Based on a kernel patch that has been merged to Linus' tree.
Some of the detections we did by grepping the model name
will probably no longer be needed.
Implement detection of mitigation for Variant 1 that is
being pushed on vanilla kernel.
Current name of the patch:
"spectre variant1 mitigations for tip/x86/pti" (v6)
Also detect some distros that already backported this
patch without modifying the vulnerabilities sysfs hierarchy.
This detection is more reliable than the LFENCE one, trust
it and skip the LFENCE heuristic if a match is found.
The values used should be the ones that come from cpuinfo instead of
the test values. The following line will print the last tuple tested
instead of the actual values of the CPU.
Line 689: _debug "is_ucode_blacklisted: no ($model/$stepping/$ucode)"
Some Intel microcodes are known to cause instabilities
such as random reboots. Intel advises to revert to a
previous version if a newer one that fixes those issues
is not available. Detect such known bad microcodes.
In batch mode, $echo_cmd was not initialized early
enough, and caused this error:
./spectre-meltdown-checker.sh: 899: ./spectre-meltdown-checker.sh: -ne: not found
Fix it by initing echo_cmd unconditionally at the start
Move all the CPU checks to their own section,
for clarity. We now check for IBRS, IBPB, STIBP,
RDCL_NO and IBRS_ALL. We also show whether the
system CPU is vulnerable to the three variants,
regardless of the fact that mitigations are in
place or not, which is determined in each vuln-
specific section.
For variant3 under AMD, the debugfs vulnerabilities hierarchy
flags the system as Vulnerable, which is wrong. Trust our own
is_cpu_vulnerable() func in that case
When kernel is not compiled with retpoline option, doesn't
have the sysfs vulnerability hierarchy and our heuristic to
detect a retpoline-aware compiler didn't match, change result
for retpoline-aware compiler detection from UNKNOWN to NO.
When CONFIG_RETPOLINE is not set, a retpoline-aware compiler
won't produce different asm than a standard one anyway.
Before, when the /sys kernel vulnerability interface
was available, we would bypass all our tests and just
print the output of the vulnerability interface. Now,
we still rely on it when available, but we run our
checks anyway, except for variant 1 where the current
method of mitigation detection doesn't add much value
to the bare /sys check
In addition to IBRS (and microcode support), IBPB
must be used to mitigate variant 2, if retpoline
support is not available. The vulnerability status
of a system will be defined as "non vulnerable"
if IBRS and IBPB are both enabled, or if IBPB
is enabled with a value of 2 for RedHat kernels,
see https://access.redhat.com/articles/3311301
In offline mode, in the worst case where an invalid
config file is given, and we have no vmlinux image
nor System.map, the script was reporting Variant 2
and Variant 3 as vulnerable in the global status.
Replace this by a proper pair of UNKNOWNs
To avoid false negatives when looking for a message
in dmesg, we were previously also grepping in known
on-disk archives of dmesg (dmesg.log, kern.log).
This in turn caused false positives because we have no
guarantee that we're grepping the dmesg of the current
running kernel. Hence we now only look in the live
`dmesg`, detect if it has been truncated, and report
it to the user.
