol "* Kernel supports Page Table Isolation (PTI): "
|
|
kpti_support=0
|
|
kpti_can_tell=0
|
|
if [ -n "$opt_config" ]; then
|
|
kpti_can_tell=1
|
|
if grep -Eq '^(CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION|CONFIG_KAISER)=y' "$opt_config"; then
|
|
# shellcheck disable=SC2046
|
|
_debug 'kpti_support: found option '$(grep -E '^(CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION|CONFIG_KAISER)=y' "$opt_config")" in $opt_config"
|
|
kpti_support=1
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
if [ "$kpti_support" = 0 ] && [ -n "$opt_map" ]; then
|
|
# it's not an elif: some backports don't have the PTI config but still include the patch
|
|
# so we try to find an exported symbol that is part of the PTI patch in System.map
|
|
kpti_can_tell=1
|
|
if grep -qw kpti_force_enabled "$opt_map"; then
|
|
_debug "kpti_support: found kpti_force_enabled in $opt_map"
|
|
kpti_support=1
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
if [ "$kpti_support" = 0 ] && [ -n "$vmlinux" ]; then
|
|
# same as above but in case we don't have System.map and only vmlinux, look for the
|
|
# nopti option that is part of the patch (kernel command line option)
|
|
kpti_can_tell=1
|
|
if ! which strings >/dev/null 2>&1; then
|
|
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "missing 'strings' tool, please install it, usually it's in the binutils package"
|
|
else
|
|
if strings "$vmlinux" | grep -qw nopti; then
|
|
_debug "kpti_support: found nopti string in $vmlinux"
|
|
kpti_support=1
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [ "$kpti_support" = 1 ]; then
|
|
pstatus green YES
|
|
elif [ "$kpti_can_tell" = 1 ]; then
|
|
pstatus red NO
|
|
else
|
|
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't read your kernel configuration nor System.map file"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
mount_debugfs
|
|
_info_nol "* PTI enabled and active: "
|
|
if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
|
|
dmesg_grep="Kernel/User page tables isolation: enabled"
|
|
dmesg_grep="$dmesg_grep|Kernel page table isolation enabled"
|
|
dmesg_grep="$dmesg_grep|x86/pti: Unmapping kernel while in userspace"
|
|
if grep ^flags /proc/cpuinfo | grep -qw pti; then
|
|
# vanilla PTI patch sets the 'pti' flag in cpuinfo
|
|
_debug "kpti_enabled: found 'pti' flag in /proc/cpuinfo"
|
|
kpti_enabled=1
|
|
elif grep ^flags /proc/cpuinfo | grep -qw kaiser; then
|
|
# kernel line 4.9 sets the 'kaiser' flag in cpuinfo
|
|
_debug "kpti_enabled: found 'kaiser' flag in /proc/cpuinfo"
|
|
kpti_enabled=1
|
|
elif [ -e /sys/kernel/debug/x86/pti_enabled ]; then
|
|
# Red Hat Backport creates a dedicated file, see https://access.redhat.com/articles/3311301
|
|
kpti_enabled=$(cat /sys/kernel/debug/x86/pti_enabled 2>/dev/null)
|
|
_debug "kpti_enabled: file /sys/kernel/debug/x86/pti_enabled exists and says: $kpti_enabled"
|
|
fi
|
|
if [ -z "$kpti_enabled" ]; then
|
|
dmesg_grep "$dmesg_grep"; ret=$?
|
|
if [ $ret -eq 0 ]; then
|
|
_debug "kpti_enabled: found hint in dmesg: $dmesg_grepped"
|
|
kpti_enabled=1
|
|
elif [ $ret -eq 2 ]; then
|
|
_debug "kpti_enabled: dmesg truncated"
|
|
kpti_enabled=-1
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
if [ -z "$kpti_enabled" ]; then
|
|
_debug "kpti_enabled: couldn't find any hint that PTI is enabled"
|
|
kpti_enabled=0
|
|
fi
|
|
if [ "$kpti_enabled" = 1 ]; then
|
|
pstatus green YES
|
|
elif [ "$kpti_enabled" = -1 ]; then
|
|
pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "dmesg truncated, please reboot and relaunch this script"
|
|
else
|
|
pstatus red NO
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
pstatus blue N/A "can't verify if PTI is enabled in offline mode"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# no security impact but give a hint to the user in verbose mode
|
|
# about PCID/INVPCID cpuid features that must be present to avoid
|
|
# too big a performance impact with PTI
|
|
# refs:
|
|
# https://marc.info/?t=151532047900001&r=1&w=2
|
|
# https://groups.google.com/forum/m/#!topic/mechanical-sympathy/L9mHTbeQLNU
|
|
if [ "$opt_verbose" -ge 2 ]; then
|
|
_info "* Performance impact if PTI is enabled"
|
|
_info_nol " * CPU supports PCID: "
|
|
if grep ^flags /proc/cpuinfo | grep -qw pcid; then
|
|
pstatus green YES 'performance degradation with PTI will be limited'
|
|
else
|
|
pstatus blue NO 'no security impact but performance will be degraded with PTI'
|
|
fi
|
|
_info_nol " * CPU supports INVPCID: "
|
|
if grep ^flags /proc/cpuinfo | grep -qw invpcid; then
|
|
pstatus green YES 'performance degradation with PTI will be limited'
|
|
else
|
|
pstatus blue NO 'no security impact but performance will be degraded with PTI'
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
elif [ "$sys_interface_available" = 0 ]; then
|
|
# we have no sysfs but were asked to use it only!
|
|
msg="/sys vulnerability interface use forced, but it's not available!"
