mirror of
https://github.com/speed47/spectre-meltdown-checker
synced 2024-11-06 22:23:41 +01:00
feat(sysfs): print details even with sysfs
Before, when the /sys kernel vulnerability interface was available, we would bypass all our tests and just print the output of the vulnerability interface. Now, we still rely on it when available, but we run our checks anyway, except for variant 1 where the current method of mitigation detection doesn't add much value to the bare /sys check
This commit is contained in:
Stéphane Lesimple
parent
443d9a2ae9
commit
ff5c92fa6f
@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ show_usage()
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--no-color Don't use color codes
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--verbose, -v Increase verbosity level
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--no-sysfs Don't use the /sys interface even if present
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--sysfs-only Only use the /sys interface, don't run our own checks
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--coreos Special mode for CoreOS (use an ephemeral toolbox to inspect kernel)
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--batch text Produce machine readable output, this is the default if --batch is specified alone
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--batch json Produce JSON output formatted for Puppet, Ansible, Chef...
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@ -91,6 +92,7 @@ opt_variant2=0
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opt_variant3=0
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opt_allvariants=1
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opt_no_sysfs=0
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opt_sysfs_only=0
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opt_coreos=0
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global_critical=0
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@ -343,6 +345,9 @@ while [ -n "$1" ]; do
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elif [ "$1" = "--no-sysfs" ]; then
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opt_no_sysfs=1
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shift
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elif [ "$1" = "--sysfs-only" ]; then
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opt_sysfs_only=1
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shift
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elif [ "$1" = "--coreos" ]; then
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opt_coreos=1
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shift
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@ -404,6 +409,11 @@ done
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show_header
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if [ "$opt_no_sysfs" = 1 -a "$opt_sysfs_only" = 1 ]; then
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_warn "Incompatible options specified (--no-sysfs and --sysfs-only), aborting"
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exit 255
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fi
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# print status function
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pstatus()
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{
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@ -771,7 +781,7 @@ _info
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sys_interface_check()
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{
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[ "$opt_live" = 1 -a "$opt_no_sysfs" = 0 -a -r "$1" ] || return 1
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_info_nol "* Checking whether we're safe according to the /sys interface: "
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_info_nol "* Mitigated according to the /sys interface: "
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if grep -qi '^not affected' "$1"; then
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# Not affected
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status=OK
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@ -805,7 +815,7 @@ check_variant1()
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if sys_interface_check "/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v1"; then
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# this kernel has the /sys interface, trust it over everything
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sys_interface_available=1
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else
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elif [ "$opt_sysfs_only" != 1 ]; then
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# no /sys interface (or offline mode), fallback to our own ways
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_info_nol "* Checking count of LFENCE opcodes in kernel: "
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if [ -n "$vmlinux_err" ]; then
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@ -835,6 +845,10 @@ check_variant1()
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fi
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fi
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fi
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else
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# we have no sysfs but were asked to use it only!
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msg="/sys vulnerability interface use forced, but it's not available!"
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status=UNK
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fi
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# if we have the /sys interface, don't even check is_cpu_vulnerable ourselves, the kernel already does it
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@ -860,7 +874,8 @@ check_variant2()
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if sys_interface_check "/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2"; then
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# this kernel has the /sys interface, trust it over everything
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sys_interface_available=1
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else
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fi
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if [ "$opt_sysfs_only" != 1 ]; then
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_info "* Mitigation 1"
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_info " * Hardware support (CPU microcode)"
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_info " * Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation (IBRS)"
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@ -1109,13 +1124,22 @@ check_variant2()
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# See gcc commit https://github.com/hjl-tools/gcc/commit/23b517d4a67c02d3ef80b6109218f2aadad7bd79
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# In latest retpoline LKML patches, the noretpoline_setup symbol exists only if CONFIG_RETPOLINE is set
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# *AND* if the compiler is retpoline-compliant, so look for that symbol
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if [ -n "$opt_map" ]; then
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if [ -e "/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2" ]; then
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if grep -qw Minimal /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2; then
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pstatus red NO "kernel reports minimal retpoline compilation"
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elif grep -qw Full /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2; then
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retpoline_compiler=1
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pstatus green YES "kernel reports full retpoline compilation"
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else
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pstatus yellow UNKNOWN
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fi
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elif [ -n "$opt_map" ]; then
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# look for the symbol
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if grep -qw noretpoline_setup "$opt_map"; then
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retpoline_compiler=1
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pstatus green YES "noretpoline_setup symbol found in System.map"
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else
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pstatus red NO
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pstatus yellow UNKNOWN
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fi
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elif [ -n "$vmlinux" ]; then
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# look for the symbol
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@ -1125,7 +1149,7 @@ check_variant2()
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retpoline_compiler=1
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pstatus green YES "noretpoline_setup found in vmlinux symbols"
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else
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pstatus red NO
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pstatus yellow UNKNOWN
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fi
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elif grep -q noretpoline_setup "$vmlinux"; then
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# if we don't have nm, nevermind, the symbol name is long enough to not have
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@ -1133,40 +1157,46 @@ check_variant2()
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retpoline_compiler=1
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pstatus green YES "noretpoline_setup found in vmlinux"
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else
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pstatus red NO
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pstatus yellow UNKNOWN
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fi
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else
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pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't find your kernel image or System.map"
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fi
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elif [ "$sys_interface_available" = 0 ]; then
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# we have no sysfs but were asked to use it only!