|
|
status=UNK
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Test if the current host is a Xen PV Dom0 / DomU
|
|
if [ -d "/proc/xen" ]; then
|
|
# XXX do we have a better way that relying on dmesg?
|
|
dmesg_grep 'Booting paravirtualized kernel on Xen$'; ret=$?
|
|
if [ $ret -eq 2 ]; then
|
|
_warn "dmesg truncated, Xen detection will be unreliable. Please reboot and relaunch this script"
|
|
elif [ $ret -eq 0 ]; then
|
|
if [ -e /proc/xen/capabilities ] && grep -q "control_d" /proc/xen/capabilities; then
|
|
xen_pv_domo=1
|
|
else
|
|
xen_pv_domu=1
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
|
|
# checking whether we're running under Xen PV 64 bits. If yes, we are affected by variant3
|
|
# (unless we are a Dom0)
|
|
_info_nol "* Running as a Xen PV DomU: "
|
|
if [ "$xen_pv_domu" = 1 ]; then
|
|
pstatus red YES
|
|
else
|
|
pstatus green NO
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
cve='CVE-2017-5754'
|
|
if ! is_cpu_vulnerable 3; then
|
|
# override status & msg in case CPU is not vulnerable after all
|
|
pvulnstatus $cve OK "your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not vulnerable"
|
|
elif [ -z "$msg" ]; then
|
|
# if msg is empty, sysfs check didn't fill it, rely on our own test
|
|
if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
|
|
if [ "$kpti_enabled" = 1 ]; then
|
|
pvulnstatus $cve OK "PTI mitigates the vulnerability"
|
|
elif [ "$xen_pv_domo" = 1 ]; then
|
|
pvulnstatus $cve OK "Xen Dom0s are safe and do not require PTI"
|
|
elif [ "$xen_pv_domu" = 1 ]; then
|
|
pvulnstatus $cve VULN "Xen PV DomUs are vulnerable and need to be run in HVM, PVHVM, PVH mode, or the Xen hypervisor must have the Xen's own PTI patch"
|
|
else
|
|
pvulnstatus $cve VULN "PTI is needed to mitigate the vulnerability"
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
if [ "$kpti_support" = 1 ]; then
|
|
pvulnstatus $cve OK "offline mode: PTI will mitigate the vulnerability if enabled at runtime"
|
|
elif [ "$kpti_can_tell" = 1 ]; then
|
|
pvulnstatus $cve VULN "PTI is needed to mitigate the vulnerability"
|
|
else
|
|
pvulnstatus $cve UNK "offline mode: not enough information"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
if [ "$xen_pv_domo" = 1 ]; then
|
|
msg="Xen Dom0s are safe and do not require PTI"
|
|
status="OK"
|
|
elif [ "$xen_pv_domu" = 1 ]; then
|
|
msg="Xen PV DomUs are vulnerable and need to be run in HVM, PVHVM or PVH mode"
|
|
status="VULN"
|
|
elif [ "$msg" = "Vulnerable" ]; then
|
|
msg="PTI is needed to mitigate the vulnerability"
|
|
fi
|
|
pvulnstatus $cve "$status" "$msg"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Warn the user about XSA-254 recommended mitigations
|
|
if [ "$xen_pv_domo" = 1 ]; then
|
|
_warn
|
|
_warn "This host is a Xen Dom0. Please make sure that you are running your DomUs"
|
|
_warn "in HVM, PVHVM or PVH mode to prevent any guest-to-host / host-to-guest attacks."
|
|
_warn
|
|
_warn "See https://blog.xenproject.org/2018/01/22/xen-project-spectre-meltdown-faq-jan-22-update/ and XSA-254 for details."
|
|
fi
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
check_cpu
|
|
# now run the checks the user asked for
|
|
if [ "$opt_variant1" = 1 ] || [ "$opt_allvariants" = 1 ]; then
|
|
check_variant1
|
|
_info
|
|
fi
|
|
if [ "$opt_variant2" = 1 ] || [ "$opt_allvariants" = 1 ]; then
|
|
check_variant2
|
|
_info
|
|
fi
|
|
if [ "$opt_variant3" = 1 ] || [ "$opt_allvariants" = 1 ]; then
|
|
check_variant3
|
|
_info
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
_info "A false sense of security is worse than no security at all, see --disclaimer"
|
|
|
|
if [ "$opt_batch" = 1 ] && [ "$opt_batch_format" = "nrpe" ]; then
|
|
if [ ! -z "$nrpe_vuln" ]; then
|
|
echo "Vulnerable:$nrpe_vuln"
|
|
else
|
|
echo "OK"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [ "$opt_batch" = 1 ] && [ "$opt_batch_format" = "json" ]; then
|
|
_echo 0 "${json_output%?}]"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [ "$opt_batch" = 1 ] && [ "$opt_batch_format" = "prometheus" ]; then
|
|
echo "# TYPE specex_vuln_status untyped"
|
|
echo "# HELP specex_vuln_status Exposure of system to speculative execution vulnerabilities"
|
|
echo "$prometheus_output"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# exit with the proper exit code
|
|
[ "$global_critical" = 1 ] && exit 2 # critical
|
|
[ "$global_unknown" = 1 ] && exit 3 # unknown
|
|
exit 0 # ok
|