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msg="/sys vulnerability interface use forced, but it's not available!"
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status=UNK
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fi
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cve='CVE-2017-5715'
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# if we have the /sys interface, don't even check is_cpu_vulnerable ourselves, the kernel already does it
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if [ "$sys_interface_available" = 0 ] && ! is_cpu_vulnerable 2; then
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# override status & msg in case CPU is not vulnerable after all
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pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5715 OK "your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not vulnerable"
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pvulnstatus $cve OK "your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not vulnerable"
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elif [ -z "$msg" ]; then
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# if msg is empty, sysfs check didn't fill it, rely on our own test
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if [ "$retpoline" = 1 -a "$retpoline_compiler" = 1 ]; then
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pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5715 OK "retpoline mitigate the vulnerability"
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pvulnstatus $cve OK "retpoline mitigates the vulnerability"
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elif [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
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if [ "$ibrs_enabled" = 1 -o "$ibrs_enabled" = 2 ] && [ "$ibpb_enabled" = 1 ]; then
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pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5715 OK "IBRS/IBPB are mitigating the vulnerability"
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pvulnstatus $cve OK "IBRS/IBPB are mitigating the vulnerability"
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elif [ "$ibpb_enabled" = 2 ]; then
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pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5715 OK "Full IBPB is mitigating the vulnerability"
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pvulnstatus $cve OK "Full IBPB is mitigating the vulnerability"
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else
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pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5715 VULN "IBRS hardware + kernel support OR kernel with retpoline are needed to mitigate the vulnerability"
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pvulnstatus $cve VULN "IBRS hardware + kernel support OR kernel with retpoline are needed to mitigate the vulnerability"
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fi
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else
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if [ "$ibrs_supported" = 1 ]; then
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pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5715 OK "offline mode: IBRS/IBPB will mitigate the vulnerability if enabled at runtime"
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pvulnstatus $cve OK "offline mode: IBRS/IBPB will mitigate the vulnerability if enabled at runtime"
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elif [ "$ibrs_can_tell" = 1 ]; then
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pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5715 VULN "IBRS hardware + kernel support OR kernel with retpoline are needed to mitigate the vulnerability"
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pvulnstatus $cve VULN "IBRS hardware + kernel support OR kernel with retpoline are needed to mitigate the vulnerability"
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else
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pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5715 UNK "offline mode: not enough information"
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pvulnstatus $cve UNK "offline mode: not enough information"
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fi
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fi
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else
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pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5715 "$status" "$msg"
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[ "$msg" = "Vulnerable" ] && msg="IBRS hardware + kernel support OR kernel with retpoline are needed to mitigate the vulnerability"
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pvulnstatus $cve "$status" "$msg"
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fi
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}
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@ -1182,7 +1212,7 @@ check_variant3()
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if sys_interface_check "/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/meltdown"; then
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# this kernel has the /sys interface, trust it over everything
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sys_interface_available=1
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else
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elif [ "$opt_sysfs_only" != 1 ]; then
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_info_nol "* Kernel supports Page Table Isolation (PTI): "
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kpti_support=0
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kpti_can_tell=0
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@ -1292,7 +1322,7 @@ check_variant3()
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if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
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# checking whether we're running under Xen PV 64 bits. If yes, we're not affected by variant3
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_info_nol "* Checking if we're running under Xen PV (64 bits): "
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_info_nol "* Running under Xen PV (64 bits): "
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if [ "$(uname -m)" = "x86_64" ]; then
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# XXX do we have a better way that relying on dmesg?
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dmesg_grep 'Booting paravirtualized kernel on Xen$'; ret=$?
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@ -1308,6 +1338,10 @@ check_variant3()
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pstatus blue NO
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fi
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fi
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elif [ "$sys_interface_available" = 0 ]; then
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# we have no sysfs but were asked to use it only!
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msg="/sys vulnerability interface use forced, but it's not available!"
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status=UNK
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fi
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# if we have the /sys interface, don't even check is_cpu_vulnerable ourselves, the kernel already does it
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@ -1335,6 +1369,7 @@ check_variant3()
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fi
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fi
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else
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[ "$msg" = "Vulnerable" ] && msg="PTI is needed to mitigate the vulnerability"
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pvulnstatus $cve "$status" "$msg"
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fi
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}
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